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Executive summary 
  
Purpose of the study 
This study focuses on Dutch good governance policies implemented in Uganda between 2007 
and 2012. Its purpose is to learn more about the effectiveness of governance activities and 
about the potential problems connected to the implementation of such activities in a context 
of increasing executive dominance of the political system and enhanced electoral 
authoritarianism. The study analyses in more detail a set of governance projects implemented 
with financial support from the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Uganda: HURINET-U’s 
Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP), and ACODE’s Local Government 
Councils’ Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI). 
 
Main governance challenges in Uganda 
The main governance challenges related to justice, rule of law and decentralisation have 
arisen in Uganda since the mid-2000s against the increasingly authoritarian, personalistic and 
centralised character of governance in Uganda. This process involved the abolition of 
presidential term limits in 2005, the growing reluctance by the executive to fight corruption 
among senior and loyal political allies and the increasing use of force to retain power. Multi-
party politics was restored in 2005 as a result of domestic and international pressure. 
The major consequences of the changing political circumstances are threefold. Firstly, the 
need to ‘buy’ political support for parties (particularly the National Resistance Movement, 
NRM) has diverted increasingly large amounts of resources towards patronage. Secondly, the 
freedom of independent media houses, the judiciary and opposition politicians has been 
limited by the government in an effort to bolster its position. Finally, the decreasing reliance 
on development partners has made the government feel far less circumscribed in pursuing its 
domestic political agenda. 
The governance challenges related to justice and the rule of law are fourfold. First, the justice 
and law and order sector (JLOS) has increasingly been subject to capacity constraints as a 
consequence of neglect by the Government of Uganda, and has become increasingly reliant 
on development partner funding. Next, the prevalence of corruption among justice personnel 
is an important challenge. Thirdly, executive interference in judicial matters has become 
increasingly commonplace. Finally, the Government’s growing intolerance of opposition 
groups and critics has led to steady militarisation and politicisation of the Ugandan Police 
Force (UPF). 
In relation to decentralisation, there are three major governance challenges. First, the creation 
of parallel structures to local government institutions has resulted in a ‘parallel centralisation’ 
of decision making on local issues. Secondly, the doubling of the number of districts between 
2000 and 2015) for political purposes and the maintenance of patronage networks represents 
a major challenge to promoting more accountable and efficient local government. Thirdly, 
limited funding and capacity of local government structures and offices poses a major threat 
to decentralisation in the country. 
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Approach of the Dutch government, other Dutch agencies and other donors 
The approach of the Dutch government to Uganda was laid down in three Multi Annual 
Strategic Plans (MASPs), covering, respectively the 2005-2008, 2008-2011 and 2012-2015 
periods. Strategic choices for the 2005-2008 period included JLOS, human rights and 
decentralisation. The 2008-2011 period was marked by a change away from general budget 
support toward sector budget support for JLOS and education, linked to a more results-based 
approach. Next, policies were aimed at police reform and human rights. The 2012-2015 
period was marked by the move away from sector budget support in the light of concerns 
about corruption. Further support was provided to JLOS and the Democratic Governance 
Facility (DGF), while civil society in the justice and law and order sector was supported for 
promoting good governance and demanding accountability. Overall, aid commitments for 
democratisation, rule of law and control of corruption to Uganda amounted to almost US$580 
million between 2004 and 2012. The Netherlands was in the top 5 of donors for two sub-
fields: legal and judicial development and democratic participation and civil society. 
As part of the MFS programme, the Dutch government supported governance activities 
undertaken by Hivos, ICCO, OxfamNovib, SNV and the Uganda Governance Monitoring 
Platform, which brought together five Dutch and 19 Ugandan partner organisations. The 
Netherlands has also supported the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD) through the 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). Since good governance was 
dropped as a separate issue area for Dutch development policy, special programmes have 
been ended and the issue has been integrated into other programmes, e.g. as creating an 
enabling environment for private sector programmes. 
Of other donors, Denmark has been playing a central role in financing activities aimed at 
good governance promotion, particularly in the field of democratic participation and civil 
society, through its support for the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) and DGF. 
External support for JLOS comes from, among others, Austria, Denmark, the European 
Union, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, the United Kingdom 
and the World Bank), which are brought together in the JLOS Development Partners Group. 
 
The relevance of Dutch activities in the light of governance challenges and activities of 
other donors 
Data on Dutch commitments to Uganda suggest that major programme funding from The 
Netherlands has tried to address several of the issues identified as major governance 
challenges in the justice sector and local government, among others by providing support to 
JLOS. Yet, it is also clear that the major governance challenges – such as grand-scale 
corruption, executive interference, militarisation of the police force, parallel centralisation 
and district proliferation – are not addressed directly by The Netherlands. 
The activities in the justice sector and decentralisation supported by the Dutch government 
and the Netherlands Embassy in Kampala were largely complementary to those of other 
Dutch agencies, such as the partners in the Dutch co-financing system (Hivos, ICCO, 
OxfamNovib and SNV) and the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy. 
The approach to governance challenges by the international donor community has been 
characterised by coordination and collaboration among donors. The Netherlands has been an 
important contributor to activities on democratic participation and civil society, and legal and 
judicial development. The activities of three main programmes focused on the strengthening 
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of democracy and the legal system (DDP, DGF and JLOS) are the witness of the common 
endeavours of the international community in Uganda. 
 
Insights from evaluations on Dutch good governance projects  
Available evaluations on Dutch good governance projects related to the Deepening 
Democracy Programme (DDP), the Local Governance Development Project (LGDP) 2000-
2007, and the Justice, Law and Order Sector. The evaluation studies do not provide insights 
on the extent to which good governance projects have contributed to objectives such as 
poverty reduction or economic growth. With regard to the contribution of the projects to 
governance objectives (such as democratic participation, improved rule of law, more control 
of corruption, and a more transparent and accountable government), evaluation studies 
suggest that the three projects have played a positive role. DDP-supported interventions were 
found to be important for the integrity of elections and the nature of civic engagement. The 
LGDP activities were successful and bore many fruits, ranging from infrastructure and 
services to enhanced capacity of local governments. The projects paved the way for a sector 
wide approach to decentralization. The outcomes of LGDP, however, were not sustainable as 
some of the project effects dissipated over time. The JLOS programme has been able to 
improve the functioning of the sector in many ways: new laws enacted, better prisons, 
improvements in police facilities, capacity building to fight corruption, etc.  
 
HURINET: Police Accountability and Reform Project 
The Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP), implemented by Human Rights 
Network Uganda (HURINET-U), aimed to improve accountability and democratic 
governance within the Uganda Police services in close cooperation with civil society 
organisations. Target groups of the various activities differed from police officers, to 
representatives of the media, students, members of parliament and leaders of civil society 
organisations. Most activities were workshops aiming to create rapport between the police 
and a variety of social actors, and took the form of ‘dialogues’. Next to this, activities 
undertaken as part of the PARP were aimed at creating awareness about the impending 
changes in the Ugandan public order management regime. Research on the impact of PARP 
consisted of two parts. A survey among 600 police officers was used to find out whether 
officers who had participated in HURINET’s activities respond differently from non-
participants to real-life cases describing undesired police behaviour. In-depth interviews were 
held with 23 high-ranking police functionaries to gauge the impact of HURINET activities in 
day-to-day police operations. 
The survey among police officers has demonstrated a marked difference between the views 
on proper policing of those who participated in HURINET activities and those who did not 
take part. The results show that participants judge adherence to the official code of policing 
as more important than non-participating officers, evaluate situations of undue advantage, 
bribery and fraud more critically, are more likely to register complaints against the police, are 
less likely to discharge reports of severe crimes, and disapprove of the undue use of force by 
the police. The impact of HURINET activities appears most pronounced in relation to police 
officers’ attitudes and ethical judgements about undesired practices. Differences were much 
smaller when questions were asked about the likelihood that police officers would actually 
report misbehaviour by colleagues. Overall, the findings of the survey suggest that 
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organisational and internal structural dynamics of the police have an important bearing on the 
perceptions and work practices of police officers. 
Notably, HURINET’s activities appear to have been successful in diffusing knowledge about 
proper policing, as demonstrated by the findings that cases of more severe misbehaviour are 
judged more negatively and the differences between participants and non-participants of 
HURINET’s activities are most pronounced in those cases. The most pronounced differences 
were found in cases related to the treatment of arrested persons, suspects, thieves and persons 
who filed a complaint; this seems indicative of the human rights agenda of HURINET, which 
appears to have resulted in better knowledge of appropriate policing among police officers 
who participated in HURINET activities. 
The survey results indicate that, even when the rules about good policing are known and are 
officially in place, police officers do not fully comply with these rules. The self-assessment of 
their own behaviour indicates that individual police officers do not live up completely to the 
official standards of good policing. This suggests that official standards are only partially 
enforced, and leave room for individual officers to interpret the rules to their own advantage. 
The results of the in-depth, qualitative interviews largely confirm the findings of the survey 
in the sense that the knowledge and attitudes of police officers in districts targeted by PARP 
were in conformity with the intended changes of the police project. Further, the responses by 
police officers indicate that the normative beliefs about proper police behaviour have been 
adjusted. Replies to questions about the involvement of civil-society organisations in police-
oriented activities suggest furthermore that attitudes among police officers about those 
organisations have been impacted favourably by PARP activities. 
 
ACODE: Local Government Councils’ Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI) 
The Local Government Councils’ Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI) was set up in 2009 with 
support from the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP), a basket fund for supporting 
initiatives for improved democratic governance in Uganda, which was funded by, among 
others, The Netherlands. LGCSCI aims to assess the performance of district councils and 
councillors on the basis of a scorecard, provide feedback reports on those assessments, and 
organise capacity building for councils, councillors and citizens. Research on the LGCSCI 
was performed on the basis of administrative service-delivery data at the district level and 
data on citizens’ perceptions of the quality of local democracy and governance from the 
Afrobarometer, as well as interviews and discussions with local government councillors, 
LGCSCI researchers and citizens.  
District-level administrative data indicate that districts participating in the scorecard initiative 
spend, on average, less of their budgets than districts that are not part of LGCSCI, and return 
a larger share of their budget to the central government. This finding appears to be caused by 
the fact that the LGCSCI has resulted in a stronger sense of accountability among local 
government councils. Afrobarometer data indicate that the scorecard initiative has had 
negligible effects on the perceived performance of local councillors, although councillors in 
scorecard districts are generally seen to be less corrupt than councillors in other parts of the 
country.  
Interviews and focus group discussions with a range of participants and observers show that 
the political economy of local government exerts a major influence on the functioning of 
local councils. In particular, the dependence of local governments on central government 
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funds reduces the effectiveness of local-level activities. The scorecard initiative appears to 
have had very limited influence on citizens’ consciousness of public affairs in their district, as 
few citizens are aware of the scorecard’s philosophy and seem to know only about the 
ranking of local councillors. Further, the scorecard has not resulted in greater demand by 
citizens for better services. Interviews and focus group discussions indicated that the 
introduction of the scorecard has mainly resulted in a better understanding among local 
councillors of their roles and responsibilities. 
 
Conclusions 
A central finding of this study is that demand-side governance programmes are vulnerable to 
the political-economy realities in Uganda. The resources that are controlled by the incumbent 
political elite are being used as instruments to guarantee regime survival and maintain 
political control over society. As a consequence of this control over resources, the activities 
of Ugandan civil society and international agencies aimed at stimulating the demand for 
governance reform are sometimes rendered less effective or even outright ineffective. 
 
Although the restrictions following from the Ugandan political economy may impede the 
impact of governance reform programmes in the short- to medium-term, it is by no means 
evident that such limits should lead to the cancellation of demand-side programmes. Despite 
the dominance of the executive, the existence of strong civil-society organisations is a likely 
positive political force in the long run. In order to maintain such vibrant civil society, 
providing support is necessary even if short-term effectiveness is limited.  
 
The research also points at a paradoxical feature of the demand-side governance programmes 
that have been implemented in Uganda. While the objective of the programmes has very 
explicitly been the strengthening of the demand for governance reform, many of the concrete 
actions – such as the activities organised by HURINET for the police and the assessment of 
the performance of local government councillors – were in fact oriented towards supply-side 
actors. As a result of such bias, the impact of the activities on the Ugandan citizenry seems to 
have been neglected. The consequence of this is that citizen awareness of the roles and 
responsibilities of public servants has not been enhanced, and that the target group of 
demand-side programmes (police officers and local councillors) have not become 
significantly more attuned to engaging the citizenry on their grievances and expectations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 From supply- to demand-side governance programmes 
 
The Netherlands has had a long-standing development cooperation relationship with Uganda. 
Reflecting a broader trend within the international donor community, substantial aid flows 
have been allocated to governance-related activities since the turn of the century. From 2006 
to 2013, The Netherlands spent a total of US$ 114.1 million on activities related to 
government and civil society. This was roughly 40 per cent of all bilateral assistance provide 
by the Dutch government to Uganda (OECD 2015).1 
 
Traditionally, a substantial portion of governance-related aid was spent on so-called ‘supply-
side’ governance activities, related to state institutions such as Parliament, the judiciary and 
the security sector (army and police). The idea behind such supply-side support was that the 
quality of governance would be enhanced by improving the quality of institutions and 
training the individuals occupying positions within state institutions. Changes in thinking 
about the nature of governance reform, reflected among others in the attention to issues of 
ownership and accountability in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, led to an 
emphasis of the importance of ‘demand-side’ governance activities, focusing on the 
strengthening of citizens’ groups and other civil-society organisations in order to empower 
them to ‘demand’ governance reform from their governments. The World Bank’s 
programmes on ‘demand for good governance’ were among the leading ones reflecting the 
more general trend of refocusing governance programmes to the demand side (cf. World 
Bank 2013). 
 
For The Netherlands, the increased focus on demand-side governance support within the 
donor community was a reinforcement of earlier trends to supporting civil society 
organisations in partner developing countries, both from bilateral development assistance 
funds and from the funds that had been allocated to private development organisations 
through the co-financing programme. With regard to Uganda, the attention to demand-side 
governance activities coincided with and was reinforced by increased scepticism about the 
Museveni-led government in the country, which was felt to turn increasingly authoritarian 
and less accountable during the second half of the previous decade. In particular, the increase 
of so-called supplementary budgets under control of the Ugandan executive, in contravention 
of the country’s Public Financial Management Act, resulted in a revision of the Dutch 
approach to supporting the Ugandan government directly through budget-support 
arrangements (Daily Monitor 2012). Demand-side governance activities were felt to be 
needed in order to enhance the capacity of Ugandan society to call for greater accountability 
from the government. 
 
This country study of Dutch good governance policies focuses on a set of governance 
projects implemented with financial support from the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Uganda. 
The purpose of the country study is to learn more about the effectiveness of governance 
activities and about the potential problems connected to the implementation of such activities 
in a context of increasing executive dominance of the political system and enhanced electoral 
authoritarianism. 
                                                 
1 OECD figures on commitments and disbursements by The Netherlands may differ from figures obtained from 
Piramide (the Management Information System used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) since different 
categorisations are being used. 
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1.2 Methodology of the country study 
 
Work for this country study took place in two phases, organised on the basis of the Terms of 
Reference (see Appendix A). The inception phase was completed between May and October 
2014; the field work phase took place from April until July 2015. 
 
The inception phase consisted of desk research, interviews in The Netherlands and field work 
related to the activities of HURINET and ACODE and other actors in the governance domain 
in Uganda. Various methods of data collection were applied in order to triangulate findings 
on the basis of different types of sources. 
 
Desk research in the orientation phase consisted of the analysis of documents from the 
archives of the Dutch Embassy in Kampala, the analysis of scholarly work on governance in 
Uganda and the analysis of policy documents (Multi-Annual Strategic Plans pertaining to the 
2005-2015 period and documents produced by other Dutch agencies and other donors). 
Further, interviews were held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Appendix B, section B1) 
and information was obtained from key informants at various Dutch agencies. 
 
A first phase of field work in Uganda took place in May 2014 and consisted of interviews 
with individuals or groups of staff members at the Dutch Embassy in Uganda, HURINET-U 
and ACODE, as well as representative of a set of other governmental and non-governmental 
organisations working in the governance domain in Uganda (see Appendix B, sections B1-
B4). 
 
The field work phase of the project applied a variety of methods of data collection and 
analysis. In this phase, further desk research was done, while both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques were used to collect data on the ground in Uganda. 
 
Desk research in the field work phase involved the reanalysis of evaluations of projects and 
programmes in the domains of democratisation, rule of law and control of corruption. The 
purpose of the reanalysis was to find out what had been identified as factors explaining the 
(lack of) effectiveness of certain interventions that were aimed at governance reform in 
Uganda. The findings of the reanalysis are included in chapter 3 of this report. 
 
Quantitative research techniques were used to establish the impact of the Police 
Accountability and Reform Project (PARP), implemented by HURINET, and the Local 
Government Councils’ Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI), implemented by ACODE. In order to 
assess the impact of the PARP, a vignette-based survey was set up and administered among 
600 police officers in Uganda. The results of the survey are presented and analysed in section 
4.3. In relation to LGCSCI, quantitative data were obtained from the Ugandan Ministry of 
Local Government’s annual assessment of the performance of local councils, and from the 
Afrobarometer. The results of the analysis of these data are presented in section 5.3.1. 
 
Qualitative research in Uganda consisted of two parts. The first part related to PARP and 
involved interviews with police officers about the functioning of the Ugandan Police Force in 
general and their knowledge of and experience with PARP. The interviews served to get a 
better understanding of actual attitudes (and possibly behaviour) of police officers in Uganda. 
The findings of the interviews are reported in section 4.3.5. 
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The second element of qualitative research focused on the implementation of the demand-
side oriented LGCSCI and ACODE’s Citizens’ Budget Tracking and Information Centre 
(CBTIC) and consisted of two main sets of activities.2 First, interviews were held with 
representatives of relevant organisations that are involved in the implementation of LGCSCI 
and CBTIC, in order to get a better understanding of the political and political-economy 
context in which both projects were implemented. Secondly, interviews and focus-group 
discussions were organised in three districts where LGCSCI and CBTIC have been 
implemented. Those activities involved a range of actors at the local level, including 
councillors, administrative staff and citizens. The results of the analysis of the qualitative data 
are included in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. 
 
                                                 
2 The research as part of the project placed most emphasis on the score card initiative (LGCSCI) since the state 
of implementation of this initiative provided better opportunities to assess the nature of demand-side governance 
activities in Uganda undertaken by The Netherlands. 
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2. Good governance promotion in Uganda 
 
2.1 Main governance challenges related to justice, rule of law and 
decentralisation 
(TOR question 3.1) 
 
2.1.1 Background and overview 
 
The Uganda inherited by the current Government of Uganda (GoU) in January 1986 was one 
where few citizens had access to state justice institutions and where the rule of law itself 
featured largely as a fiction for most of the population. The brutal and personalistic 
dictatorships of Idi Amin (1972-1979) and Milton Obote (1980-1985) coupled with the 
prolonged civil war (1980-1986) which brought Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance 
Army/Movement (NRA/M) to power lead to most of Uganda’s state structures, including 
those of the justice sector, shrinking and collapsing. The highly centralised and sectarian 
regimes of Uganda’s post-independence history had also jealously opposed any meaningful 
devolution of power to the country’s regions and former kingdoms, particularly that of the 
comparatively wealthy southern Buganda kingdom, since Obote’s abolition of these polities 
and Uganda’s federal system during his first period in office in 1966 (Golooba-Mutebi and 
Hickey 2013). 
 
Determined to introduce ‘fundamental change’ to the manner in which Uganda was ruled and 
mindful of his new government’s relatively small regional support base, Museveni introduced 
a radically decentralised system of governance during the NRM’s early years in power. This 
focused around devolving substantial powers to local ‘Resistance Councils’ (RCs; ‘Local 
Councils’ from 1996) established first in areas captured by the NRA during the civil war. 
These RCs existed at five levels – from village to district – and each was elected by its 
subordinate, drawing its authority ultimately from local communities voting for its lowest 
rung (Kasfir 1998, 2005). Though this occurred within the so-called ‘Movement system’ 
(1986-2005) whereby individuals could stand for office only on their individual merit and not 
on a party platform, the GoU’s early decentralisation policies were praised by many 
commentators (Mamdani 1996; Langseth et al. 1997). 
 
Similar radicalism and commitment was less apparent in the GoU’s formative approaches to 
the justice sector where initial investment and interest from Kampala remained more limited. 
A raft of legislation and reforms were nevertheless introduced in the later 1990s and early 
2000s – with the support of a range of donors – to enhance the justice sector’s capacity and 
independence, to increase access to justice – particularly at the local level – and to tackle 
systemic bureaucratic and political corruption within the sector which had become endemic 
by the time the GoU came to power and has continued so into its tenure. 
 
It is against this backdrop that this section will delineate the key challenges in the areas of 
justice/rule of law and decentralisation in Uganda for the period of the evaluation, 2007-
2014. It will also briefly comment on the extent to which the GoU has been willing to address 
these challenges. In doing so, the historical problems of limited capacity and systemic 
corruption will be highlighted. Critically, however, it is crucial to highlight the degree to 
which the GoU’s own evolving regime maintenance imperatives have not only limited its 
commitment to addressing such issues but also produced many of the most significant 
challenges in these areas in recent years. This is a consequence of fundamental shifts in 
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Uganda’s political economy since the mid-2000s which have led the GoU to focus 
increasingly on patronage and violence, as opposed to service delivery and support from 
Western donors, as its main strategy for retaining power.  
 
This section will therefore first outline the changing nature of these regime maintenance 
imperatives in order to place in context the subsequent consideration of key governance 
challenges to both the justice sector and decentralisation and the GoU’s willingness to 
address these challenges.  
 
While this will be undertaken from a national perspective, it is vital to acknowledge the very 
different experience of northern Uganda, a region which emerged from decades of conflict 
between the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan state in only 2006. Governed de 
facto by military commanders during parts of the 1990s and 2000s, this region’s experience 
with decentralisation under the NRM has been very different from others in the country 
(Dolan 2009). The devastation of war has also exacerbated the capacity issues prevalent in 
the national justice sector overall far more here than elsewhere. This has nevertheless meant 
that other justice institutions – notably ‘traditional justice’ mechanisms – have often taken on 
much more significance and authority for many in the north (Allen 2006, 2010). Reconciling 
these established and locally legitimate mechanisms with those formal, and locally alien, 
justice structures of the state therefore represents a particular governance challenge in this 
part of contemporary Uganda.  
 
 
2.1.2 Shifting regime maintenance imperatives and their effects on governance 
 
During its first two decades in power (1986-c.2005), the Museveni government sought to 
foster broad national support for its continued tenure through bringing a range of former 
political leaders and groups into a ‘broad-based government’, incorporating defeated and 
surrendered rebel groups into the new Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and 
restoring, in 1993, five of the kingdoms abolished by Obote in the 1960s, albeit as ‘cultural’ 
rather than a political institutions (Johanssen 2005; Khadiagala 1995; Tripp 2010: 140-142).3 
This occurred under a ‘no-party’ dispensation where political parties were banned and 
Ugandans stood for office individually as members of the national ‘Movement System’ 
(Kasfir 1998, 2000). 
 
The GoU also worked hard to secure the support and assistance of the international donor 
community in its formative years, even abandoning statist economic policies in 1987 and 
wholeheartedly adopting IFI-recommended adjustment reforms by 1992 to do so (Brett 
1996). To some extent, the very substantial injections of development aid (a significant part 
of which came to be delivered through General Budget Support by the early 2000s) 
encouraged the GoU to pursue ‘donor-friendly’ policies focusing on service provision, 
healthcare and poverty reduction (Mosley 2012). As Alan Whitworth, Tim Williamson and 
others have convincingly argued, however, the GoU itself (particularly President Museveni 
and senior officials within the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MFPED)) was a primary mover of many of these approaches (Whitworth and Williamson 
2010; Whitworth 2010). Indeed, a range of policies which later received high praise from 
                                                 
3 Aside from Buganda, the other four kingdoms restored were those of Toro (south western Uganda), Bunyoro 
(western), Busoga (south eastern) and Ankole (south western). Other self-styled kingdoms, including Bamasaba, 
remain  unrecognized by the state at present.  
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development partners, notably decentralisation and the introduction of Universal Primary 
Education in 1996, were initially opposed by this community for fear of their perceived 
radicalism and unaffordability.4 
 
By the mid-2000s, however, Uganda’s Movement system had atrophied as an increasingly 
authoritarian Museveni sought to personalise and centralise the governance of Uganda. This 
process involved the abolition of presidential term limits in 2005, the growing reluctance by 
State House to condemn or restrict involvement in high-level corruption activities by senior 
and loyal political allies and the increasing use of force (notably during the 2001 general 
election) to retain power (Gloppen et al. 2006: 21-22; Tangri 2005; Tangri and Mwenda 
2010; Tripp 2010). A desire to streamline the GoU’s political operation, coupled with some 
domestic and international pressure, led to the restoration of multi-party politics in 2005 
(Makara et al. 2009). The post-2005 multiparty era, as Sam Hickey notes, has also coincided 
with the GoU’s decreasing reliance on its traditional Western development partners as 
financiers, with the role of China becoming steadily more significant in recent years and the 
discovery of oil reserves in western Uganda in 2006 providing alternative revenue sources 
(Hickey 2013). 
 
There have been three major consequences of these changing circumstances which are 
relevant to this part of the evaluation. Firstly, the opening-up of the political system has 
increased the ‘cost’ of ‘buying’ political support for parties (particularly the NRM) at local 
and national level leading the GoU to divert increasingly large amounts of resources towards 
patronage to retain the support of key communities and ‘gatekeeper’ individuals; a process 
Joel Barkan has referred to as ‘inflationary patronage’ (Barkan 2011). Secondly, perceived 
competition from opposition parties (and, indeed, internal NRM challengers) has encouraged 
the GoU to pursue increasingly discriminatory and violent approaches to independent media 
houses, the judiciary and opposition politicians themselves in an effort to bolster its position 
(Anderson and Fisher forthcoming). 
 
Finally, the decreasing reliance on development partners has made the GoU feel far less 
circumscribed in pursuing its domestic political agenda. This has meant greater impunity 
being afforded to NRM/pro-NRM politicians and business leaders involved in corruption 
scandals as well as GoU support for populist and discriminatory legislation, including the 
2014 Anti-Homosexuality Bill (Titeca 2014). At a general level, however, it has allowed the 
GoU to move away from poverty reduction and service provision as its key foci and for State 
House to increasingly override the objections of MFPED officials whose authority derived to 
a considerable degree from their close relationships with development partners. Instead, as 
Hickey has shown, the GoU has turned steadily towards supporting economic growth and 
investment in the ‘productive sectors of the economy’ (notably natural resource extraction, 
manufacturing and ICT) as its primary developmental focus with state support for the Justice, 
Law and Order Sector (JLOS), among others, largely deprioritised in the process (Hickey 
2013), with the exception of the Uganda Police Force, see para 2.2.3 D). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Author interview with former donor officials based in Kampala during the mid-1980s and early 1990s, 
London, Washington and Kampala, 2009-2010. 
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2.1.3 Justice and Rule of Law in Uganda: Governance challenges and the GoU’s 
approach to dealing with these 
 
A. Capacity constraints 
 
The JLOS has traditionally been dramatically under-resourced in Uganda, in terms of 
manpower, physical premises (courts, prisons etc.), training for judges and lawyers and 
accessibility to civilians physically and financially (through legal aid, paralegals etc.) (World 
Bank 2009) Access to justice has been particularly curtailed for those in conflict-affected 
areas (northern Ugandans largely relied on ‘traditional justice’ institutions during the 1986-
2006 conflict in the region), those in rural areas and for women and children.  
 
The GoU has, nevertheless, introduced a range of institutions and reforms during the 2000s 
(in partnership with donors) to address many of these challenges including creation of 
coordination bodies for the criminal justice system, family and children courts, Local Court 
Councils and the Judicial Service Commission (whose responsibility is to educate Ugandan 
civilians on justice matters, advise the President on judicial appointments and oversee 
disciplinary procedures within the justice sector, including removal of judges). Authority to 
decide on a range of issues has also been devolved to Magistrates’ Courts during the 2000s to 
deal with growing backlogs in caseload (World Bank 2009). 
 
Investment in the prisons sector and human resource field, however, remains limited and the 
GoU has remained deeply ambivalent about the role of traditional institutions in northern 
Uganda’s judicial sphere, in spite of the greater trust many civilians have in these 
mechanisms compared to those of the state (Allen 2006, 2010). A growing challenge in the 
JLOS sector, however, is its growing neglect by the GoU in the latter’s move towards 
investing in more ‘growth-focused’ sectors (see above) – a development which has 
exacerbated the backlog issue. An emerging challenge in this regard, therefore, relates to the 
growing reliance of the JLOS on development partner funding to function - an issue which 
not only undermines Ugandan ownership of JLOS but also makes this sector particularly 
vulnerable to shifts in the political economy of international funding patterns.  
 
B. Corruption 
 
Another longstanding challenge to the provision of efficient, effective and equitable justice in 
Uganda has been the prevalence of corruption among justice personnel before and since the 
contemporary Museveni era. The current GoU initially demonstrated significant commitment 
to tackling this systemic problem – within and outside the judiciary - through the 
establishment of a range of investigative and oversight bodies during the 1990s and early 
2000s tasked with identifying corrupt practices, from the top downwards, including the 
Inspectorate-General of Government (Tangri and Mwenda 2006; Watt et al. 1999). This 
practice has continued into the present day with the opening of an Anti-Corruption Court 
(established in 2009) in 2013 (CMI 2013; NTV Uganda 09/01/2014).   
 
These institutions have a mixed record with a range of senior GoU officials and Museveni 
advisers investigated by them (leading, on some occasions, to their arrest and imprisonment) 
since the late 1990s including Museveni’s brother Salim Saleh and former close ally Jim 
Muhwezi, Ugandan foreign minister (Sam Kutesa), health minister (Mike Mukula) and 
former vice president (Gilbert Bukenya). As Roger Tangri, Andrew Mwenda and others have 
shown, however, the GoU has increasingly manipulated and interfered with these institutions’ 
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work to ensure that they ‘punish’ officials out of favour and absolve those close to the 
presidency (Tangri and Mwenda 2013). Moreover, the demands of ‘inflationary patronage’ 
(see above) since the mid-2000s have lead the GoU to increasingly sanction and even engage 
in corrupt practices at the local and national level to retain the support of key stakeholders 
and mobilisers (Tangri and Mwenda 2008, 2013). This has, naturally, rendered its 
commitment to tackling corrupt practices, within JLOS and elsewhere, substantially reduced. 
 
C. Executive interference 
 
The independence of the Ugandan judiciary is guaranteed by Uganda’s 1995 Constitution and 
judges have security of tenure (World Bank 2009: 37-38). During the first two decades of the 
Museveni Government this arrangement was largely observed by the GoU and a range of 
judgments issued during the mid-2000s which undermined or criticised GoU policy were 
nonetheless respected by actors in the executive. Since the dawn of the multi-party era, 
however, executive interference in judicial matters and police officers’ ignoring of judgments 
overturning arrests of opposition leaders or closure of media houses (see below) has been 
increasingly commonplace (Anderson and Fisher forthcoming). Most notoriously, following 
a judge’s decision to release opposition leader Kizza Besigye from prison on bail5 in the 
midst of the 2006 presidential election, paramilitaries linked to the GoU stormed the court 
house and refused to allow anyone in attendance (including some Western diplomatic 
personnel) to leave until Besigye was re-arrested and re-imprisoned (Makara et al. 2009: 196-
197). 
 
D. Militarisation of the police force 
 
In contrast to much of the rest of the JLOS, the Ugandan Police Force (UPF) have benefited 
from considerable and sustained investment from the state since the mid-2000s leading to 
their total strength growing from 14,352 in 2003/04 to 18,000 in 2006 and 40,000 in 2012 
(New Vision, 16/07/2013; World Bank 2009: 31). The GoU’s focus on recruitment has meant 
that the ratio of Ugandan police to civilians has substantially exceeded the international 
standard ratio of 1:500 since the early 2000s although the Government has also allocated 
significant funds to address and improve police welfare, particularly in the areas of housing 
and HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment (substantial numbers of UPF personnel were lost to 
HIV/AIDS on an annual basis during the 2000s; World Bank 2009: 31). 
 
The Museveni Government’s growing intolerance of perceived threats to it posed by 
domestic opposition groups and critics has nevertheless led to the GoU’s steady militarisation 
and politicisation of the UPF in the last decade including the appointment of senior military 
allies of the President to the UPF’s highest office, Inspector-General of Police (IGP), since 
2001 (Anderson and Fisher forthcoming; Mwenda 2007; Tripp 2010: 135-140). During the 
tenure of the current IGP, Kale Kayihura (2005-), in particular, the UPF has come to act 
increasingly like a presidential guard of the NRM leadership. Dressed in fatigues almost 
indistinguishable from those of the UPDF, UPF personnel have been involved in a range of 
crackdowns of dubious legality on media houses, opposition parties and leaders and even on 
internal NRM critics themselves since the early 2000s (Anderson and Fisher forthcoming; 
Perrot 2014).  This politicisation of the role of the Ugandan police represents a major 
challenge to maintenance of the rule of the law in the country. 
  
                                                 
5 He was in prison for ‘treason, concealment of treason and rape’ (Makara et al. 2009: 197). 
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2.1.4 Decentralisation in Uganda: Governance challenges and the GoU’s approach to 
dealing with these 
 
A. Parallel centralisation 
 
The Museveni Government has gone further than any previous Ugandan administration in the 
promotion and institutionalisation of decentralisation with a substantial range of powers 
(political and financial) devolved to the elected members of RCs/LCs through a range of 
legislation including the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute (1987), Local 
Government Decentralisation Programme (1992), Local Governments Act (1993) and Local 
Government Act (1997) (Green 2013: 5-6). As Peter Langseth et al. wrote in 1997, ‘districts 
have now more power, resources, responsibilities and decision-making autonomy’ than ever 
before in Uganda’s post-colonial history – a statement which remains true today (Langseth et 
al. 1997: 2) 
 
Particularly since the early 2000s, however, the GoU has created and augmented a range of 
parallel structures at the local level to ensure that central authority reaches down to the 
village level. These include ‘NRM Committees’, composed of NRM loyalists elected in 
parallel processes and structures to those of the RCs/LCs, tasked with mobilising government 
activities at the local level with the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) – an NRM official 
appointed by the Presidency as de facto political representatives with a range of powers over 
local government structures (Green 2008; Green 2013: 6-8). The creation of an ‘Executive 
Director’ of Kampala Capital City Authority within months of the election of opposition 
politician Elias Lukwago as Lord Mayor of Kampala in 2011 represents a further example of 
this practice of parallel centralisation. Many of the Lord Mayor’s powers were transferred to 
the Executive Director in this process with the latter being appointed by the President himself 
(Independent, 06/04/2014). 
 
This increasing practice by the GoU of ‘going over the heads’ of governance structures to 
build support directly at the local level represents an important part of the changing political 
dynamics of regime maintenance in Uganda (Hickey and Golooba-Mutebi 2013: 16-17). 
Indeed, as Sandrine Perrot has argued, the success of this strategy played an important role in 
securing a major victory for Museveni and the NRM during the 2011 general elections 
(Perrot 2014). 
 
B. District proliferation 
 
A further challenge to the effectiveness of decentralisation in contemporary Uganda has been 
the mass creation of districts by the state in recent decades. While the number of Ugandan 
districts rose from 33 to only 39 between 1980-1994, this figure has increased vastly since the 
late 1990s, rising to 56 in 2000, 80 in 2006 and 111 by 2012 (Green 2010: 88; Uganda 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives 2012). While this has led to greater 
representation of Ugandan citizens at the local and national level (all districts elect a new 
Woman MP to the Parliament in Kampala) it has not lead to any noticeable improvement in 
service delivery. As Elliot Green notes, there appears to be no significant relationship 
between district creation and improvements of livelihood indicators in these new districts – 
or, indeed, between the location of new districts created and more impoverished areas (Green 
2010). 
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Instead, district creation has undermined service provision through diverting limited funds 
(see below) to paying district-level administrative staff and maintaining district buildings and 
headquarters. Green and others have convincingly argued that the impetus behind district 
proliferation is a desire on the part of central government to provide patronage resources 
(jobs, budgets etc.) to increasingly valuable local powerbrokers under Uganda’s multi-party 
dispensation; a state of affairs which represents a major challenge to promoting more 
accountable and efficient local government structures in Uganda (Golooba-Mutebi and 
Hickey 2013: 16-17). 
 
C. Funding, capacity and corruption 
 
Finally, effective decentralisation in Uganda faces growing challenges posed by the limited 
funding and capacity of local government structures and offices. Difficulties experienced in 
collecting sufficient revenue by local officials during the 1990s and early 2000s has led to 
local structures becoming increasingly reliant upon central government for funding since 
2005 (Green 2013: 9-11). This has, however, coincided  with a decrease in funding 
allocations to local government in GoU budgets (from 25 per cent of Uganda’s national 
budget in 2005/06 to less than 18 per cent in 2011/12) and the embezzlement of significant 
amounts of money bound for northern Ugandan districts by officials in the Prime Minister’s 
Office between 2011-2013 (Green 2013: 10-11; Independent, 17/02/2013). These problems 
have been exacerbated by the growing number of districts being created – more local 
government structures are coming into existence with decreasing amounts of funding to 
support them. 
 
Systemic corruption – particularly linked to the transfer of funds from the centre to districts 
and from districts to sub-counties – along with an absence of properly-trained and educated 
staff within local government structures represents a further on-going challenge to 
decentralisation efforts. The problem of insufficient staff numbers overall and of skilled staff 
in particular is, once again, especially aggravated by district proliferation, a process which 
has not been accompanied by the offering of training to new district staff (Green 2013). 
 
D. The political and legal context of strengthening demand side governance at the local 
level 
 
An understanding of the context in which local political and administrative officials operate 
is required for a proper assessment of the effectiveness of any activity aimed at demand-side 
governance reform. For while the planning, resourcing and implementation of a wide range 
of services has been devolved to local government units – particularly districts (LCV) and 
sub-counties (LCIII) – since 1997 especially, their independence, discretion and capacity has 
been steadily circumscribed since the mid-2000s. Likewise, while a range of local structures, 
architectures and fora theoretically serve to facilitate wide popular participation in sub-county 
and district budget-making from the village level (LCI) up, in reality few of these structures 
function effectively or transparently. Ultimately, any effort to promote demand-side 
governance in Uganda must contend with – and acknowledge – the limited space available 
for LCs and their staff to respond to local demands independent of central government 
priorities and resources.  
 
The 1995 Ugandan Constitution and 1997 Local Government Act clearly demarcated the 
responsibilities and resources of the country’s central and local government units, with local 
governments empowered to create their own development plan and to plan and implement a 
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range of devolved programmes across a wide area (including schools, health centres, road 
construction, water and land, forestry and veterinary services). They also confirmed local 
governments’ authority to raise revenue – through the longstanding graduated personal tax 
(GPT), effectively a poll tax dating from the colonial era – and to hire and dismiss 
administrative staff from Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) down via a District Service 
Committee (Awortwi 2011; Green 2013; Kjaer 2009; Nabaho 2013).   
 
The RC/LC structure (see 2.1.1.) was also developed in part to allow for an institutionalised 
and permanent means for citizens to participate in local politics and development. While 
district officials are meant to consult with key stakeholders in specific areas (e.g. water and 
sanitation) at annual district-level coordination committee meetings, the main space for 
popular participation in the overall budget process – outside of ad hoc lobbying of councillors 
or administrators – is the annual ‘budget conference’, held at all LC levels (Blore et al 2004: 
105; Golooba-Mutebi 2012; interviews with councillors, technical staff and CSO 
representatives, Amuru, Kabarole and Mbale, 15-21 April 2015). Theoretically open to all, 
these conferences involve the discussion of project proposals from citizens, the appointment 
of project management committees to implement or monitor projects and the ‘kicking 
upstairs’ (to the district) of proposals which cannot be funded at a particular level (Blore et al 
2004: 105; interviews with councillors and district and sub-county technical staff and CSO 
personnel, Amuru, Kabarole and Mbale, 15-21 April 2015). 
 
Since the mid-2000s, however, there has been a clear erosion of local government’s authority 
and ability to deliver its own development plans – and to respond to citizen demands and 
proposals therein. The abolition of the GPT in 2005, for example, removed the primary 
source of local revenue for LCs (84 per cent at the district level by then according to Green) 
and was replaced several years later by local hotel and service taxes which raise barely 8 per 
cent of the revenue formerly raised by the GPT (Green 2013). This revenue yield is also 
highly unstable – in Mbale District between 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 local revenue yields 
declined by 18 per cent, then rose by 64 per cent by 2013/2014 before falling again by 38 per 
cent in the next financial year (Mbale District 2015). Consequently, LCs often seek funding 
from the private sector or international actors (development partners) to bridge this gap; in 
the three districts visited during fieldwork (Amuru, Kabarole and Mbale) respondents 
discussed their linking-up with the World Bank, UNICEF, World Vision and others in 
relation to road construction, bridge repair and safe water provision (Golooba-Mutebi 2012; 
King 2015; interviews with CSO representatives and district councillors, Mbale and 
Kabarole, 15-21 April 2015). 
 
Councillors and technical staff interviewed during field work for this review frequently cited 
the GPT’s abolition as a major reversal in their ability to respond to citizens’ service delivery 
demands since it leaves districts ‘reliant on central government’ and its priorities for funding 
of local services. Different respondents suggested a figure of around 90 per cent as the 
proportion of local budgets financed by central government (Cammack et al 2007; Lewis 
2014; interviews with councillors and district and sub-county technical staff and CSO 
personnel, Amuru, Kabarole and Mbale, 15-21 April 2015). The research team was able to 
corroborate this directly through attending the laying of the Mbale District Local Government 
Budget in April 2015 where estimates for the District’s sources of revenue for 2015/2016 
were broken down as follows: 86.96 per cent from central government transfers, 10.98 per 
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cent from donor funding and 2.06 per cent from local revenue (Mbale District Local 
Government 2015: 7).6 
 
In reality, the impact of the GPT abolition on central vs local funding for budgets is less 
clear. As Francis and James demonstrate, GPT revenue failed to cover more than 10 per cent 
of district budgets even in the early 2000s owing to difficulties in collecting what became a 
deeply unpopular and resented tax. Moreover, a significant percentage of GPT collected (40 
per cent in Mbale by 2003) was consumed in the actual collection itself or spent on officials’ 
salaries (Francis and James 2003). What appears to have had a much more significant impact 
on the independence and discretion of local government units vis-à-vis budgeting and 
spending has instead been the overall decline in the size of central government allocations 
since the early 2000s: where around 20 per cent of the national budget was allocated to 
districts in the early 2000s, this figure has now been slashed by more than a quarter 
(Grossman and Lewis 2014). The proliferation of district creation during the same period (see 
2.1.4.) has led to a further stretching of funds allocated to individual districts (Green 2013). 
 
This situation has been exacerbated by an increase in central grants provided for specific, 
predetermined purposes (‘conditional grants’) and a significant decline in central grants 
which LCs can spend as they wish (‘unconditional grants’). Where unconditional grants 
represented around a quarter of central grants in the early 2000s, the figure is closer to 10 per 
cent now (Lewis 2014; interviews with councillors and technical officials, Kabarole and 
Mbale District headquarters, 15-21 April 2015). In other words, over the last decade LCs 
have progressively received less money from central government but became more reliant 
upon it and have steadily lost control over how the vast majority of their funds can be 
allocated.  
 
This has come about in part due to a concern in Kampala that LCs lack the competence and 
integrity to plan and implement service delivery programmes effectively (Awortwi and 
Helmsing 2014; Nabaho 2014). It is also, however, a product of evolving regime maintenance 
imperatives under Uganda’s multi-party dispensation (see 2.1.2. and 2.1.3.). Now in 
competition with opposition parties, Museveni and the NRM are increasingly keen to 
demonstrate the direct impact of their (national) policies on local citizens – hence they wish 
to extend greater central control over LCs. More generally, as noted, the regime has become 
more centralised, personalised and authoritarian since the mid-2000s and changes to LC 
financial and political independence should be seen through this lens. 
 
So too should the recentralisation of powers to appoint CAOs and their deputies since 2005 – 
a further way in which LC’s ability to respond to local demands has been eroded in recent 
years. Formerly under district control – via District Service Committees (see above) – CAOs 
have been appointed by the central Public Service Commission. Though still technically 
responsible to the district chair, CAOs are thus now politically and personally responsible to 
the centre rather than to local councillors or their constituents. As Nabaho observes, CAOs 
‘now suffer from “operational” loyalty to local councils and their “career” loyalty to central 
masters’ (Nabaho 2013: 25).  
 
Aside from incentivising CAOs to privilege central government priorities over local ones 
(when the two clash), this change has further weakened the accountability of LCs’ technical 
bureaucracies since Kampala often appoints CAOs with little personal connections to a 
                                                 
6 Attendance at Mbale District Local Government budget speech and laying session, April 2015. 
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district. Many CAOs therefore need significant time to become acclimatised to a new 
operating environment, particular in large districts and those with particularly remote 
populations or poor infrastructure. Many also do not feel an obligation to keep district chairs 
informed of travel beyond the district, leading in some cases to extended absenteeism and 
under-spending of funds – with the latter often reclaimed by the centre at the end of the 
financial year (Nabaho 2014). 
 
The ‘dual loyalty’ of CAOs has also caused considerable friction between the political and 
technical branches of LCs in recent years (see Watala 2013). Where the former often resent 
the latter as ‘creatures’ of the centre with little commitment to responding to local demands, 
technical staff (who tend to be more consistently educated to a high standard than 
councillors) often criticise councillors for being corrupt and incompetent. In Mbale district, 
for example, one senior councillor interviewed suggested that district administrators should 
be evaluated in the LGCSCI (see below) alongside councillors to address their ‘accountability 
deficit’ while a senior administrative official condemned some councillors for their ‘lack of 
integrity, drunkenness and dubious deals’ (interviews, Mbale District headquarters, 15 April 
2015). 
 
 
2.2 Approach of the Dutch government to good governance promotion in 
Uganda 
 
Motivations and objectives of Dutch policies and activities in Uganda from 2007 to 2013 
have been analysed by studying the three Multi Annual Strategic Plans (MASPs) adopted in 
this period (MASPs 2005-2008, 2008-2011 and 2012-2015). Next, interviews with staff 
based at the Dutch embassy in Uganda served to complement the analysis of the policy 
documents. 
 
 
2.2.1 Planning period 2005-2008 
 
In the MASP 2005-2008 ‘good governance’ was one of six strategic choices.7 Within this 
category, the following five goals were identified: 
 
 reduction of corruption; 
 pursuit of democratisation; 
 provision of a good judicial system; 
 respect for human rights; and 
 reinforcement of local governance performance. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The other strategic choices are:  
• significant reduction in the proportion of the world’s population that live on less than a dollar a day;  
• all children, both boys and girls, should have the opportunity to complete primary education; 
• equality between men and women, giving women a greater voice;  
• a better business climate in developing countries, making them more competitive on both national and 
international markets; and  
• regional stability by means of effective action in conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict solution 
and post-conflict recovery. (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005: 9) 
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A. Contextual factors 
 
The strategic choices made in relation to good governance were informed by: an analysis of 
the Ugandan context, the policy agenda of The Netherlands and the perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Uganda.  
 
With respect to local governance, the MASP 2005-2008 argued that the Ugandan Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)8 gave the decentralisation process a boost by emphasising 
basic service delivery for the poor. Moreover, a fiscal decentralisation policy provided local 
governments with more discretion over planning of and spending on local service delivery. 
The MASP estimated that more than 38 per cent of the national budget was transferred to 
local governments as a result of the adoption of the 1997 Local Government Act. Important 
issues were identified in the MASP: 
 
 the inadequate institutional capacity within local governments; 
 the overemphasis on ‘upward’ rather than ‘downward’ accountability; 
 the inequalities between and within districts; and  
 the local government system’s lack of financial sustainability. 
 
In addition, a trend of re-centralisation by the government was noted in the MASP, which 
was seen as a threat to decentralisation processes (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005: 
3, 19). 
 
In the justice and rule of law area, the MASP pointed to serious concerns about the 
government’s (lack of) commitment to justice and law and order and the respect for human 
rights. The MASP indicated that the budgets for institutions like the police, the judiciary and 
the prison system were insufficient, in spite of the donor-supported Justice, Law and Order 
Sector (JLOS) reform programme, and that this situation could impact negatively on the 
human rights situation in Uganda.  
 
With respect to the aid environment, the MASP observed a robust framework for donor 
coordination and dialogue between donors and the government. A Donor Democracy and 
Good Governance Group (DDGG) had been set up to deal with democratisation, human 
rights and anti-corruption. Concerns were voiced on the time-consuming nature of donor 
coordination and the impact of coordination on the original principles of more critical donors, 
such as The Netherlands (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005: 4).  
 
The key priorities of the Dutch government policy agenda for Uganda were felt to be: the 
promotion of good governance and human rights; the acknowledgement that bilateral 
cooperation should also involve political, diplomatic and commercial partnerships and 
involve civil society organisations, the private sector and academia; and the emphasis of 
donor coordination and harmonisation. 
 
The main strength of the Dutch Embassy in Uganda was felt to be in the governance sector, 
with a clear emphasis on local governance and justice and law and order processes. It was 
                                                 
8 The PEAP is a medium term development plan to guide government policy and sector and district plans. It is 
Uganda’s version of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Poverty Reduction Strategies encouraged the 
establishment of ‘sectors’ for coordinated planning in support of national poverty eradication goals. They were 
favourite among international donors to channel and align development aid. 
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argued that the donor community tended to perceive the Netherlands Embassy in Kampala as 
having strong governance expertise and clear and consistent views on human rights, 
governance and budget support issues (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005: 8). 
 
B. Strategic choices 
 
The MASP argued for an active Dutch role in JLOS, with an annual allocation of €5 million 
in general budget support, conditional on whether Uganda would meet the general criteria for 
budget support and would make sufficient progress against agreed benchmarks for JLOS. In 
addition, small-scale JLOS activities would be funded out of a Programme Support Fund, and 
the Embassy would attempt to stimulate the government’s commitment to JLOS, including 
by working more closely with the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee (Royal 
Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005: 18). The MASP aimed to contribute to a strengthening 
of the rule of law (in particular the crime level, the provision of legal aid in the districts and 
judicial procedures), and saw the role of the Dutch Embassy in stimulating the development 
of a monitoring and evaluation system and enhanced coordination among JLOS institutions. 
 
With respect to human rights, the MASP called for stronger cooperation in the donor group, 
harmonisation of support to human rights organisations and continuation of the dialogue of 
the JLOS donor group with the government in order to reduce the number of torture cases. 
The Embassy envisaged, among others, contributing to basket funds for support of the 
Uganda Human Rights Commission and legal aid, supporting media-initiatives, and 
providing support to finance small-scale human rights interventions (Royal Netherlands 
Embassy Uganda 2005: 18-19). Among the strategic goals, the Embassy included 
improvements in human rights observance through rule of law activities for the army, 
security organisations and the police, and maintenance of the independence of the Ugandan 
press. The role of the Dutch Embassy would be to contribute to the emergence of an 
unequivocal set of criteria in the field of human rights as part of periodic DDGG progress 
reports, and the working out of common donor approach towards the Ugandan government, 
in particular through the JLOS donor group (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005: 18-
19).  
 
Concerning decentralisation, the MASP was oriented to the implementation of the joint-donor 
Local Government Development Programme II (LGDPII), where The Netherlands had been 
the leading bilateral donor. Activities were proposed on local revenue generation, operation 
and maintenance (O&M), and improvement in local economic activities. Instruments would 
include direct technical assistance for capacity building in nine districts, in partnership with 
SNV (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005: 20). 
  
 
2.2.2 Planning period 2008-2011 
 
The MASP 2008-2011 identified as priorities: support for the education sector and the justice, 
law and order sector (including human rights and gender) and work on cross-cutting issues 
related to Northern Uganda, political governance and taxation and accountability. These 
choices were based on an analysis of the Ugandan context, the Embassy’s experience and 
comparative advantage, the choices in the context of the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy 
(UJAS), the division of labour with other donors, and the Dutch policy agenda. 
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A. Contextual factors 
 
The analysis of the Ugandan context in the MASP 2008-2011 was informed by a Power and 
Change Analysis (PCA) that had been undertaken as part of the Strategic Governance and 
Corruption Analysis (SGACA). SGACA, implemented between 2007 and 2009, aimed to 
provide analytical support to the embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
formulation and revision of their strategic governance and anti-corruption policies. SGACA 
analyses were intended to reflect on the choices and intervention strategies formulated in the 
Multi Annual Strategic Plans. The introduction of the SGACA instrument was driven by a 
growing concern about the impact of informal governance practices and corruption in aid-
receiving countries (Koenders 2008; Hout and Schakel 2014; ECORYS 2009). 
 
Uganda was one of SGACA’s pilot countries. The PCA was undertaken in June 2007 and its 
key findings were that the NRM government had become increasingly occupied with regime 
maintenance and that the functioning of the existing formal institutions was weakened by the 
informal practices related to the dominance of the president, the role of the army, patronage 
and corruption (ECORYS 2007). The MASP 2008-2011 reflected the PCA by pointing out 
that the Ugandan ‘regime uses a corrupt, inefficient and wasteful neo-patrimonial system …, 
coupled with varying … measures of pressure on alternative power centres (such as judiciary, 
parliament, media, civil society). Democratisation, separation of powers and state stability 
could be increasingly threatened and the armed instruments of the state (police, security 
apparatus) might increasingly be used for regime survival if risks are perceived to necessitate 
such action’ (Royal Netherlands Embassy 2008: 2). At the same time, the MASP noted that 
the Ugandan government seemed genuinely committed to parts of the poverty alleviation 
agenda and that there was sufficient overlap between the ‘circles of interest’ of the Ugandan 
and the Netherlands government (Royal Netherlands Embassy 2008: 2). 
 
B. Strategic choices 
 
The political approach that the MASP 2008-2011 claimed to follow entailed making clear 
choices concerning the focus of the embassy’s strategy and the implementation of appropriate 
funding strategies. An important change in the MASP 2008-2011 was the move away from 
attempts ‘at trying to “fix” all areas and aspects of decentralised service delivery’ (Royal 
Netherlands Embassy 2008: 6) towards an engagement in decentralisation for the education 
sector, particularly by contributing to universal primary education.  
 
The Embassy’s engagement in the Justice, Law and Order Sector (including human rights) 
was focused on promoting security and stability, and more specifically on moving from 
regime policing to democratic policing and civilian oversight. Security and stability were 
seen as prerequisites for further democratisation, which in turn was seen to contribute to 
further development. The second JLOS Strategic Investment Plan (SIP-II) described the 
goals, strategy and targets for the sector, including the promotion of the rule of law and due 
process, human rights, enhanced access to justice for all and the reduced incidence of crime 
and increased safety and security. Sector budget support to JLOS and a selection of strategic 
project interventions would be the means to contribute to those goals (Royal Netherlands 
Embassy 2008: 14).  
 
The choice for sector budget support was made in view of the disenchantment with earlier 
attempts at ‘notionally earmarking’ general budget support for certain sectors, particularly 
since this had not provided the right incentives for the government of Uganda to change its 
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governance arrangements (Royal Netherlands Embassy 2008: 6). In particular, the Embassy 
and the Ministry had become concerned about the increases of expenditures by ‘State House’ 
(the President of Uganda), resulting in a mismatch between the approved budget and actual 
expenditures, the difference being related to so-called ‘costs of patronage’ (interview, Jeroen 
Verheul, 1 July 2015).  
 
Another reason for sector budget support was that the embassy expected that the move away 
from general budget support would strengthen sector dialogue. The choice to move towards a 
more results-based approach to funding was reflected in the MASP’s proposal to make 
support dependent on a contractual relationship with the government related to results (ex-
post funding) rather than budgeted inputs (ex-ante funding) (Royal Netherlands Embassy 
2008: 9-10).  
 
Next to providing support for JLOS, the Embassy emphasised objectives falling outside the 
circle of interest of the Uganda, but closely linked to the shared agenda, namely the fostering 
of more democratic policing and increased civilian oversight. The Embassy aimed to 
convince the government of Uganda of the long-term benefits of its approach through 
dialogue, ‘show projects’ and the support of advocacy initiatives. The Embassy wanted to 
build on its good relationship with the police, which had resulted from the support provided 
to the police to strengthen its presence in the North, after the withdrawal of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2014). The Embassy 
estimated that the risk following from the regime’s use of the police to maintain its grip on 
power, could be mitigated by building on the police’s commitment to the goals of SIP-II, 
engaging regularly with high-level representatives of the police and playing on professional 
pride (Royal Netherlands Embassy 2008: 14). 
 
Next to the support to the police, the embassy prioritised the independence of the judicial 
system within the JLOS sector. While this would not seem to align with the government’s 
direct interest, the embassy saw scope to strengthen the judiciary, even at the political level, 
based on its lead role in the JLOS and its good reputation within the sector (Royal 
Netherlands Embassy 2008: 14). To ensure the link between JLOS and poverty reduction the 
Embassy chose to focus on the delivery of justice to vulnerable groups in Ugandan society 
and pay attention to the areas of family and land justice (Royal Netherlands Embassy 2008: 
14). 
 
Human rights got special attention in the 2008-2011 period. The Embassy emphasised that 
the shared agenda seemed to be limited, since the incumbent regime was mainly interested in 
maintaining stability and security. Despite this, the Embassy did see an overlap in interests at 
the technocratic level: the MASP pointed at the existence of an increasingly effective Uganda 
Human Rights Commission and the adoption of an enhanced human rights culture as one of 
the core objectives of JLOS. The human rights strategy attempted to link activities on human 
rights to activities in JLOS, as became evident in the police review process, the security 
sector reform debate, the support to the peace talks, and the support to gender activities like 
fighting female genital mutilation. The specific focus was on the most serious human rights 
violations in Uganda, like torture and illegal detention by security and law enforcement 
organisations and violations of the right to fair trial and due process (Royal Netherlands 
Embassy 2008: 15). 
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2.2.3 Planning period 2012-2015 
 
The MASP 2012-2015, under the title ‘Food and justice: Investing in human security in a 
challenging governance context’, reflected a revision of the Netherlands’ policy towards 
Uganda based on the new Dutch development and foreign affairs policy and the lessons learnt 
from the previous MASP. In contrast to the previous MASP, the 2012-2015 multi-annual 
plan focused on two ‘spearheads’: 1) security and rule of law and 2) food security. The 
choice for these spearhead was in line with new Dutch policy priorities (Minister for 
Development Cooperation 2011) and was informed, among others, by the assessment that the 
spearheads can positively impact conditions for stability, that The Netherlands would be able 
to produce value added and that the spearheads would offer reasonable prospects for setting 
up effective programmes within the existing governance context.  
 
Another main difference with the previous planning period was the move away from sector 
budget support. While the MASP 2008-2011 described budget support as the preferred aid 
modality in the case of overlap between the ‘circles of interest’ of the Dutch and Ugandan 
government, the MASP 2012-2015 stated that programme or project support was favoured as 
aid modality and budget support was dropped, because the latter is no longer considered 
appropriate due to major concerns about corruption and fiduciary risks (interview, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2014). Corruption scandals had already led the Netherlands to cut 
the Sector Budget Support for JLOS with EUR 3.2 million for the years 2010/2011 (Royal 
Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2011: 4). This was a follow-up to the decision of the Minister 
for Development Cooperation to stop general budget support for the Museveni government in 
2008. 
 
The area of decentralisation did not any longer receive attention in the MASP 2012-2015. 
With the change in focus away from the education sector, the focus on decentralisation issues 
appeared also to have been ended. 
 
With its engagement in the Justice, Law and Order Sector – falling under the spearhead of 
security and rule of law – the Embassy aimed not only to promote security and rule of law (as 
an end itself) but also to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs and the improvement of 
the business climate.  The main financial interventions the Embassy was undertaking under 
this spearhead related to the provision of support to JLOS and the Democratic Governance 
Facility (DGF) (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2011: 10). 
 
Financial support to the JLOS had been channelled through a Sector Wide Approach fund, 
instead of through sector budget support. In addition, the embassy continued its dialogue 
activities in this sector. Based on previous experience it had, according to the MASP, proven 
to be more productive to engage in informal political dialogue that focuses on specific issues 
and is conducted in a non-confrontational setting rather than set up formalised dialogue. For 
this reason, the Embassy focused specifically on informal high level political dialogue. 
Moreover, past involvement in JLOS had also made clear that the opportunities for progress 
at the political level are far more limited than at the technical level. Therefore, the embassy 
focused on the JLOS Strategic Investment Plan III (SIP-III) and continued with strengthening 
the professionalism of JLOS personnel. In addition, support to civil society that is active in 
this sector was also continued to strengthen further their role in promoting good governance 
and demanding accountability (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2011: 15).  
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2.3 Activities of other Dutch agencies in Uganda 
(TOR question 3.2) 
 
The fact that Uganda had been a ‘donor darling’ until the first decade of the 21st century was 
reflected in the involvement of many development agencies in activities in the country. This 
brief review identifies the major activities of other Dutch agencies and other donors in the 
area of good governance promotion. This section first discusses the main MFS partners 
working in Uganda (Hivos, ICCO, Cordaid and OxfamNovib), as well as their joint 
programme, the Uganda Governance Monitoring Programme (UGMP). Further, the Inter-
Party Organisation for Dialogue, supported by NIMD, is discussed. The next section (2.4) 
discusses the activities of other donors alongside other centrally financed activities, most 
notably JLOS and the Democratic Governance Facility, where The Netherlands was part of 
international consortia. 
 
 
2.3.1 MFS partners 
 
Under MFS II (2011-2015) much coalition building took place on issues related to good 
governance. However, good governance has been dropped as a separate Dutch policy issue. 
Some elements of it (democratisation, promotion of rule of law and control of corruption) 
have become part of the ‘Peace and security for development’ objective (see ToR pp. 3,4). 
Good governance no longer being a policy priority for the Netherlands, means that in practice 
special programmes have been or are being ended and that the issue has been integrated into 
other programmes, e.g. as creating an enabling environment for private sector programmes.  
 
A. Hivos9 
 
Hivos has an East Africa office, based in Nairobi, Kenya. Between 2007 and 2012 Hivos 
supported some 50 organisations in Uganda annually. The most important organisations 
working on good governance (national and/or local) are: 
 
 ACODE:  Hivos has supported ACODE for its advocacy and lobby work on 
environmental issues, especially on genetic engineering, the Trade Innovations and 
Biotechnology Programme, until 2009. ACODE is included in the IOB study. Between 
2003 and 2006, Hivos supported ACODE with € 300,000; the amount for 2007-2010 is 
unknown. 
 UGMP: see sub-section E below. 
 UDN: the Uganda Debt Network, which focuses on external debt and corruption 
issues, and is a watchdog on public expenditures. Hivos funding from 1998 to 2006 
was € 355,000. EU funding through a consortium of Cordaid (65 per cent) and Hivos 
(35 per cent) amounted to € 1,400,000. 
 RWECO: Rwenzori Consortium for Civic Competence, an organisation working on 
issues of election monitoring in Rwenzori region in partnership with Hivos, CEFORD, 
ACROD and promoting good governance, and civic empowerment. 
                                                 
9 Information about the work of Hivos in Uganda has been obtained from the office in The Hague. Hivos has 
shared major documents about the work of ACODE, FOWODE, KALI, UDN and UGMP, who have all been 
active in the field of budget tracking. 
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 FHRI: Foundation for Human Rights Initiative, which contributes to promoting and 
improving rule of law and democratic processes and has waged an anti-death penalty 
campaign. 
 FOWODE: Forum for Women in Democracy, an organisation for building capacity of 
women and men in analysing budgets from a gender perspective and for promoting 
gender inclusion in local and national governments’ budgets. With improving the 
quality of accountability and transparency of local and national governments and 
public representatives the organisation aspires to contribute to good governance 
processes. 
 KRC: Kabarole Research Centre, which played a central role in UGMP. 
 KALI: an organisation aiming to build community skills to act as watchdogs over 
public expenditure for rural development, and contribute to combating corruption, 
increasing the participation of women, and stimulating citizens’ participation in 
politics and elections. The Hivos contribution was € 100,000 from 2004 to 2007; its 
contribution for 2007-2009 is unknown. 
 GHFRD:  Good Hope Foundation for Rural Development, which promotes human 
rights in rural communities, with emphasis on girls and gender aspects, and works 
towards better government practice. 
 
B. ICCO10 
 
ICCO has an office in Kampala. During the inception mission, we did not have the time to 
visit the office. Of the six areas of ICCO’s work in Uganda, one (conflict transformation and 
democratisation) is related to the topic of the evaluation.11 ICCO is a partner in the UGMP. 
 
C. OxfamNovib12 
 
OxfamNovib has an office in Kampala. OxfamNovib has worked in Uganda since the 1980s, 
and now concentrates on three regions in the north: West Nile, Acholi, and Lango.  
OxfamNovib’s work in Uganda is related to: the right to sustainable livelihoods, the right to 
basic social services, and the right to social and political participation. In supporting local 
partner organisations, OxfamNovib coordinates its work with other donors, for example 
through the Uganda Governance Monitoring Programme. 
 
D. SNV 
 
SNV has an office in Kampala, whose director is Jeanette de Regt. The activities of  SNV are 
not specifically oriented towards governance. Governance issues are ‘cross-cutting’ in the 
areas of agriculture, renewable energy and water, sanitation and hygiene. 
 
E. The Uganda Governance Monitoring Programme (UGMP)13 
 
The UGMP consists of a Dutch and Ugandan based platform. The Dutch Uganda platform 
brings together five Dutch organisations: Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO, OxfamNovib, and CMC. 
The Ugandan based platform consists of 19 partner organisations in Uganda, such as 
                                                 
10 Information from the ICCO website: http://www.iccokia.org/centraleastafrica/about-us/countries/uganda. 
11 The other programmes are: food nutrition and security; fair climate; water, hygiene and sanitation; basic 
health and HIV; and education. 
12 Information from the OxfamNovib website, http://www.oxfamnovib.nl/SPEF-uganda.html. 
13 Based on information provided by Hilke Jansen, director BBO. 
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ACODE, ACCU, Caritas Uganda, Deniva, KRC, USDC, NGO Forum, UJCC, FHRI, FIDA, 
Isis-WICCE, UDN and UWONET among others.  
 
UGMP was established in 2004. The Bureau Beleidsvorming Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
(BBO) in The Hague was the coordinator on the Dutch side, the Dutch Uganda Platform 
(DUP). As a lobby organisation BBO secretariat provided support to the UGMP in 
conducting its research and in making its trend reports more analytic and forward looking. 
Annually, a round table dialogue was organized on the trend reports with the Netherlands 
embassy. The DUP and the role of BBO came to an end in 2011. 
 
The overall objective of the UGMP initiative is to contribute to a substantial and critical 
political dialogue between the Dutch government and other donor countries on the one hand 
and the Ugandan government on the other on the themes of democratisation, human rights 
and peace-building. Over the years, UGMP has been publishing governance trends bulletins 
and it has lobbied the government to improve the governance situation in the country.  
 
In 2010 Warner Strategy and Fundraising evaluated the relevance, effectiveness and 
efficiency of the DUP. Their report is critical about the Platform’s effectiveness, stating that 
the ‘direct effect … in policy making appears to be limited’. The report further explains that 
‘The Dutch Embassy views the Dutch Uganda Platform to a large extent as a facilitator for 
the UGMP. The Embassy has not received any questions from the Ministry or Parliament as a 
result of the lobby of the Dutch Uganda Platform’ (Warner Strategy and Fundraising 2010:4). 
 
Whereas the Dutch branch of the Platform ended its work, in Uganda the Platform has 
continued its work. It is coordinated by the NGO Forum, since the Ugandan NGOs feel that 
the platform adds value to the work of the individual NGOs, who believe that a joint and 
constructive voice of citizen’s and their organisations on governance issues can influence the 
government and can lead to transformation. The approach is three-pronged: creating demands 
for transparency and accountability from below, improving existing engagements with the 
state, and making linkages and networks at supra-national level.  
 
UGMP generates annual monitoring reports, based on indicators related to the poverty 
reduction policy ‘National Development Plan 2010-2015’. These are used for lobby and 
advocacy. It conducts civic education activities via public dialogues, press conferences, 
education material, etc. Amongst others UGMP has developed a Citizens’ Manifesto, as a 
social contract between the leaders and the led and as a basis for citizens to hold their leaders 
accountable.  
 
 
2.3.2 The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy 
 
NIMD established the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD), based on a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the six political parties represented in the Ugandan 
parliament, in February 2010. IPOD, the goals of which have been defined ‘in minimalist 
terms’, has been conceived as a forum ‘geared to preventing a ‘worsening of the situation’’ 
(Global Partners Governance 2013: 4), in the face of the increasing dominance by the NRM 
of the Ugandan political scene, as described in section 2.2. above.  Funding is provided by the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Democratic Governance Facility. The IPOD 
budget was approximately €1,400,000 in 2015 (NIMD 2015). 
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IPOD’s central objective was to ‘help develop a well functioning democratic multiparty 
political system’, with work in three broad areas (Global Partners Governance 2013: 3-4): 
 
 Fostering interparty dialogue that addresses issues of national concern;  
 Strengthening political parties to become legitimate, accountable and responsive 
actors, equipped with dialogue, policy development and communication and outreach 
skills;  
 Supporting alliances (communities of change) between political and civil society to 
create a broad support base for the agenda that emerges out of the dialogue platform.  
 
NIMD Uganda specified six outputs of the IPOD activities: 
 
 Commit the six parliamentary parties to participate in an informal dialogue process.  
 Develop consensus on the purpose and modalities for the platform;  
 Secure consensus on a shared agenda of minimalistic reforms decided by the parties 
participating in the process; 
 Enhance the trust between parliamentary party representatives; 
 Establish a representative NIMD office in Uganda in order to facilitate the dialogue; 
 Ensure that the NIMD programme is effectively managed through regular and 
adequate monitoring and evaluation procedures. (Global Partners Governance 2013: 
4). 
 
The mid-term review (Global Partners Governance 2013: 15-21) concludes that dialogue 
among the political parties has progressed only quite slowly. This is due to the role of the 
NRM in Ugandan politics, its attempt to increase its hold to power and limit the role of the 
opposition, but also due to the limited degree of institutionalisation of opposition parties. 
 
 
2.4 Other donors and joint activities 
 
2.4.1 The international donor community in Uganda 
 
The data presented in table 1 indicate that aid commitments to Uganda between 2004 and 
2012 amounted to almost US$580 million for purposes of democratisation, rule of law and 
control of corruption. The Netherlands was in the top 5 of donors for two sub-fields: legal 
and judicial development and democratic participation and civil society. The Dutch position 
in the former sub-field is the result of the substantial sectoral budget support given to JLOS 
from 2007 to 2012; in the latter field this is related to the support provided to basket funding 
of the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) between 2007 and 2011 and the Democratic 
Governance Facility (DGF), primarily in 2011 and 2012 (OECD 2014). 
 
In a similar vein, Ireland’s and Austria’s prominent position in the domain of legal and 
judicial development is the result of their support to JLOS and the rights, justice and peace 
component in DGF. Denmark’s leading role in the field of democratic participation and civil 
society can, to a large extent, be explained by its role in the DGF (OECD 2014). 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 1: Overview of aid commitments in the field of democratisation, rule of law and control of 
corruption, 2004-2012 (US Dollars, in millions, current prices) 
 Total aid Top 5 donors Allocation (per cent of 
total) 
Democratic participation and 
civil society 
 
 
 
 
237.04 1. Denmark 
2. Netherlands 
3. Multilaterals 
4. Ireland 
5. Sweden 
38.9 
11.7 
10.3 
9.5 
8.5 
Legal and judicial 
development 
 
 
 
 
 
177.50 1. Netherlands 
2. Ireland 
3. Austria 
4. Norway  
5. Multilaterals  
31.5 
25.3 
15.2 
8.7 
4.9 
Decentralisation and support 
to local government 
 
 
 
 
98.98 1. Multilaterals 
2. Belgium 
3. United States 
4. Ireland 
5. Japan 
86.5 
5.2 
3.9 
3.0 
0.7 
Anti-corruption organisations 
and institutions 
 
 
 
65.14 1. Multilaterals 
2. United Kingdom 
3. Denmark 
4. United States 
5. Ireland 
83.0 
10.2 
3.4 
1.7 
1.7 
Source: OECD (2015) 
 
 
2.4.2 Denmark 
 
The data reported in table 1 indicate that Denmark has been playing a central role in 
financing activities aimed at good governance promotion, particularly in the field of 
democratic participation and civil society. The Danish Embassy in Uganda was a central 
player in the Deepening Democracy Programme and remains an important partner in DGF. 
For this reason this sub-section provides more information on the Danish policy of good 
governance promotion in Uganda. 
 
The Danish government provided support to civil society in Uganda, as part of the Danish 
Civil Society Strategy, with the overarching objective of contributing to ‘the development of 
a strong, independent and diversified civil society in developing countries’.  
 
Between 2006 and 2011 the DANIDA Human Rights and Good Governance Office 
(HUGGO) provided funding for Ugandan government line ministries, local and national 
CSOs. Total contribution to HUGGO was approximately DKK 100 million annually, out of 
which about 40 per cent was allocated to CSOs. 
 
In March 2013 an Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society was published, containing  a 
separate Uganda Country Study. The period covered by the evaluation was 2008-2012. This 
evaluation describes the context and the developments of civil society organisations in 
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Uganda. The NGO sector in Uganda is young, but has been growing fast, from 200 registered 
NGOs in 1986 to 9,500 at the end of 2011. The evaluation concluded amongst others that: 
 
 Denmark has, with other development partners, contributed to a more vibrant and open 
debate through supporting CSOs in Uganda; 
 The improvements in representation, legitimacy and locally based organisations in 
Uganda cannot specifically be attributed to Danish support; 
 The ‘strategic partnership’ modality was singled out as being the best way of securing 
ownership, but also criticised for benefitting the big and traditional organisations, 
while the ‘calls for proposals’ were claimed to better ‘level the playing field’. While 
partnerships with Danish NGOs were generally assessed as positive, there were some 
concerns voiced by Ugandan CSOs of being part of a programme, which was mainly 
defined by the International and/or Danish NGO; 
 The Danish contribution to advocacy work has been important and consistent, 
increasingly in ‘claimed’ spaces and exposing the governing elite’s misuse of power. 
This is accredited to the Danida Human Rights Good Governance Office (HUGGO) 
and the Democratic Governance Fund (DGF) and to some of the international and 
Danish NGOs. 
 
 
2.4.3 JLOS 
 
The overview of financial contributions provided to Uganda by The Netherlands between 
2007 and 2012 (see table 1 in section 2.3) indicates that sector budget support (2007-2010) 
and contributions to a SWAp fund (2011) for the justice and law and order sector (JLOS) are 
the major elements of the Dutch involvement in Uganda. Total Dutch contributions amounted 
to approximately €21 million in this period, or almost two-thirds of all development 
assistance funds spent in Uganda. Support to JLOS was suspended in 2014 in response to the 
passing of the Anti-Homosexuality Act by the Ugandan Parliament and the ratification of the 
act by President Museveni. Despite the annulment of the act by the Constitutional Court, The 
Netherlands has been withholding all support funds for JLOS, because of the involvement of 
various government agencies in JLOS (communication, Royal Netherlands Embassy, 
Kampala). 
 
JLOS is a network of 17 institutions working in the sector, which was founded in 2000. 
Partner institutions include the judiciary, the police, the public prosecutor, the prison system 
and the human rights commission. It started as a donor-driven initiative, but is assessed as 
having become a home-grown network (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 
2014). External support for JLOS comes from, among others, Austria, Denmark, the 
European Union, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, the United 
Kingdom and the World Bank), which are brought together in the JLOS Development 
Partners Group (interviews, JLOS secretariat, 19 May 2014; World Bank 2009: 18). 
Together, the development partners contribute around 10 per cent toward the total budget of 
the JLOS institutions, which amounts to approximately UGX 600 billion (around €174 
million) (interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2014, JLOS secretariat, 19 May 
2014). 
 
Focal areas within JLOS are: criminal justice, civil justice (land, farming, and commercial 
justice), human rights and accountability, and transitional justice. Apart from operating at the 
national level, JLOS works through so-called District Chainlinked Committees, which bring 
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together representatives from the institutions at the level of the districts. Committees at the 
district level serve to communicate on problems existing at the local level, to reach out to 
communities with information on topical issues, and check on the functioning of the 
institutions at the local level (interviews, JLOS secretariat, 19 May 2014). 
 
Improvement of service delivery and strengthening of procedures were felt to have been the 
main results of donor support for the JLOS institutions (interviews, JLOS secretariat, 19 May 
2014). 
 
 
2.4.4 Democratic Governance Facility 
 
The Netherlands has been involved with the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) and its 
predecessor Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) since 2007. The Netherlands 
contributed €1,518,000 to a basket fund in support of the DDP between 2007 and 2011, and 
started to contribute to DGF in 2011 (€2,000,000 annually for the period between July 2011 
and July 2016). 
 
DDP was created as a post-election programme, set up after the 2006 general elections in 
Uganda, aiming at contributing to the process of democratisation in the country. DDP was a 
programme set up by six donors (Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the UK and The 
Netherlands, who all contributed to a basket fund, administered by Danida’s Human Rights 
Good Governance Office (HUGGO). The main components of the DDP were support of: 
 
 The national electoral commission; 
 Organisational development of political parties; 
 Parliamentary processes; 
 The national civic education programme; 
 Civil society; and  
 Media in democracy. (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2012: 4, 6) 
 
DDP was subsumed into DGF upon the creation of the latter in 2012. DGF was established 
by Austria, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the European Union in order to finance both civil society organisations and government 
institutions. It focuses on three key areas: 1) Deepening Democracy, 2) Rights, Justice and 
Peace, 3) Voice and Accountability.  
 
 
2.5 The relevance of Dutch activities in the light of governance challenges 
and activities by other donors 
 
The overview of Dutch programmes in the justice and decentralisation sector, supplied by 
IOB, lists two broad sets of activities between 2007 and 2012 as given in table 2. 
 
Given the nature of the activities, it is difficult to give a precise assessment of the extent to 
which the policies and funding decisions of The Netherlands in the justice sector and 
decentralisation address the main governance challenges in Uganda. Below, a tentative 
answer to this question is given along the following lines: 
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1. The extent to which Dutch activities have addressed the main governance challenges 
in the justice sector and decentralisation; 
2. The extent to which those activities have taken account of the political feasibility to 
foster change; 
3. The extent to which the activities have taken into account (a) the activities of other 
Dutch agencies and (b) the activities of other donors. 
 
 
Table 2: Governance reform activities funded by The Netherlands, 2007-2012 
 
A. Major financial contributions (rounded off to thousands of euros) 
Years Description Counterpart Sector Intervention Budget (€) 
2007 Local Government Sector 
Investment Plan (LGSIP) 
Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic 
Development (FPED) 
Decentralisation Supply side 3,900,000 
2007-11 Deepening Democracy 
Programme basket funding 
DANIDA/HUGGO Democratisation/ 
decentralisation 
Supply and 
demand side 
1,518,000 
2008-10 Sectoral budget support JLOS Ministry of FPED Rule of law Supply side 17,800,000 
2008-12 Contribution to Independent 
Development Fund 
Independent Development 
Fund 
Rule of law/civil 
society 
Supply and 
demand side 
1,250,000 
2011 Sector-wide Approach JLOS Ministry of FPED Rule of law Supply side 3,215,000 
2011 Democratic Governance 
Facility 
Danish Embassy Kampala Democratisation/ 
decentralisation/ 
rule of law 
Supply and 
demand side 
2,000,000 
2007-12 Total    29,683,000 
 
B. Project funding (rounded off to thousands of euros)  
Years Description Counterpart Sector Intervention Budget (€) 
2007 ACODE, think tank role ACODE Democratisation/ 
decentralisation 
Demand side 19,000 
2007 Support fund for human rights HURINET Rule of law Demand side 8,000 
2007 Domestic violence project CAAD Defilement Rule of law Demand side 5,000 
2007 Design human rights fund DANIDA Kampala Rule of law Demand side 48,000 
2007 Private sector foundation 
human rights 
Various Rule of law N/a 100,000 
2007 Technical assistance in districts SNV Decentralisation Supply side 191,000 
2007-8 Anti-corruption Kick corruption out of 
Kigezi  
Rule of law Demand side 86,000 
2007-8 Preparation of document on 
constitution 
Kituo Cha Katiba Democratisation/ 
rule of law 
Demand side 37,000 
2007-8 Prisoner Magazine UPAF Uganda Prison Services Rule of law Demand side 12,000 
2007-10 Core funding Human Rights Forum 
(HURIFO) 
Rule of law Demand side 135,000 
2007-12 Police accountability project (2 
phases) 
HURINET Rule of law Demand and 
supply side 
421,000 
2008-11 Support Ugandan Human 
Rights Commission 
Ministry of Finance Rule of law Supply side 300,000 
2009-11 Police review State University of New 
York 
Rule of law Supply side 415,000 
2009-12 Budget tracking project 
(CBTIC) 
ACODE Decentralisation/ 
democratisation 
Demand side 980,000 
2010-11 Consultancy ORIO Advance Consulting Rule of law N/a 25,000 
2007-12 Total    2,782,00 
Source: IOB 
 
A comparison of activities with the main governance challenges that were identified in 
section 2.2, leads to an answer to the first question, related to the extent to which Dutch 
activities have addressed the main governance challenges in the justice sector and 
decentralisation. Section 2.2 argued that the major challenges in the justice sector are related 
to capacity constraints, corruption, executive interference and militarisation of the police 
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force. The main challenges in the area of decentralisation were argued to be: parallel 
centralisation, district proliferation and funding and capacity of local government institutions. 
 
It is clear from the overview in table 2 that major programme funding from The Netherlands 
has tried to address several of the issues identified as major governance challenges in the 
justice sector and local government. In particular, the joint funding of the JLOS support 
programme was aimed at enhancing capacity of institutions in the Ugandan justice sector. 
Next to this, Dutch contributions to enhance capacity of local government were provided 
primarily to the Ugandan Local Government Sector Investment Plan. 
 
Smaller contributions to projects of limited scale and duration seemed to have targeted 
specific issues related to justice, law and order and decentralisation, such as the activities 
aimed at the role of the police (e.g. the Police Accountability project implemented by 
HURINET and the Police Review undertaken by the State University of New York). Support 
for ACODE’s budget tracking project can be seen as one of the ways to strengthen local 
government, as can the support provided to ACODE through DGF for the local government 
scorecard initiative. 
 
In relation to the second question – focusing on the extent to which those activities have 
taken account of the political feasibility to foster change – we feel that a certain degree of 
caution is necessary. Some of the governance challenges that were identified in section 2.2 
are major issues, related to fundamental characteristics of the political economy of Uganda, 
as well as the power bases of the incumbent regime. The data in table 2 indicate that the 
major governance challenges – such as grand-scale corruption, executive interference, 
militarisation of the police force, parallel centralisation and district proliferation – have not 
been addressed directly by The Netherlands. To a large extent, donor reticence in these areas 
seems to be informed by the recognition of the limits to external action. Donors are aware 
that they have limited capacity for bringing about change in institutions and practices that the 
incumbent regime considers vital to its such survival. The Dutch government has acted, 
though, in response to allegations of corruption, because it possessed the ‘power of the 
purse’. Corruption issues have led to the periodic interruption and later cessation of budget 
support to the Government of Uganda. In general, the literature on issues of political 
conditionality suggests that the leverage of international donors over unwilling governments 
is rather small: the suitability of development assistance funds as a tool for pressurising 
governments seems quite restricted, and most donors tend to shy away from direct 
intervention in the internal affairs of recipient governments. 
 
In addition to these two points, it is noteworthy that the Embassy was confident of its ability 
to promote governance challenges in Uganda, which were not directly part of the agenda of 
the Ugandan government. The MASP 2008-2011 mentioned the fostering of more democratic 
policing and increased civilian oversight as parts of the Netherlands agenda but falling 
outside the circle of interest of the Ugandan government. In a similar vein, the Embassy 
aimed to promote the independence of the judicial system, an objective not in line with the 
government’s direct interests (see section 2.2.3 above). The MASP 2012-2015 reflects the 
Embassy’s change in strategy: from formal political dialogue to more informal dialogues, 
which had proven to be more productive, and from cooperation at the political level to greater 
focus on the technical level. It was argued that past involvement with JLOS had demonstrated 
that opportunities to make progress are far more limited at the political level than at the 
technical level. Hence, the Embassy chose to give priority to strengthening the 
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professionalism of JLOS personnel and supporting civil society in their role in promoting 
good governance and demanding accountability. 
 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 have provided input for answering the third question, concerning the 
extent to which Dutch activities related to the justice sector and decentralisation have taken 
into account (a) the activities of other Dutch agencies and (b) the activities of other donors. 
 
The inventory of the activities of other Dutch agencies in Uganda indicates that the activities 
in the justice sector and decentralisation supported by the Dutch government and the 
Netherlands Embassy in Kampala have been largely complementary to those of the MFS 
partners (section 2.3.1) and NIMD (section 2.3.2). The major financial contributions provided 
by The Netherlands (see part A in table 2) do not seem to show major overlap with the 
activities of the MFS partners, although specific projects supported from either the 
Deepening Democracy Programme (between 2007 and 2011) or the Democratic Governance 
Facility (since 2011) may have resembled the MFS-supported projects. Specific projects 
funded by the Netherlands Embassy (part B in table 2) seem to differ quite substantially from 
the MFS and NIMD projects described in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Possible exceptions to this 
more general trend may be the support provided for NGOs working on transparency of the 
Ugandan budget process, such as ACODE (the Citizens’ Budget Tracking and Information 
Centre), the Uganda Debt Network, which has been supported by Hivos, and the umbrella 
organisation Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group, which received financial support 
through DGF. Through the funding of various organisations working on budget transparency, 
the Dutch Embassy and MFS partners seem to have enhanced the capacity of Ugandan civil 
society to monitor budgetary policies of the Ugandan government. Next to this, collaboration 
of Dutch and Ugandan NGOs in the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform (UGMP) 
between 2004 and 2011 seems to have been relevant for policy making on Uganda by the 
Dutch government, given that UGMP has been monitoring trends in governance in the 
country. 
 
The overview of activities by the international donor community in Uganda, both in joint and 
bilateral frameworks (section 2.4), indicates that the approach to governance challenges has 
been characterised by coordination and collaboration among donors. The figures on aid 
commitments related to various aspects of governance (table 1) provide an indication of this 
coordination. The financial commitments point to a strong focus of aid in a small number of 
sub-sectors, such as democratic participation and civil society; legal and judicial develop-
ment; decentralisation and support to local government; and anti-corruption organisations and 
institutions. The data show that The Netherlands has been an important contributor to 
activities in the first two of these sub-sectors: between 2004 and 2012 it provided 11.7 per 
cent of the funds for activities related to democratic participation and civil society and even 
31.5 per cent of the funds in support of legal and judicial development. The activities of three 
main programmes focused on the strengthening of democracy and the legal system (DDP, 
DGF and JLOS) are the witness of the common endeavours of the international community in 
Uganda. Dutch support to these three main programmes, plus the Local Government Sector 
Investment Plan (LGSIP), account for 87.6 per cent of all Dutch spending on Uganda 
between 2007 and 2012 (see table 2). 
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3. Insights from evaluations on Dutch projects related to justice, 
rule of law and decentralisation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
What have available evaluations said about the effectiveness of the Dutch supported 
programmes and projects on justice and decentralisation? In question 3.19, the Terms of 
Reference for this country study request an investigation of previous evaluations. Specific 
points to be addressed are:  
 
 the extent to which outputs, intermediate outcomes and outcomes have been achieved; 
 the mechanisms contributing to the results, as well as other factors, positively and 
negatively; 
 the unexpected or unintended results; 
 the possible difference in results for men and women; 
 the extent to which the intervention can be expected to have contributed to the ultimate 
governance objectives, given the influence of other factors. 
 
 
3.2 Sample of evaluation studies 
 
The major programmes (co)-funded by The Netherlands between 2007-2014 in support of 
justice and decentralisation in Uganda have been the Local Government Sector Investment 
Plan (LGSIP), the Justice, Law and Order Sector Investment Plans (JLOS), the Deepening 
Democracy Programme (DDP) and its successor the Democratic Governance Facility (see 
also table 2 above). In addition, the Netherlands government funded some fifteen projects on 
these themes, while other Dutch agencies also supported a variety of activities (see paragraph 
2.3 above).14 
 
Searching for suitable evaluation studies, it became clear that the number of evaluations of 
programmes for justice and decentralisation in Uganda is limited. There are no external 
evaluations of the sector programme LGSIP: differences of opinion between the Government 
of Uganda and its development partners induced the latter to stop funding LGSIP in mid-
2009. For JLOS one external mid-term evaluation study (2010) is available, and there is an 
end term evaluation for the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP). Strictly speaking, the 
DDP does not fall under the categories of justice and of decentralisation, so that it would be 
out of the realm for ToR question 3.19. However, given its broad character as a programme 
fund, DDP has been selected in the current sample. 
 
To further beef up the lean sample, the criteria for sample selection were stretched by looking 
at the period before 2007 and by including other documents than evaluations. For DDP, a 
draft Programme Completion Report was added. To compensate for the absence of an 
evaluation of LGSIP, an evaluation of the Local Governance Development Project 2000-2007 
(the predecessor of LGSIP) was included, along with an official closure project document 
from the Netherlands Embassy.  The one mid-term evaluation of the Justice, Law and Order 
                                                 
14 Only those projects have been included that started before the end of 2012, the start of the policy review. 
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Sector, was complemented with the Annual Performance Reports since 2011. Box 1 gives an 
overview of the studies consulted. 
 
 
Box 1: Studies consulted  
For DDP: 
- IDP, End-Term Evaluation Report Deepening Democracy Programme Uganda, 2011 
- Deepening Democracy Programme, Deepening Democracy Completion Report, draft 
version, 2012 
 
For LGDP: 
- World Bank, Implementation and Completion Report LGDP II , 2008 
- Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank), Project Performance Assessment Report, 
The Republic of Uganda, Second Local Government Development Project, Report no 
87597, 2014 
- Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda, Slotdocument LGDP LGSIP, 2010 
 
For JLOS: 
- World Bank, Uganda Legal and Judicial Sector Study Report, 2009 
- The Consulting House, Office of the GLR (Nairobi) and Centre for Justice Studies and 
Innovations (Kampala), Justice Law and Order Sector, Second Sector Strategic 
Investment Plan (SIP II), Independent Mid term Evaluation Report, 2010 
- JLOS, Annual Performance Report 2011/12 (SIP II), 2012 
- JLOS, Annual Performance Report 2012/13 (SIP III), 2013 
- JLOS, Annual Performance Report 2013/14 (SIP III), 2014 
 
 
3.3 Findings from previous evaluation studies 
 
3.3.1 Deepening Democracy Programme 
 
The DDP grew out of development partner support around the 2006 elections in Uganda. The 
programme was designed to strengthen democracy as an ongoing process and with an eye on 
the next elections in 2011. DDP provided support for the election process, the multiparty 
political system, parliamentary autonomy, active civic engagement and free media. Around 
30 partners have implemented projects, ranging from the electoral commission, parliament, 
political parties, media networks and civic organisations. Through them the entire population 
was targeted. 
 
DDP was a basket fund of six donors (UK, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and The 
Netherlands) who committed a total of $ 21 million. The Netherlands signed up for $ 2 
million, and have in fact contributed € 1,518,000. In 2012, DDP was succeeded by the 
Democratic Governance Fund (DGF), with the same donors plus Austria (see also section 
2.3.3). While DDP was to start in 2007, the programme did not take off until mid-2009. 
 
The evaluation came two years after the start of the programme, too short a time to show 
clear outcomes and impacts, says the report. ‘The evaluation of results, therefore, centers to a 
large extent on outputs and seeks on this basis to draw conclusions on outcomes where it 
seems safe and justified to do so.’ (IDP 2011:5) 
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A. Achievements  
 
The achievements of DDP include:  
 
 Contribution to better voter registration and to credibility of election results through 
support to electronic election devices; 
 Contribution to more competitive and structured political parties and to an increased 
dialogue between them; 
 Better-informed discussions in parliament through availability of advisory services; 
 More active civic engagement through civic education, the creation of platforms for 
debate and dialogue between duty bearers and citizens; 
 Contribution to improved service delivery through monitoring of local level 
authorities; 
 More reliable and impartial news, improved approaches to participatory broadcasting. 
 
The report concludes that overall programme performance has been good and that results 
have been achieved at a satisfactory level. It notes that DDP was only one instrument in 
promoting democracy in Uganda and that overall democratic developments are subject to 
influence from a large number of powerful actors and factors. Yet, ‘the programme … was 
timely and highly relevant. Alignment with official national policy priorities, the inclusion of 
all major actors, the ability to respond to changes in the context, and the flexibility to meet 
unforeseen needs and demands all contribute to ensuring a high degree of relevance.’ (IDP 
2011:52)  
 
B. Outcomes and impact 
 
Whereas the End term evaluation report is prudent about achievements beyond the output 
level, the draft DDP Programme Completion report 201215 does comment on outcomes and 
impact. It rates the results regarding the overall goal of improved democratic governance in 
Uganda as ‘less than satisfactory’, meaning ‘adjustments to plans and/or strategy necessary’. 
(Deepening Democracy Programme 2012:12) But, lack of improvement in democratic 
governance over the period under review does not imply that the DDP has failed, says the 
report. Such an argument would assume attribution, ‘namely that foreign assistance plays a 
key role affecting democratic practices and processes in Uganda. However, the provision of 
limited financial support supplemented by policy dialogue to improve the performance of 
formal institutions and processes does not, and cannot, touch on the fundamental 
determinants of how power is organized, allocated and exercised in Uganda. DDP, and all 
foreign aid, only has leverage in limited areas and ways.’ (Deepening Democracy Programme 
2012:13) For the author it makes more sense to analyse sub-objectives such as the integrity of 
elections or the nature of civic engagement for which DDP interventions are relatively more 
significant. The ratings of these results are ‘satisfactory’ (Deepening Democracy Programme 
2012 :14-33). The DDP’s programme completion report concluded that, overall, ‘DDP-
supported interventions achieved high levels of awareness, but … their impact in influencing 
changed attitudes or behaviour cannot be established’ (Deepening Democracy Programme 
2012: 52). This conclusion is clearly more pessimistic than IDP’s assessment, which pointed 
at various achievements of behavioural change, including voter registration practices and 
more active civic engagement (see above under A.). 
                                                 
15 The author of this report is probably DDP’s programme manager at the time, Nicolas De Torrente. The final 
version of this report could not be traced. 
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C. Mechanisms and factors responsible for (in)effectiveness 
 
The draft Programme Completion report is also open about the mechanisms and factors 
causing the lack of progress. It points to the political culture in Uganda, in particular the 
centralization and personalization of the executive power, the linkage of the ruling party with 
state organs, the affiliation of security agencies with the ruling party and patronage politics, 
which have persisted during the period of DDP implementation. Further reasons for the 
limited headway include: lack of timeliness in decision-making, lack of cooperation among 
stakeholders, lack of capacity for proper planning. (Deepening Democracy Programme 
2012:56) 
 
D. Different effects for men and women 
 
The reports do not specify differences in impact for men and women. Gender equality 
projects included support to the Uganda Women’s Parliamentary Association (UWOPA) for 
its work on legislation regarding domestic violence and female genital mutilation, to the 
Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGROUP) for the monitoring of women’s participation 
in the electoral process from voter registration to polling day, and support to the Women in 
Democracy Group (WDG) to prepare women candidates for the elections.  
 
A concrete result was that the Domestic Violence and Female Genital Mutilation bills were 
passed into law. (IDP 2011:8, Deepening Democracy Programme 2012:55) The evaluation 
also reports that women leaders were elected partly as a result of the work of WDG; it 
suggests to further support the new leaders so that they can effectively represent their 
constituents. (IDP 2011:53) 
 
E. Lessons and recommendations 
 
However useful the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ framework may be, the draft Programme 
Completion report argues that future programming should be oriented towards ‘demand-side’ 
interventions. First, because of the ambivalence of state actors towards democratic 
governance processes and institutions, and, second, because of the likelihood that civic 
education or governance accountability initiatives will be undertaken by partners more 
receptive to external assistance and capable to lead the democratic progress in Uganda’s 
‘mixed picture’ context. (Deepening Democracy Programme 2012:57) 
 
The End term evaluation does not speak in favour of a particular form of interventions, but 
emphasizes that an alteration of the democratic practice, values and culture is a long-term 
process that is influenced by factors beyond the control of the programme. This requires the 
setting of realistic targets, which are to be reviewed regularly (IDP 2011:51). The evaluation 
also found that the choice to limit the Programme Management Unit’s (PMU) role to 
‘technical support’, as opposed to engaging directly in policy discussions, gave the DDP a 
sense of impartiality and thus contributed to credibility of the programme. With regard to 
civic education, the report recommends to go for more alliances and networks of CSOs, and 
to put more emphasis on their organizational development (IDP 2011:53). 
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3.3.2 Local Government Development Project II 
 
Between the year 2000 and mid-2007, there were two Local Government Development 
Projects. They supported local government reforms in Uganda, which started in 1992 with the 
decentralization policy pronouncement. In 1997, the reforms became part of the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP, see section 2.2.1), the framework for detailed sector and 
local governments planning. LGDP I ran from 2000 to 2003. To consolidate its achievements, 
a Second Local Government Development Project (LGDP II) was organised from mid-2003 
to mid-2007.  
 
Total costs of LGDP II were appraised at US$ 165 million, financed by a World Bank credit 
of US$ 50 million and a World Bank grant of US$ 75 million. The Netherlands contributed 
US$ 15 million and was the leading bilateral donor. Other external partners were the 
Republic of Ireland: US$7.5m, DANIDA: US$1.8m, Austria Development Corporation: 
US$0.3m. The Government of Uganda contributed US$14.8m. 
 
The project development objective was to improve the institutional ability of local 
governments for sustainable and decentralized service delivery. There were five components: 
support for the Decentralization Process, Local Development Grant (LDG), Local 
Government Capacity Building, Local Government Revenue Enhancement and support to 
Project Implementation. The primary target groups of the project were the local governments 
and their institutions and constituencies, as well as private contractors for implementation of 
the substantial parts of the program.  
 
A. Achievements 
 
In a closure document the Royal Netherlands Embassy (2010) notes that LGDP partly 
achieved its objective of improving local government institutional performance for 
decentralised service delivery. The functional capacity of local governments improved so that 
they can now prepare and submit annual accounts, and can plan and manage the delivery of 
services with increased participation by the people. A system of annual assessments on 
performance was developed, leading, amongst others, to an increase in the quantity and 
quality of infrastructure in the countryside.  
 
Six years of support through Local Government Development Projects (LGDP I and II) 
paved the way for a sector wide approach to decentralization, the Local Government Sector 
Investment Programme (LGISP). But since the Government of Uganda could not agree with 
the development partners on the character of LGSIP as a planning framework, the basis for 
support disappeared and funding was ended at the end of June 2009. 
 
B. World Bank assessments 
 
The World Bank conducted two studies on the LGDP II, an Implementation and Completion 
Report (ICR) in 2008, and a Project Performance Assessment by the Independent Evaluation 
Group in 2014. While the first one was rather positive on the results of LGDP at the end of 
the project, the study conducted six years later showed that initial results had been 
undermined by various circumstances.  
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C. Outputs and outcomes 
 
The ICR lists outputs by component, including the development of planning guides, 
regulations, training of staff, the conduct of audits, projects concerning roads and drainage, 
education, production, health, water and sanitation, administration, waste, the preparation of 
local government revenue enhancement plans with training of local officials, and project 
management support. The overall outcome rating on implementation was ‘satisfactory’ on all 
components. Some components were qualified ‘highly satisfactory’, like the capacity 
building grant; others were ‘moderately satisfactory’, e.g. the local government revenue 
enhancement. The report identifies three substantial challenges due to government policy 
shifts during the project period: the government established new local governments, it 
abolished the Graduated Tax, and exempted owner-occupied houses from paying rates 
(World Bank 2008: 4-5). 
 
The Project Performance Assessment done by IEG (2014)16 found that the project was 
initially successful in building administrative capacity of local governments; it supported 
over 30,000 sub-projects in several sectors. However, due to substantial policy reversals since 
2005, the improved administrative capacity has been underutilized.  
 
D. Mechanisms and factors responsible for (in)effectiveness 
 
For the IEG, the mechanisms responsible for the shift in the project’s effectiveness are the 
following policy reversals: the near elimination of local revenue base, the reduction of 
transfers to local governments, increased percentage of conditional grants, and the creation of 
new districts, mostly for political patronage. These factors have been hindering service 
delivery and have led to a weakening of the discretionary powers of local governments, to a 
centralization of functions and resources, and a reduction of available financial and human 
resources at district level. Consequently, says IEG, the progress achieved under the project 
was not sustainable. Instead of an improvement of the institutional performance of local 
governments for sustainable, decentralized service delivery, IEG noted deterioration in the 
quality of service delivery. Lack of funds for operations and maintenance has subsequently 
led to the progressive erosion of the initial improvements in quality of management, and in 
infrastructure. For IEG it is clear that ‘the GOU policy reversals, during and after the life of 
the project, made such results unsustainable in the medium term’. (IEG 2014: x) 
 
E. Different effects for men and women 
 
None of the reports specifies differences in impact for men and women. The Appraisal 
document for LGDP II says ‘gender is included in objectives and assessment criteria’. 
 
F. Lessons and recommendations 
 
Key lessons from LGDP for the RNE are that: ‘Sustainable solutions require full political 
support’ and ‘Without sound political support there is no meaningful local revenue generation 
and without meaningful local revenue there can be no meaningful decentralisation’. 
                                                 
16 Project Performance Assessments are part of IEG’s standard procedures to annually assess 20-25% of the 
Bank’s lending operations through field work. They are carried out for interventions that are innovative, large, 
or complex, or interventions that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations or likely to generate 
important lessons. 
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Likewise, IEG concludes that ‘Policy reversals can cause serious damage to otherwise 
significant project outcomes, and are difficult to counter.’ A further lesson for IEG is that 
‘Decentralization is not a sector, while it was treated as such in Uganda with a Sector 
Working Group, a Sector Investment Plan and specific donor support. Decentralization of 
service delivery affects all sectors of the economy and should be supported in a harmonized 
way across sectors and donor programs.’ (IEG 2014: xi). 
 
 
3.3.3 Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) 
 
The JLOS was formed in 2000, when Justice, Law and Order institutions in Uganda got 
organized into a sector and set joint objectives in line with those of the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP). The initial number of institutions that joined JLOS was ten, including 
the Uganda Police Force, the Uganda Prison Service, the Ministry of Gender and the Ministry 
of Local Government for the Local Councils Courts. Over the years, JLOS grew to its current 
17 member institutions. A special Secretariat was established in August 2000 and it 
developed its first Sector Investment Plan for the years 2001 to 2006. The mission of JLOS 
was to enable all people to live in a safe and just society. 
 
The Royal Netherlands Embassy has been a key partner in the development of the Justice, 
Law and Order Sector in Uganda. RNE was instrumental in bringing the sector together 
around the year 2000, and it has been a major player in the International Development Partner 
Group, often as its Chair. The Embassy supported both the formal supply side of the sector 
(government and constitutional bodies) and the demand side (citizens and civil society 
organisations), gradually moving from one to the other over the years. Between 2007 and 
2012, supply-side institutions received some € 22 million, almost two-thirds of all Dutch 
development assistance funds for Uganda. In the same period, demand side support was 
approximately € 2 million. The Netherlands suspended its support to JLOS in 2014 in 
response to the passing of the Anti-Homosexuality Act by the Ugandan Parliament and the 
ratification of the act by President Museveni. Despite the annulment of the act by the 
Constitutional Court, The Netherlands has been withholding all support funds for JLOS. 
 
The main objectives of the first Strategic Investment Plan of JLOS (SIP I, 2001-2006) were 
to maintain law and order and to increase access to justice for all persons. SIP II (2006-2011) 
carried these goals forward, but added the aim to enhance the public’s capacity to demand 
improved service. For the realization of this intention, civic and local leaders were invited in 
the District Chain Linked Initiative and in the JLOS Coordination Committees. The goal of 
the current third Strategic Investment Plan (SIP III, 2012-2016/17) is to promote the rule of 
law. SIP III has set quantitative targets for 2016: to increase public satisfaction with JLOS 
services from 60% in 2011 to 70%; to increase public confidence in the justice system from 
26% in 2012 to 44%; and to enhance the index of judicial independence from 3.8 to 4. 
 
As a sector programme JLOS contains a multitude of activities, including the promotion of 
enacting laws, institution and capacity building for fighting corruption, improving prisons 
both its physical environment and the treatment of prisoners, improving police services, 
conducting legal education and the promotion of human rights. Beneficiaries are many, 
ranging from staff of prisons and police to prisoners and citizens, to judiciary and state 
attorneys. 
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The Netherlands’ thematic focus in JLOS has been twofold: i) the police - promoting a 
change from regime policing to democratic policing and civilian oversight - and ii) the 
judiciary system - promoting its independence, including the improvement of legal aid and 
the prison system. Due attention was also given to gender equality issues, with the Embassy 
playing an active role in the gender working group of JLOS and supporting gender activities 
such as the fight against female genital mutilation, and the promotion of access to justice for 
victims of gender based violence. Decentralisation, another major theme of Dutch support to 
Uganda, figured in the JLOS as well. From the start of the sector, the Ministry of Local 
Government has been one of the participating institutions, its specific mandate in JLOS is to 
supervise the Local Council Courts throughout the country. 
 
The Netherlands’ ambitions for the JLOS were high. According to the MASP 2008-2011 the 
Embassy saw scope to promote part of The Netherlands’ agenda that fell ‘outside the circle of 
interest of the Government of Uganda’ (see also section 2.4.2 if this report), notably the 
fostering of more democratic policing. RNE believed that it could convince the GoU of the 
long-term benefits thereof, through dialogues, ‘show’ projects and support to advocacy 
initiatives and civilian oversight. Another of the Embassy’s priorities was the promotion of 
the independence of the judicial system, which was neither in line with the government’s 
direct interest. The Embassy believed that its lead role in the JLOS and its good reputation 
would lead to success in this field. In the MASP 2012-15 the Embassy adapted its strategy: 
the dialogues in the JLOS sector were to continue, but in a more informal way instead of 
being formal political dialogues. Because of its experience that making progress at the 
political level was far more limited than at the technical level  
the Embassy switched its support to strengthening the professionalism of JLOS personnel and 
civil society actors. Both strategies were re-enforced in the MASP 2014-2017. 
 
A. Evaluations of JLOS 
 
In spite of the long duration of the JLOS programme, its size and the importance attached to 
it by the development partners, evaluations of the programme have been few.17  
 
In 2009, the World Bank published a report on the legal and judicial sector, which was 
undertaken in 2005 and updated in 2007 and in 2008. The scope of this study was limited to 
i) the commercial courts and the establishment of the Centre for Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution (CADER), ii) the adequacy of legal education, and iii) the provision of legal aid 
services to the poor. The study concludes that the commercial justice reform programme was 
a success, as was the CADER. More capacity and changed attitudes of lawyers trained by the 
centre were major results. In the report concern is raised about the priority in JLOS for 
commercial justice in a country where the majority of the population is engaged in 
agriculture, and where programs on family and land justice are urgently needed. This is 
particularly pertinent in view of the other findings of the study, notably that the system of 
legal education was inadequate, with an overlap of institutions wasting resources and turning 
out large number of lawyers that were unable to carry out tasks required within the sector. 
Similarly, access for the poor to justice is found to be weak and the delivery of justice in 
serious need of improvement.  
 
                                                 
17 In 2012, The Netherlands Court of Audit performed a study about sector budget support with Uganda as a 
case (Algemene Rekenkamer 2012). The study investigated how donor and partner countries account for budget 
support, but it has not looked at the effectiveness of the support itself. Hence, it is not useful for ToR question 
3.19. 
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In 2010, an external evaluation team conducted a Mid-term evaluation of SIP II. It found the 
agenda for sector reforms on course so that the SIP II had good potential for impact – which 
would imply transformation of the sector. In particular, the work on law reforms was a 
success. Many laws were enacted, which facilitated the Judiciary to deal with case backlog 
(The Consulting House et al. 2010: 56). The commercial justice component was doing well, 
with achievements on the case disposal rate and capacity development of commercial 
lawyers. The areas of family justice and land justice, on the other hand, were slow in getting 
off the ground. The MTE is concerned about the so-called ‘brick and mortar reforms’: the 
construction of physical facilities. Since these were not always followed by services it looked 
as if JLOS institutions were brought closer to the poor, but in reality the distance between the 
poor and the law was not sufficiently reduced. A similar point concerns the institutional 
reforms through equipment and vehicles. While they prepared and facilitated the institutions 
for implementation, they were not always effective. Some of the investments resulted in 
‘dead capital’: without recurrent budget to service them, they died (The Consulting House et 
al. 2010: 10). Investment in human capital, another critical implementation pre-requisite, was 
also found to be inadequate. 
 
B. Outputs and outcome 
 
Recent information about the results of JLOS can be found in the Annual Performance 
Reports published under the responsibility of the JLOS Leadership Committee. Thanks to 
sophisticated M&E arrangements developed for SIP III, the implementation of JLOS has 
been closely monitored since 2012. The result is an annual overview of activities and outputs; 
occasionally outcomes are mentioned.  
 
The Annual Performance Report of 2011/12 highlights the achievements of SIP II and 
mentions results in the sphere of law enactment, capacity building to fight corruption and to 
use prosecution-led investigation, training in human rights skills for 1500 prison and police 
staff, and community awareness through barazas and media campaigns. The prison facilities 
and treatment in prison improved, resulting e.g. in a reduction of mortality rates in prisons 
from 10 in 1000 inmates at start SIP II to 2 in 1000 at end of SIP II. During SIP II, the 
carrying capacity of prisons increased by 54%. Yet, with a 72% increase in prison population 
the net result is that 35% of prison units have serious congestion levels. The police population 
ratio increased from 1:709 to 1:755, warden prisoner ratio deteriorated from 1:4.5 to 1:5, in 
some places 1:10, the functional presence of courts, police, prisons increased. There was a 
22% reduction in case backlog, and a reduction of average stay on remand.  
 
The next two Annual Performance Reports continue in the same vein, listing activities that 
lead to more improvements, with sometimes a backslide. In view of the additional aim for 
SIP II to enhance the public’s capacity to demand services, it is interesting to note an increase 
in number of districts with a complete chain of frontline JLOS services from 79 in 2013 to 84 
in 2014. In the same period, complaints against prisons reduced by 24%, those against police 
by 0.5%. Yet, the report recognizes that the sector must ‘deepen public access to JLOS 
services, address public perception of corruption in JLOS institutions, enhance institutional 
productivity as well as welfare of staff across sector institutions’ (JLOS 2014: 6). 
 
C. Different effects for men and women 
 
A differentiation between men and women is made in various, sometimes special, ways. The 
APR 2011/12 specifies that the number of women committing crimes increased by 48%, from 
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2,395 in 2010 to 3,533 in 2011. ‘The common offenses committed by both men and women 
were assaults, thefts, threatening violence, economic crimes, homicides, breaking in, drug 
trafficking and domestic violence. The increase is attributed to poverty, family disputes, 
consumption of alcohol and drug use and unemployment.’ (JLOS 2012: 47). 
The report also mentions a joint programme with UN Women, to enhance access to justice 
for women. (JLOS 2012: Chapter 6) The gender equality efforts in 2013 and 2014 resulted in 
the translation into 8 local languages of the Domestic Violence Act, and the simplification of 
the Female Genital Mutilation Act No 5. There was a pilot project to establish five safety 
centres, a new checklist to integrate gender principles and standards into draft legislation 
while the Judiciary adopted a gender policy. 
 
D. Support suspended 
 
A special note concerns the suspension of support by The Netherlands, which is mentioned in 
the APR 2013/14. According to the report this causes a shortfall of over € 6.5 million for 
2014/15, which is 50% of JLOS SWAP budget. Consequently various projects will be 
deferred or delayed: infrastructure and improvement, legal aid to poor, community policing, 
staff training, case backlog reduction, capacity building. ‘We are likely to experience rapidly 
growing case backlog, prison congestion, violation of rights, poor service delivery and 
breakdown in the rule of law’. (JLOS 2014: 137-138) 
 
E. Lessons 
 
Available documentation suggests that JLOS has contributed to governance objectives, but 
this documentation is not sufficient to derive conclusions about effectiveness and impact of 
JLOS. However, some issues are pertinent in the World Bank study, the mid-term evaluation 
and the annual reports: 
 
 commercial justice reform was addressed successfully, while family and land justice 
were neglected, although the latter need a lot of attention, particularly to guarantee 
access to justice for the poor ; 
 much attention was paid to the construction of physical facilities, and the purchase of 
equipment and vehicles, while the actual delivery of services was underemphasised; 
and 
 investment in human capital was inadequate. 
  
 
3.4 Contribution to the ultimate governance objectives 
 
The final effectiveness question in the ToR is to what extent the project can be expected to 
have contributed to the ultimate governance objectives (question 3.18). An answer to that 
question requires, first of all, a definition of ‘ultimate governance objectives’. The 
intervention theory for this evaluation speaks of two ultimate governance objectives.  Good 
governance as a means to an end, the end being poverty reduction and economic growth. 
Good governance as an end in itself, which includes: democratic participation, improved rule 
of law, more control of corruption, and a more transparent and accountable government. 
(ToR, p 9/10)  
 
Looking at the evaluation studies from the latter perspective of good governance, as an end in 
itself, it can be said that they have indeed contributed to the governance objectives: 
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 DDP-supported interventions were found to be significant at the level of sub-
objectives such as the integrity of elections or the nature of civic engagement, and they 
achieved high levels of awareness.   
 The LGDP activities were successful and bore many fruits, ranging from infrastructure 
and services to enhanced capacity of local governments. The projects paved the way 
for a sector wide approach to decentralization. 
 The JLOS programme has been able to improve the functioning of the sector in many 
ways: new laws enacted, better prisons, improvements in police facilities, capacity 
building to fight corruption, etc.  
 
At the same time, it is not at all clear whether the results of the programmes are stable and 
robust. The outcomes in LGDP were not sustainable. The improved capacity to which LGDP 
contributed between 2000-2007 became underutilized in later years after, and the quality of 
service delivery deteriorated: ‘the GOU policy reversals, during and after the life of the 
project, made such results unsustainable in the medium term’. In DDP, the impact of the 
projects in terms of changed attitudes or behaviour could not be established. But perhaps that 
was too much too expect, suggests the Programme Completion Report, since foreign aid 
cannot touch on the fundamental determinants of how power is organized, allocated and 
exercised in Uganda. The comment links to the lesson expressed by the Embassy at the 
closure of LGDP/LGSIP in 2010: ‘Sustainable solutions require full political support’ (Royal 
Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2010), and to the conclusion of the IEG on the same project in 
2014: ‘Policy reversals can cause serious damage to otherwise significant project outcomes, 
and are difficult to counter.’ (IEG 2014) The JLOS performance reports show gradual 
improvements in various areas, but also occasional backslides and persistent issues such as 
the limited public access to justice and services. The suspension of Dutch support in 2014 
brought out the vulnerability of the results since various projects were said to face delay or 
deferral. 
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4. HURINET: Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) 
 
 
4.1 PARP’s rationale and objectives 
 
The Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) was implemented by the civil society 
organisation Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U) with financial support from the 
Royal Netherlands Embassy (a total of €260,355 was allocated for the 2010-2012 period, 
following on an allocation of €230,000 for the activities in an earlier project – see below). 
The overall objective of the project was to improve accountability and democratic 
governance within the Uganda Police services in close cooperation with civil society 
organisations. The project brought together the police and civil society to foster exchange and 
build a stronger civilian oversight over the police. In the final report about PARP, the 
following four objectives of the intervention are detailed: 
 
1. Stronger civilian oversight of the police in Uganda; 
2. Establishment of public safety and security networks based on the premise of a shared 
responsibility between the police and the public with regard to public safety and 
security 
3. Contribution by civil society and the public to the police review process 
4. Public order management that is conducted in an environment that promotes and 
protects the rights and freedoms of Ugandans to assembly. 
 
The envisaged final outcomes of the PARP are (a) enhanced police accountability and (b) 
more effective public order management, which are supposed to contribute to improvements 
in the observance of human rights in Uganda.  
 
The intervention logic of the PARP contains three intermediate outcomes:  
 
1. more effective civilian oversight of the Ugandan police force (objective 1); 
2. more public safety and security through the engagement between citizens and the 
police (objective 2); and  
3. attainment of public order management with greater respect for human rights 
(objective 4).  
 
Key elements of PARP’s intervention theory are that: 
 
 More contacts between citizens and the police and more information about the role of 
the police will be beneficial for a better police force that will attend to societal needs; 
 Contacts and exchange of information are expected to start a process that will reverse 
the role of the police force as an instrument in the hands of the regime towards a 
service for the people; 
 More knowledge about the role of the police may bring back the trust of the 
community in the police and may enhance the police image among the people; 
 Civilian oversight over the police is expected to make the police more accountable; 
 Knowledge and understanding are supposed to be promoted by dialogues between the 
police on the one hand and civil society organisations and specific groups of civilians 
(journalists and students) on the other hand; 
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 The preferred model for the dialogue is the coalition:  coalitions of civil society 
organisations, of journalists of students are to take the lead in the process of 
knowledge – and trust building; 
 Tools for dealing with complaints about the police are expected to be useful in 
bringing malfunctioning in the open, as are various forms of research and publications. 
 
On the basis of these key understandings, the theory of change that is underpinning the PARP 
interventions can be pictured in the following way: 
 
 
Figure 1: PARP’s theory of change 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Implementation of PARP 
 
The Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) was implemented by HURINET 
between 2010 and 2012 in the second phase of a broader project focusing on improving 
police accountability, which started in 2007. While the project was carried out by HURINET-
U, the National Working Group on PARP was formed by seven local organisations, namely 
ACODE, FHRI, FIDA-U, UPAF, ACTV, HURICO, APCOF. PARP started in October 2010 
and lasted until January 2013, and included a 3 months no-cost extension.  
 
The project was implemented against the background of the perception that the police force 
in Uganda is a partisan force that rules in colonial mode. The main concerns are brutality, 
lack of respect for human rights, abuse of power and corruption. PARP aims at improving 
policing in Uganda by bringing together the police and the civil society. The implementing 
agency HURINET has a longstanding relationship with the police. 
 
Study of the project documents and interviews during the inception mission to Uganda made 
it clear that the PARP consisted of a rather loose set of activities, which were held together 
more by the logic of activism driving HURINET than by a well-conceived logic of achieving 
impact on the population at large. Target groups of the various activities differed from police 
officers, to representatives of the media, students, members of parliament and leaders of civil 
society organisations. Most activities were workshops aiming to create rapport between the 
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police and a variety of social actors, and took the form of ‘dialogues’. Next to this, activities 
undertaken as part of the PARP were aimed at creating awareness about the impending 
changes in the Ugandan public order management regime. 
 
The main activities of the project falling within the scope of this country study were as 
follows (HURINET-Uganda 2011a, 2011b): 
 
 In relation to objective 1 (civilian oversight of the police) 
- Six one-day CSO-police dialogues covering nine districts, each attended by 
approximately 60 people 
- Two dialogue meetings of the reform coalition with police commanders; 
- Advocacy dialogues of the project team with the police; 
- The creation of a police reform website; 
- Field missions to document the role of the army and police during elections, 
leading to a pre-election statement, the distribution of 700 copies of the final 
report plus digital reports for HURINET members and CSOs, press releases; 
- The monitoring of Kampala’s mayoral elections;  
- Distribution of 700 copies of the police accountability newsletter ‘Police 
Watch’; 
- Police station visits in four places in Acholi, with 850 people attending; 
 In relation to objective 2 (establishment of public safety and security networks) 
- The organisation three media-police dialogues, with approximately 150 
participants in total; 
- Introduction of a module on the media at the Police Training Department; 
 In relation to objective 4 (the establishment of a public order management regime that 
has more attention to human rights) 
- The analysis of the impact of the Public Order Management Bill/Act on human 
rights and freedoms (distribution of 300 copies and encounters with 
parliament); 
- The airing of nine radio talks shows; 
- The organisation of a dialogue workshop for media, civil society and police, 45 
participants; 
- The distribution of 10,000 copies of the review of the police complaint form 
PF105; and 
- The distribution of 5,500 copies of the police complaints handling manual. 
 
On the basis of the activities, HURINET organised police-civil-society trainings and 
dialogues at the local level by bringing together the two parties and facilitating discussions 
about good policing. These trainings were also used to provide information material 
describing how to achieve good policing that respects the basic human rights of the people. 
 
HURINET mainly worked in 13 police districts, namely Arua, Bushenyi, Gulu, Kabale, 
Kabarole, Kampala, Lira, Masaka, Mbarara, Moroto and Soroti. 
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4.3 PARP’s effectiveness 
 
4.3.1 Research design and data 
 
We carried out a survey among police officers to find out their attitudes on what constitutes 
proper behaviour as a member of the Ugandan Police Force. The underlying hypothesis was 
that police officers who have participated in the PARP activities are more critical of 
‘unacceptable’ behaviour, such as corruption, violence against protesters, limits imposed on 
free media, et cetera. We were very much concerned with the possibility that police officers 
would give only socially desirable answers. For this reasons we resorted to the approach of 
submitting vignette cases that portray stereotypical but not own behaviour. This approach is 
now common in the social sciences, when researchers are concerned about biased answers to 
questions pertaining to self-reported behaviour.18 
 
In consultation with HURINET, we randomly picked five districts in which HURINET 
carried out its activities (see section 4.2; the selected districts were Bushenyi, Kabale, 
Kabarole, Mbarara and Soroti) and purposively matched them with five other randomly 
chosen districts in which HURINET was not active (Iganga, Jinja, Luwero, Mityana and 
Tororo).19 We never chose more than one district per region to ensure regional coverage.  
 
In the ten selected districts a survey was carried out among a total of 600 police officers 
resulting in roughly 60 participants per district.20 The survey was organised in groups and 
held in rented venues that where equipped with enough tables and chairs for 30 police 
officers. Our team of enumerators chose and prepared the venue and printed the 
questionnaires. At least two survey sessions took place in each district, one in the morning 
and one in the afternoon of the scheduled survey days. Per session 30 randomly selected 
police officers came together. In an introduction, the enumerators introduced the survey to 
them and allowed for questions. The actual survey was self-administered and every police 
officer could respond to the questions at her/his speed. Anonymity was ensured by providing 
enough personal space to every officer so that s/he could answer the survey questions without 
other participants looking at her/his questionnaire. Moreover, we did not ask the officers to 
provide their names or addresses to demonstrate that they could not be identified.  
 
The survey was aimed at collecting socio-economic background information of the police 
officers together with information about their work experience and police station. The core of 
the survey was made up of twelve anchoring vignette cases that the police officers were 
asked to assess (see Appendix D, section D1 for the exact wording of the cases). The order in 
which the cases were presented to the police officers was determined at random to avoid 
order bias (which could have resulted when the cases had been presented in order of 
severity). In addition, the officers’ perception of the police was registered. Thus, the survey 
aimed at capturing perceptions and attitudes of good policing and assessing to what extent 
these are applied to the police station of the respondents. 
 
The main part of the survey consisted of hypothetical cases. Research done on police integrity in 
the US served as an inspiration for our research (see Klockars et al., 2000). The practice of this 
                                                 
18 More information about this approach can be found at King (2016). 
19 We did not include districts in Northern Uganda in the sample as this part of the country was affected by 
major conflicts until 2006, and this had great impact on the involvement of the Northern districts in a variety of 
justice, rule and law and decentralization programmes. 
20 Two districts had 59 participants and another two districts had 61 participants. 
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type of research is to ask police officers a set of standard questions about specific forms of 
behaviour. The questions tap the following dimensions of those forms of behaviour: 
• how serious the police officers themselves consider the behaviour to be; 
• how serious most police officers in their office would consider the behaviour to be; 
• whether the behaviour is regarded as a violation of official policy; 
• how they think an officer engaged in this behaviour should be disciplined; 
• whether the officers themselves would report a fellow police officer for engaging in this 
behaviour; and 
• whether they think most police officers in their agency would report a fellow officer. 
 
In close collaboration with our local team member, we developed a set of simple and 
unambiguous cases that are relevant in the context of policing in Uganda. The cases show 
conflicts of different severity and relate to the normative inclination of the police to resist 
temptations of abusing the power that comes with their job. The cases covered the following 
aspects of policing practices: 
 
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers 
Case 1: Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 
Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague 
 
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud 
Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 
Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 
Case 5: Officer taking money of found wallet 
Case 6: Police officer stealing goods when investigating a burglary 
 
Group 3: Refusal to register complaints 
Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant 
Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the complainant for false accusation 
 
Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon 
Case 9: Police officer refusing to register wife beating 
Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on 
 
Group 5: Undue force used by the police 
Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief 
Case 12: Brutal strike down of a demonstration 
 
As indicated above, the cases were presented in no particular sequence to rule out ordering 
effects. The original ordering of the cases was as follows: case 3, case 4, case 6, case 9, case 
1, case 2, case 7, case 11, case 5, case 10, case 12, case 8. After each case, we asked seven 
questions21, two of which related to police officers’ own perception and behaviour. The 
perception-related question attempted to assess how serious the interviewed police officer 
considers police behaviour depicted in the case to be. The behaviour-related question probed 
the likelihood that the interviewed police officer would report a policing practice if a fellow 
police officer was engaged in the behaviour described in the case. The answer scale for both 
questions ranged between 1 and 5, where 5 indicated that (i) the case was considered as a 
very serious incident of bad policing and that (ii) the interviewed police officer would 
definitely report this type of bad policing. The next step was to ask police officers whether 
the behaviour described in the cases was regarded as a violation of the official policy of their 
                                                 
21 While this seems a large number of questions, the survey was extensively tested before being implemented 
and respondent fatigue was minimized due to the strong recognition factor and familiarity effect of having the 
same set of questions after every case.  
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police station. By linking the response to the latter question with those on the perception- and 
behaviour-related questions, we aim to understand whether police officers have presented a 
credible narrative about their own intended behaviour and to position the individual officer 
within the broader context of her/his police station. Indirectly, this exercise informs us of the 
role of top-down versus bottom up initiatives to instil good policing practices. Basically, this 
helps to identify the role of interventions to change individual behaviour versus structural 
interventions at the level of the entire organization. 
 
Upon completion of the twelve sets of questions the police officers were asked whether they 
gave an honest response, and whether they thought that their fellow police officers would 
have reported honestly on the hypothetical cases. In addition, we collected information about 
receiving gifts and bribes and officers’ perception of corruption in the police force. We also 
asked the officers to judge their own work and that of the police in general, as well the 
treatment of handicapped people by the police. 
 
Next to the survey among 600 police officers, our research included data collection on the 
police and the prevalence of crime in the ten districts selected for the purpose of this country 
study. Table 3 presents an overview of some key indicators per district. 
 
The data presented in table 3 demonstrate quite substantial variation among the ten districts in 
terms of the average numbers of police stations, the average strength of the police force and 
the average number of riots in the 2005-2012 period. As can be seen in the last two columns 
of table 3, variation does not necessarily relate to the districts’ population size. The district 
Mityana has disproportionally many police stations given that it is the smallest district in the 
sample in terms of actual population. Most riots are documented in Jinja although it is only a 
mid-sized district. All things considered, it is clear that the number of police officers per 
district is broadly in line with population size. 
 
 
Table 3: District-level police statistics for the period 2005-2012 
District 
Number of 
police 
stations in 
the district 
Total 
number of 
police 
officers in 
the district 
Average 
number of 
riots in the 
district per 
year 
Number of 
protests in 
the district 
Total 
population 
in the 
district 
Population 
growth in 
the district 
Bushenyi 1 645 0.78 0 698255.56 1.20 
Iganga 2 837 0.38 0 628855.56 3.14 
Jinja 2.78 618 3.00 0 464255.56 1.68 
Kabale 2 648 0.89 0 486222.22 1.36 
Kabarole 1 529 1.67 0 397200.00 2.52 
Luwero  543 0.38 0 408033.33 2.61 
Mbarara 3.22 558 2.33 0 418822.22 2.41 
Mityana 2.75 399 0.38 0 299325.00 1.94 
Soroti 1 619 0.38 0 464477.78 3.82 
Tororo 1 603 0.38 0 452644.44 2.91 
Notes: Districts targeted by PARP are mentioned in bold. Figures are the average of all available data per 
district.  
Source: Administrative data, Ugandan Police Force. 
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Figure 2: Average number of crimes across treated and untreated districts in the period 2007 
to 2013 
 
Source: Administrative data, Ugandan Police Force 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of homicides across treated and untreated districts in the period 2005 to 
2013 
 
Source: Administrative data, Ugandan Police Force 
 
500,0
700,0
900,0
1100,0
1300,0
1500,0
1700,0
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
cr
im
e
s
Year
Treated districts
Untreated districts
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
35,0
40,0
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
h
o
m
ic
id
e
s
Year
Treated districts
Untreated districts
58 
 
Next to other differences, the ten districts appear to differ considerably in terms of their crime 
rates. Data on aggregate numbers of crimes between 2007 and 2013 in figure 2 indicate that 
the absolute annual crime rate per district shows a similar trend across treatment and control 
districts. The number of annual crimes has varied from a minimum of 167 in Mityana to a 
maximum of slightly over 3,000 in Jinja. In terms of reported homicide rates between 2005 
and 2013 (see figure 3), there is again a substantial difference, ranging from a minimum of 0 
(Luwero in 2006) to a maximum of 74 (Mbarara in 2013). There appears to be considerable 
fluctuation in the reported crime and homicide rates: the fact that many districts experience 
similar fluctuations suggests that the volatility may result from differences in reporting 
standards rather than actual crime rates. On the basis of available data on crime and homicide 
rates, it seems impossible to assess the quality of policing in Uganda and the impact of the 
PARP activities. The number of reported homicides fluctuates in similar ways.  
 
 
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Before reporting on the results of the quantitative analysis in section 4.3.4, this section 
presents the overall characteristics of our sample of police officers. Descriptive statistics of 
the characteristics of police officers are presented in table 4. Overall, 592 respondents were 
included in the analyses, as eight respondents did not complete all required information. Of 
the 600 surveyed individuals, 250 (or 41.7 per cent of the sample) had participated in any 
HURINET activity, while 350 respondents (58.3 per cent) had not taken part in HURINET 
trainings. The circumstance that there is a slight over-representation of non-participants is a 
desired feature that is exploited in the data analysis presented in section 4.3.4. 
 
The results in table 4 show that the average officer in the sample is almost 42 years old. 
Slightly over a fourth of the respondents are female. Most of the officers (84 per cent) are 
married, resulting in an average household size of almost 7 people. Moreover, 84 per cent of 
the interviewees are household heads. Almost half the officers have secondary education, 
while 27 per cent have advanced secondary education and 25 per cent have higher education. 
The remainder of surveyed officers (less than 3 per cent) have only primary education. To 
capture economic well-being we asked the respondents about the income bands they are in. 
They majority of the respondents, namely 60 per cent, earn between UGX 300,000 and 
500,000 on a monthly basis taking into account their income from all possible sources. The 
group of top earners, who earn more than UGX 700,000 per month, contains 10 per cent of 
the respondents. Questions about mobile phone ownership and the number of habitable rooms 
in respondents’ homes served as additional controls for the economic situation of the 
respondents. The average respondent owns 1.34 mobile phones and has almost 2 habitable 
rooms in her/his house. Questions about membership of clubs and community organisations 
and sports activities served as controls for respondents’ activity level and readiness to 
participate in social activities. Membership of a community association was reported by 
almost half the respondents. Concerning sporting activities, slightly more than half of the 
respondents indicated that they had been doing some sports in the last year.  
 
In addition to the average statistics of the full sample, table 4 presents statistics by groups 
(participants vs. non-participants in HURINET activities). When employing a simple 
difference-in-means test for these control variables we observe that most background 
variables are statistically equal across the two groups (p-values > 0.1). HURINET 
participants are likely to earn on average slightly less compared to non-participants. This 
difference becomes apparent between the two low-income groups that are reported. At the 
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same time, HURINET participants report having on average 0.3 rooms more in their homes. 
The difference, while very small in economic terms, is statistically significant and has been 
controlled for in the multivariate analyses reported below. These differences among 
participants and non-participants that are apparent in simple comparisons highlight that it is 
important to control for observable characteristics in the analysis. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of control variables 
  Overall  
HURINET 
participants 
 Non-participants 
DiM (p-
value) 
 N Mean Std.Dev. N Mean Std.Dev. N Mean Std.Dev.  
Age 600 41.81 9.39 250 42.31 9.34 350 41.46 9.43 0.28 
Respondent is female 600 0.23 0.42 250 0.21 0.41 350 0.24 0.43 0.32 
Marital status (Excluded category: Not married)        
   Married  600 0.84 0.36 250 0.85 0.36 350 0.84 0.37 0.62 
Household size 600 6.67 3.99 250 6.87 3.76 350 6.53 4.15 0.31 
Respondent is household head 600 0.84 0.36 250 0.84 0.37 350 0.85 0.36 0.85 
Education levels (Excluded category: Primary education)        
   Secondary education 600 0.46 0.50 250 0.48 0.50 350 0.44 0.50 0.38 
   Advanced secondary education 600 0.27 0.44 250 0.25 0.43 350 0.28 0.45 0.34 
   Higher education 600 0.25 0.43 250 0.25 0.44 350 0.25 0.43 0.86 
Income level (Excluded category: Incomes below  200,000 UGX)        
   Income between 200,000 and 300,000 UGX 600 0.12 0.32 250 0.14 0.35 350 0.09 0.29 0.06* 
   Income between 300,000-500,000 UGX 600 0.60 0.49 250 0.54 0.50 350 0.65 0.48 0.01** 
   Income between 500,000-700,000 UGX 600 0.14 0.35 250 0.15 0.36 350 0.13 0.34 0.63 
   Income of more than 700,000 UGX 600 0.10 0.29 250 0.11 0.31 350 0.09 0.28 0.36 
Number of mobile phones owned 600 1.34 0.58 250 1.29 0.59 350 1.37 0.57 0.11 
Number of habitable rooms 600 1.76 1.10 250 1.93 1.21 350 1.63 0.99 0.00*** 
Member of a club/community organization 600 0.48 0.50 250 0.48 0.50 350 0.48 0.50 0.92 
Does sport 600 0.53 0.50 250 0.52 0.50 350 0.53 0.50 0.84 
Police section (Excluded category: Other sections and duties)        
   Traffic 599 0.04 0.20 250 0.03 0.17 349 0.05 0.23 0.12 
   Investigation 599 0.26 0.44 250 0.22 0.41 349 0.30 0.46 0.03** 
   Intelligence 599 0.06 0.24 250 0.06 0.25 349 0.06 0.24 0.96 
   General duties 599 0.46 0.50 250 0.58 0.49 349 0.38 0.49 0.00*** 
Number of years spent as police officer 600 18.80 10.56 250 19.38 10.66 350 18.38 10.48 0.25 
Number of police officers at station 600 569.90 116.49 250 543.96 114.08 350 588.42 114.79 0.00*** 
District-level controls        
   District-level crime rate 10 338.23 143.51 5 296.80 131.77 5 379.66 157.11 0.39 
   District-level number of homicides 10 36.60 19.24 5 38.80 23.59 5 34.40 16.26 0.74 
   District-level population size 10 427,400 92,560 5 394,880 97,524 5 459,920 84,389 0.29 
Honesty of answering the questionnaire           
   Own honesty of answering the questions 600 0.95 0.22 250 0.94 0.23 350 0.95 0.22 0.90 
   Honesty of fellow police officers 600 0.70 0.46 250 0.74 0.44 350 0.66 0.47 0.03** 
Assessment of own work by the police officers           
   Treatment of men versus women  600 3.81 1.20 250 3.98 1.19 350 3.69 1.20 0.00*** 
   Treatment of poor people by the police 600 3.57 1.30 250 3.70 1.28 350 3.47 1.30 0.03** 
   Treatment of handicapped people by police 600 4.22 1.01 250 4.35 0.96 350 4.12 1.03 0.01** 
   Offered a bribe in last year 600 0.10 0.30 250 0.06 0.23 350 0.14 0.34 0.00*** 
   Receipt of gifts at work 600 0.29 0.45 250 0.24 0.43 350 0.32 0.47 0.04** 
   Statement: The police is corrupt 600 2.56 1.42 250 2.46 1.44 350 2.63 1.41 0.16 
   Confidence in own work 600 4.58 0.84 250 4.71 0.70 350 4.49 0.91 0.00*** 
   Confidence in police in general 600 4.43 0.89 250 4.51 0.79 350 4.37 0.95 0.05* 
Note: * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; and *** p<0.01. DiM abbreviates difference in means, the corresponding p-value is 
presented. 
Source: Authors’ survey 
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The specific police work of the respondents is part of the third set of control variables. The 
bottom part of table 4 reports information on the section of the police force where 
respondents are situated, on the duration of their work as police officer and on the number of 
colleagues at their police station. The differences between participants and non-participants in 
HURINET activities indicate that police officers with general duties are overrepresented 
among the participants, while significantly fewer work in the investigation section. 
Participants and non-participants do not differ significantly with regard to their experience as 
police officers. Yet, HURINET participants tend to have fewer direct colleagues as compared 
to non-participants. 
 
The final part of the report on descriptive statistics relates to district-level characteristics. The 
last three variables reported at the bottom of the table show the district-level crime rate, 
number of homicides and population size. As shown in figures 2 and 3, we do not find any 
statistically significant differences across crime rates, number of homicides and in addition 
the population size suggesting that treatment and control districts are comparable.  
 
Table 5 compares the distribution of participants and non-participants in HURINET activities 
across districts. The subsamples of HURINET participants and non-participants show 
considerable differences across districts. As HURINET trainings took place in Bushenyi, 
Kabale, Kabarole, Mbarara, and Soroti, most of the participants are still located in these 
districts. In the other five districts we selected considerably fewer HURINET participants and 
more police officers who did not take part in the activities. Table 5 shows that the share of 
participants versus non-participants differs considerably across the 10 districts: this indicates 
that the difference in treatment status (whether an individual participated in HURINET 
activities or not) results predominantly from location and not from personal characteristics. 
We make use of this observation in our multivariate analyses and therefore control for 
district-level characteristics such as the crime rate, the number of homicides and the 
population size.  
 
 
Table 5: Distribution of HURINET participants and non-participants across districts 
  HURINET participants          Non-participants 
 
N 
Percentage of 
treatment sample 
N 
Percentage of control 
sample 
Bushenyi 35 14.0 24 6.86 
Iganga 17 6.8 43 12.29 
Jinja 8 3.20 52 14.86 
Kabale 38 15.20 23 6.57 
Kabarole 48 19.20 12 3.43 
Luwero 3 1.20 57 16.29 
Mbarara 43 17.20 17 4.86 
Mityana 2 0.80 57 16.29 
Soroti 54 21.60 7 2.00 
Tororo 2 0.80 58 16.57 
Total 250 100 350 100 
Note: Districts targeted by PARP are highlighted in bold. 
Source: Authors’ survey 
 
It needs to be noted that police officers have some degree of mobility. At the time of the 
survey, almost 13 per cent of participating police officers resided in districts in which 
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HURINET had not carried out its activities. It is likely that these are officers who participated 
in HURINET activities when they were working in an intervention district (highlighted 
district) but in the meantime moved to other police stations outside the intervention area. 
 
Next we present descriptive statistics related to our outcome variables. These statistics are 
shown in table 6. We decided to present the average response level of HURINET participants 
versus the average response of non-participants. This allows us to compare the differences in 
raw means across both groups. When just comparing the raw means of the answers 
concerning the own judgment of the severity of the cases and own reporting of a fellow 
police officer who engaged in a certain bad policing practice, we observe that HURINET 
participants tend to give a higher average score. This indicates that HURINET participants 
judge misconduct more critically. For the average non-participant it is okay to accept repair a 
supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays as indicated by a score of 3.5. However, HURINET 
participants give a score of 4.0 on average, showing that on average they rate the behaviour 
half a point worse on the Likert scale. Not reporting a drunk driving colleague who had an 
accident receives lower scores in both groups but again HURINET participants rate the 
behaviour more critical.  
 
We now turn to situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud. Free meals are ranked least 
important across all vignette cases. Most notably, participants and non-participants are close 
to neutral (value of 3) when it comes to the reporting of a colleague. Again, HURINET 
participants are slightly more likely to report a colleague. The picture changes when we turn 
to the acceptance of bribes. Bribery receives a very critical judgment from both HURINET 
participants and non-participants as indicated by the respective scores of 4.58 and 4.22. 
However, again the police officers are not very likely to indicate that they would report a 
colleague who engaged in such behaviour as indicated by the scores of 3.64 for HURINET 
participants and 3.43 for non-participants. Misappropriating money from a found wallet and 
when investigating a burglary is again judged quite critically on average. However, when it 
comes to reporting, the police officers indicate a lower willingness to report their colleagues. 
Thus, these first six cases show that the police officers have an internal ranking of their 
severity with acceptance of bribes and misappropriation being ranked far more critically as 
compared to violations of the code of conduct among police officers. Moreover, we observe 
that the severity is generally judged more critically as compared to the indicated willingness 
to report a colleague who engages in the depicted type of behaviour. In addition, we find that 
HURINET participants judge the severity on average more critically than non-participants 
and they are more likely to indicate that they would report a fellow colleague who engages in 
misbehaviour. 
 
Next we turn to two cases that depict situations in which police officers refuse to register 
complaints. While the refusal to register a complaint and the humiliation of the complainant 
is judged rather laxly, the refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the 
complainant for false accusation are judged more critically, which is in line with our 
expectations and shows the internal coherence of the vignette cases. Very critical evaluations 
are given to reported cases of severe crimes against individuals that are not followed up by 
the police. The same applies for the use of undue force by the police. Across cases HURINET 
participants tend to give a more critical evaluation of such situations.  
 
In the following discussion, we assess whether we can derive a causal link between 
HURINET activities and the evaluation of the vignette cases. The comparison of average 
response levels of HURINET participants and non-participants suggests that officers who 
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took part in the training apply a more careful judgement. Yet, this simple comparison of 
means does not account for the socio-economic characteristics of the police officers. 
Therefore, we now turn to the multivariate analysis. 
 
 
Table 6: Responses to the vignette cases by HURINET participants and non-participants  
 
HURINET 
participants 
Non-participants DiM (p-
value) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers     
Case 1: Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays    
     Severity (own judgment) 4.01 1.42 3.51 1.63 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 3.76 1.32 3.35 1.52 0.00*** 
Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague    
     Severity (own judgment) 3.97 1.48 3.53 1.63 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 3.54 1.40 3.21 1.52 0.01** 
      
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud    
Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty    
     Severity (own judgment) 3.79 1.46 3.35 1.56 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 3.36 1.50 3.03 1.58 0.01** 
Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe     
     Severity (own judgment) 4.58 1.07 4.22 1.39 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 3.64 1.38 3.43 1.46 0.07* 
Case 5: Officer taking money of found wallet      
     Severity (own judgment) 4.35 1.34 3.82 1.63 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 3.73 1.37 3.43 1.49 0.01** 
Case 6: Police officer stealing goods when investigating a burglary    
     Severity (own judgment) 4.69 0.95 4.32 1.37 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 4.20 1.09 3.77 1.41 0.00*** 
      
Group 3: Refusal to register complaints     
Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant    
     Severity (own judgment) 3.99 1.51 3.36 1.72 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 3.82 1.36 3.37 1.48 0.00*** 
Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the complainant for false accusation 
     Severity (own judgment) 4.33 1.41 3.78 1.68 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 4.63 0.90 4.36 1.12 0.00*** 
      
Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon    
Case 9: Police officer refusing to register wife beating     
     Severity (own judgment) 4.53 1.16 4.09 1.56 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 4.05 1.16 3.88 1.35 0.12 
Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on     
     Severity (own judgment) 4.19 1.50 3.73 1.69 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 4.65 0.85 4.34 1.07 0.00*** 
      
Group 5: Undue force used by the police     
Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief      
     Severity (own judgment) 4.23 1.38 3.66 1.65 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 3.64 1.41 3.38 1.42 0.03** 
Case 12: Brutal strike down of a demonstration      
     Severity (own judgment) 4.44 1.32 3.89 1.71 0.00*** 
     Own reporting of a fellow police officer engaged in bad policing 4.25 1.42 3.91 1.53 0.01** 
Note: * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; and *** p<0.01. DiM abbreviates difference in means, the corresponding p-
value is presented. 
Source: Authors’ survey 
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4.3.3 Identification strategy 
 
We now proceed with presenting the empirical strategy that is used in the analysis. In our 
identification strategy we use propensity score matching (PSM) for two reasons. First, 
treatment locations were purposively and not randomly chosen by HURINET. Therefore, a 
simple comparison of means is not valid. Second, we have only one round of available data 
collected after the training. Consequently, we cannot apply a difference-in-difference 
framework. 
 
For the PSM method to be valid we need to impose the assumption about conditional 
independence, which holds that given a set of observable covariates X which are not affected 
by treatment – i.e., are exogenous to treatment – potential outcomes are independent of 
treatment assignment. It implies the strong assumption that selection into the training is solely 
based on observable characteristics that are observed by the researcher. As we have seen 
from the descriptive statistics, treatment allocation seems to be based mainly on location and 
not on the personal characteristics of police officers. We are therefore confident that we can 
properly capture allocation into treatment with the above-presented set of control variables. 
By employing a logistic regression of treatment status on the observable covariates X, we 
determine the probability of participation for each and every police officer based on her/his 
characteristics. By deriving the probability of participation based on the logistic regression, 
we ensure that persons with the same observables have a positive probability of being both 
participants and non-participants. The common support is hence an overlap condition ruling 
out the phenomenon of perfect predictability. The common support condition needs some 
randomness that guarantees that persons with identical characteristics can be observed in both 
states. It then allows us to form matches of individuals with similar characteristics observed 
for participants and non-participants. We set-up the PSM model in such a way to derive the 
best possible overlap, i.e., common support, based on the observable characteristics that we 
have identified. We derive the simple PSM estimator for the average treatment impact on the 
treated (ATT). The estimator is simply the mean difference in outcome variables over the 
common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants. 
The average treatment effect is thus the difference in weighted outcomes. We match each 
individual from the treatment group with one individual from the control group. This is 
referred to as nearest neighbour matching. We apply the revised PSM procedure that has been 
proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008). In addition, we compare our results to an 
estimator that makes use of the PSM weights in a regression framework, which is referred to 
as inverse probability weighting. We derive both estimators so that we are able to gauge the 
robustness of our results. We only consider differences as statistically significant if models 
lead to the same conclusion. 
 
 
4.3.4 Results 
 
A. Determinants of treatment status 
 
The first set of results from the empirical analysis concerns the determinants of treatment 
status, i.e., participation in HURINET activities. Logistic regression results are presented in 
Table 7. It appears that, in line with the descriptive statistics reported in section 4.3.2, the 
majority of the observable characteristics of police officers do not determine the likelihood of 
participating in HURINET activities. Individual characteristics (age and gender), education, 
physical activities, and the number of mobile phones owned do not impact significantly on 
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treatment status. Similarly, marital status, education, and being the household head are 
statistically insignificant in determining whether a police officer participates in HURINET 
activities or not. While the comparisons of means suggested differences in the income 
distribution between HURINET participants and non-participants, these differences do not 
show up in the multivariate logistic regression. The number of habitable rooms in the house 
and household size, however, show to have an impact on treatment status. The coefficient 
estimates from the logistic regression emphasize that a comparison of raw means is not 
enough to find the determinants of participation in HURINET activities. Overall, they show 
that participation in HURINET activities is not driven by individual level characteristics thus 
mitigating issues of self-selection. 
 
Characteristics associated with the work as police officer do, in turn, significantly impact 
whether individual police officers were trained by HURINET. Those officers working for the 
intelligence unit and those being assigned to general duties are significantly more likely to 
have participated in HURINET trainings. The time spent at the police and the number of 
officers in one’s station do not predict the likelihood of participation in HURINET activities. 
 
 
Table 7: Logit regression of treatment status on matching characteristics 
 Logit coefficients Standard errors 
Age -0.02    (0.46)    
Respondent is female 0.05    (0.85)    
Marital status (Excluded category: Not married) 
   Married -0.10    (0.73)    
Household size 0.06**  (0.02)    
Respondent is household head -0.08    (0.80)    
Education levels (Excluded category: Primary education) 
   Secondary education 0.68    (0.23)    
   Advanced secondary education 0.58    (0.33)    
   Higher education 0.79    (0.19)    
Income level (Excluded category: Incomes below  200,000 UGX)  
   Income between 200,000 and 300,000 UGX 0.74    (0.15)    
   Income between 300,000-500,000 UGX -0.03    (0.95)    
   Income between 500,000-700,000 UGX 0.21    (0.69)    
   Income of more than 700,000 UGX 0.48    (0.40)    
Number of mobile phones owned -0.22    (0.21)    
Number of habitable rooms 0.18*   (0.05)    
Member of a club/community organization -0.08    (0.68)    
Does sport 0.10    (0.62)    
Police section (Excluded category: Other sections and duties) 
   Traffic -0.21    (0.70)    
   Investigation 0.36    (0.25)    
   Intelligence 0.72*   (0.09)    
   General duties 1.06*** (0.00)    
Number of years spent as police officer 0.02    (0.37)    
Number of police officers at station (log) -0.01    (0.87)    
Crime rate -0.01*** (0.00) 
Number of homicides (log) 1.14*** (0.00) 
Population size (log) -1.77*** (0.00) 
Observations 592  
 Notes: * denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Findings in table 7 further show that the characteristics of the districts where the officers 
work have most power in predicating participation in HURINET activities. Police officers 
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from those districts with more homicides are more likely to participate in the training. District 
size as measured by the population size reduces the likelihood of participation, as does the 
crime rate.  
 
As already indicated in section 4.3.2, these are reassuring findings as there is little evidence 
that people with certain character traits are overrepresented among the participants. As 
HURINET has chosen the locations to intervene and we do not expect police officers moving 
out of these places in response to HURINET’s choice, we can consider the activities as an 
exogenous event for the police officers concerned. As a consequence, self-selection bias 
resulting from unobservable characteristics is very unlikely. In assessing the knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural outcomes of the participation in HURINET’s activities we will, 
consequently, rely on the observed differences between a matched sample of HURINET 
participants and non-participants. 
 
From the logistic regression we can derive the probability for each and every police officer 
that he/she has participated in HURINET activities. The probability of participation in 
HURINET activities, conditional on the observed characteristics, lies between 0 and 1. The 
lowest participation probability for a HURINET participant is 12.0 per cent, the highest 
participation probability is 91.0 per cent. The lowest participation probability for a non-
participant is 11.8 per cent, while the highest participation probability is 94.9 per cent. The 
two probability distributions overlap to a large extent. 
 
B. Results of the vignette cases 
 
Results for the comparisons of the outcome variables are presented in Table 8 and 
complemented by some additional results in Table 8a. The first pair of columns in Table 8 
show the impact of participation in the HURINET training on own judgment of the severity 
of the cases with the first column presenting the PSM estimator for the average treatment 
impact on the treated, and the second column showing the estimator based on inverse-
probability weighting. The second pair of columns show the same for own reporting of a 
colleague who engages in the misbehaviour depicted in the cases. 
 
Below the coefficient estimates we report p-values. Whenever the coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant, we can establish the impact of the HURINET training based on our 
identification strategy of matching. For all 24 outcome variables in response to the twelve 
vignette cases, we observe that the HURINET participants score higher on average, which 
indicates that they assess the depicted behaviour more critically. At the same time, 
differences in the significantly estimated propensity-weighted scores tend to be small in 
absolute terms, ranging between 0.05 (see table 8a, ‘Offered a bribe in last year’) and 0.93 
points (see table 8, case 7: ‘Refusal to register a complaint’) on a scale from 1 to 5 (see all 
outcomes in tables 8 and 8a). Among the vignette cases, nine out of twelve responses 
referring to severity show a difference bigger than half a point between HURINET 
participants and non-participants. Put differently, taking the average across all cases suggests 
that HURINET participants assess the severity of the cases more than half a point more 
critically compared to non-participants. Yet, HURINET participants are only 0.28 points 
more likely on average to indicate that they would report the misbehaviour depicted in the 
cases if they observed a colleague doing so. (Note that the 0.28 points represent the global 
average across all 12 cases for reporting.) Only in one case (see table 8, case 12: ‘Brutal 
strike down of a demonstration’) we find that HURINET participants are half a point more 
likely to report the misbehaviour. 
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Table 8: Main Results 
 
Severity (own 
judgment) 
Own reporting of a 
fellow police 
officer engaged in 
bad policing 
 (1)          (2) (3)              (4)    
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers PSM IPW PSM IPW 
Case 1: Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for 0.84*** 0.72*** 0.41** 0.40** 
holidays (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes 
unreported by colleague 
0.52** 
(0.01) 
0.60*** 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.24) 
0.22 
(0.15 
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud     
Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 0.48** 0.40** 0.25 0.08 
               (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.59) 
Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 0.54*** 0.28** 0.05 0.03 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.82) (0.86) 
Case 5: Officer taking money of found wallet 0.84*** 0.78*** 0.31 0.32** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.03) 
Case 6: Police officer stealing goods when investigating a burglary 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.37** 0.41*** 
               (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Group 3: Refusal to register complaints     
Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant 0.93*** 0.79*** 0.41** 0.47*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the   0.80*** 0.68*** 0.36* 0.32* 
complainant for false accusation (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) 
Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon     
Case 9: Police officer refusing to register wife beating 0.38** 0.62*** 0.18 0.17 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.32) (0.21) 
Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on 0.86*** 0.72*** 0.26* 0.30*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) 
Group 5: Undue force used by the police     
Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief 0.84*** 0.75*** 0.29 0.24* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.09) 
Case 12: Brutal strike down of a demonstration 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.54*** 0.40** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Average coefficient size across cases 0.69 0.63 0.30 0.28 
Notes: The propensity score based average treatment on the treated is labelled PSM and presented in columns 1 and 3. The 
inverse-probability weighted results are labelled IPW and presented in columns 2 and 4. P-values are presented in 
parentheses. 
* denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
The first two cases reported in table 8 relate to the code of conduct among the police officers. 
The police mechanic, who repairs a supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays, is judged very 
critically by the HURINET participants. This shows up in high coefficient estimates close to 
1 for both empirical models and in the high level of statistical significance. While the 
coefficient associated with reporting is only half as big it is still highly statistically significant 
and suggests that HURINET participants are not only more aware of inappropriate behaviour 
at the level of the police but also more likely to report it. However, this seems to work only if 
a colleague manages to obtain an advantage from his/her superior. Case 2, depicting the 
situation of a police officer who was driving drunk and had an accident, and goes unreported 
by the colleague who found him, shows a different result. While HURINET participants are 
more likely to indicate that coverage of misbehaviour is not acceptable, they are equally less 
likely to report the fellow police officer. Both empirical specifications associated with 
reporting show no impact of the HURINET training. 
 
Next we turn to four cases that depict situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud. Case 
3 presents the acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty.  On average 
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the officers judge this a small problem as is indicated by the score of 3.79 for HURINET 
participants and 3.35 for non-participants (see table 6), which do not deviate much from the 
neutral stance (the middle score of 3). According to our analysis, HURINET participants are 
almost half a point more likely to consider this behaviour unacceptable (see table 8, PSM 
coefficient=0.40), which is very much in line with the raw differences between the 
participants and the non-participants. However, the respondents are all equally neutral when 
it comes to the reporting of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty. The 
HURINET training did not appear to have impacted on reporting, as shown by the small 
coefficient estimates and the lack of statistical significance. 
 
The fourth case presents the issue of not reporting speeding in exchange for a bribe (table 8, 
case 4). This behaviour is judged to be far more serious compared to the acceptance of free 
meals and small gifts, as demonstrated by the higher average score (see table 6). The impact 
assessment shows that participants in HURINET activities assess the acceptance of bribes 
more critically compared to non-participants. Moreover, when only considering the PSM 
estimates, we find some indications that the acceptance of bribes is evaluated more critically 
by HURINET participants compared to the acceptance of freely offered meals and small 
gifts. Yet again, HURINET participants are not any more likely to report a colleague who 
accepts bribes. Officers cover each other when trespassing the rules of proper policing. Thus, 
for the first four cases we observe that the HURINET trainings seem to have had an impact 
on perceptions but that this does not necessarily translate into changed behaviour. It only 
seems to translate into changed behaviour if police officers have the impression that they 
personally lose out in front of their supervisors. 
 
We now turn to the other two cases that depict situations of undue advantage, bribery and 
fraud. These cases depict more severe situations, as the amount of money involved is 
considerably higher. In case 5 (‘Officer taking money of found wallet’) the value of the 
misappropriated money is worth a day’s pay and in case 6 (‘Police officer stealing goods at a 
crime scene’) the value of the misappropriated goods is worth a month’s pay. In table 8 we 
see that these two cases are judged more critically by HURINET participants than non-
participants. Again we see that the training has been successful in instilling an increased 
perception of what is right and wrong. The tacit police code that fellow officers are covered 
even when they misbehave seems to be disrupted by the HURINET activities. Moreover, it 
seems that if wrongdoings reach a certain threshold – in these cases expressed in monetary 
terms – HURINET participants are more likely to report them. While the coefficients 
associated with reporting are again smaller as compared to those associated with own 
judgment of the severity of the situation, they are statistically significant for cases 5 and 6. 
Thus, reporting is encouraged for types of misbehaviour where individual officers seem to get 
considerable gains. 
 
The third group of cases describes two situations in which police officers refuse to register 
complaints (cases 7 and 8). These cases relate to the complaint registry that HURINET 
seriously lobbied for as a new tool for police accountability. HURINET’s activities appear to 
be reflected in the responses given by those police officers that worked with the human rights 
NGO. The situations depicted in cases 7 and 8 deal with the treatment of former arrestees and 
suspects. Here we observe clear differences between officers who participated in HURINET 
activities and those who did not. The refusal to register a complaint of a former arrestee is 
considered a minor problem by non-participating officers in comparison to participants. On 
average, HURINET participants tend to rate this behaviour almost 1 point more critically on 
the Likert scale. Again, the coefficient estimate with reporting is only half the size of the 
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coefficient estimate associated with own judgment. Yet, all coefficient estimates are highly 
statistically significant. It is important to know here that HURINET has been placing 
particular emphasis on human rights and on the introduction and use of the complaint forms. 
It seems that along this dimension HURINET was rather successful in sensitising police 
officers since the coefficients related to cases 7 and 8 are among the highest coefficient 
estimates of own judgment. 
 
Group 4 collects two cases of reported severe crimes against individuals that are not followed 
up upon by the police. Case 9 depicts the situation of a police officer refusing to register wife 
beating. This behaviour by the police officer is more critically assessed by the HURINET 
participants compared to non-participants. This indicates that the trained police officers 
appear sensitised about domestic violence. Yet, again we observe that HURINET participants 
are not more likely to report colleagues who refuse to register wife beating. This is in contrast 
to case 10, which depicts a reported murder that is not being followed up. Again, the 
HURINET participants assess this behaviour very critically. Moreover, HURINET 
participants are slightly more inclined compared to non-participants to report such behaviour. 
 
The last group of cases shows situations of undue force used by the police. These two cases 
(cases 11 and 12) are judged equally severely as the cases that depict the refusal to register a 
complaint. Thus, HURINET seems to have achieved its human rights agenda in terms of 
sensitising police officers. In the case of a foot patrol torturing a thief (table 8, case 11) 
participating officers give an average rating of the behaviour that is 0.84 points higher, i.e., 
more critical. This difference is statistically significant, which indicates that participating 
officers have become more sensitised to the severity of the offence. Moreover, participating 
officers judge the likelihood of reporting such behaviour 0.29 points higher than non-
participating colleagues. However, the latter result is only marginally significant at 11 per 
cent. The brutal strike down of a demonstration (table 8, case 12) is almost as severely 
condemned as case 9 (‘Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the 
complainant for false accusation’) by the HURINET participants. Thus, the officers judge the 
severity of the case in line with its damage as the presented case depicts a peaceful 
demonstration that is met with teargas and firing of live ammunitions, killing 20 of the 
demonstrators including the area leader. Independent of the training the police officers rank 
the average severity of the event higher than 4 (see table 4). Furthermore, participating 
officers would report this behaviour, which shows again that the human rights agenda of the 
NGO was transmitted. 
 
C. Reporting on officers’ own behaviour 
 
Taken by themselves, the cases do not necessarily tell us whether the police officers behave 
as indicated. In order to learn about probable behavioural responses in an indirect way, we 
asked the police officers, after they had completed answering questions on the vignette cases, 
whether their answers were honest.  Almost 95 per cent of the respondents indicated that their 
answers were honest (see table 4). One might be concerned that this response is a socially 
desirable response. Research among the police using vignette cases is limited to one other 
study (Klockars et al., 2000). However, from the use of vignette cases in the medical 
literature it is know that responses to the paper cases reflect actual behaviour by doctors and 
patients very well (Peabody et al., 2000; Van der Meer and Mackenbach, 1998). The 
reassuring outcome that the police officers took the survey seriously may have resulted from 
the research design, which involved the hierarchy of the police. The survey had been 
approved by the Directorate of Research, Planning and Development of the Uganda Police 
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Force, and their involvement was communicated to the officers. The two groups of 
HURINET participants and non-participants are equally likely to indicate that they answered 
the cases honestly. The difference is statistically insignificant. While respondents consider 
their own responses by and large to be honest, the honesty of colleagues is assessed less 
favourably. This shows up particularly for non-participating individuals, who rate only 66 per 
cent of the responses of their colleague as honest (see table 4). HURINET participants have 
higher confidence in their colleagues: they suggest that 74 per cent of their colleagues give 
honest responses (see table 4).  Here, the difference between HURINET participants and non-
participants is statistically significant, which suggests that the trainings increased the 
confidence in the work of fellow police officers.  
 
In relation to the responses to the vignette cases, we have also assessed the questions 
pertaining to honesty in a PSM framework. Results are reported in table 8a. We do not find 
any significant differences between HURINET participants and non-participants for personal 
honesty, which confirms the descriptive statistics and suggests that both groups are equally 
honest. Moreover, applying the PSM weighting we do not find any statistically significant 
differences for the perceived honesty of the fellow police officers, either. The inverse-
probability weighted results reinforce these findings. 
 
Next we augment the results found for the vignette cases by turning to the treatment of 
vulnerable groups by the police as reported by our respondents (table 8a). There is a slight 
indication that HURINET participants are more likely to indicate that men and women are 
treated identically by the police. However, this result only shows up when employing 
inverse-probability weighting. The treatment of rich and poor is rated equally across the two 
groups. However, there is again some indication that participating officers report more 
careful treatment of handicapped people (table 8a). This is only found when applying inverse 
probability weighting and the difference is very small. While these questions were also 
assessed on a five point Likert scale, the coefficient estimates found in table 8a tend to be 
considerably smaller than the ones we found for the cases.  
 
The survey also asked about the actual receipt of bribes and gifts (table 8a). We find a small, 
yet statistically significant difference in the treatment of bribes. HURINET participants report 
that they have received slightly fewer bribes. Having participated in the training reduces the 
likelihood of accepting bribes by 5 to 7 percentage points. Yet, all officers are equally likely 
to receive gifts. There is no difference between HURINET participants an non-participants. 
Gifts seem to be judged more acceptable.  
 
At the same time, the statement ‘The police is corrupt’ gets the lowest average score of all the 
response variables. The average score is 2.46 for the group of HURINET participants and 
2.63 for non-participants (see table 4), indicating that police officers generally have a positive 
self-image of their work. This positive self-image is statistically identical for participants and 
non-participants of HURINET activities as we cannot identify a significant difference 
between the two groups. 
 
The last two variables we assessed relate to the confidence that police officers have in their 
own work and the police in general. Here again, we find interesting differences. First, 
participating police officers tend to have more confidence in their own work as compared to 
the work of the police in general (see table 4). The actual difference is small but reflects a 
typical behavioural observation, namely that individuals tend to be more positive about their 
own work as compared to the work of a group or organisation. Secondly, HURINET 
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activities appear to have impacted only the confidence in police officers’ own work. 
Participating officers tend to be 0.38 points more confident than non-participants, with the 
difference being statistically significant. This finding indicates that the provision of 
knowledge and training may have an important impact on confidence and thus ultimately on 
work performance. This may be a strong argument in favour of police accountability 
activities, as only a confident police force can solve difficult cases competently. Despite this 
finding, overall confidence in the work of the police does not appear to have been affected by 
HURINET’s activities. The fact that overall confidence in the work of the police force is not 
affected by the activities suggests that the police officers, no matter whether they participated 
or not in HURINET’s programme, are aware of the lacunae in the operation of the police as 
an organisation.  
 
 
Table 8a: Main results (continued) 
 (1) (2) 
 PSM IWP 
Own honesty of answering the questions -0.03 -0.01 
    (0.27) (0.46) 
Honesty of fellow police officers 0.05 0.06 
 (0.44) (0.19) 
Treatment of men versus women by the police 0.24 0.23* 
 (0.15) (0.05) 
Treatment of poor people by the police 0.27 0.22 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
Treatment of handicapped people by police 0.11 0.21** 
 (0.31) (0.03) 
Offered a bribe in last year -0.07* -0.05* 
 (0.05) (0.07) 
Receipt of gifts at work -0.04 0.01 
 (0.45) (0.85) 
Statement: The police is corrupt -0.01 0.00 
 (0.97) (1.00) 
Confidence in own work 0.38** 0.38*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Confidence in police in general 0.14 0.16 
  (0.33) (0.14) 
Notes: The propensity score based average treatment on the treated is labelled PSM and presented in column 1. The inverse-
probability weighted results are labelled IPW and presented in column 2. P-values are presented in parentheses. 
* denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
D. Caveats of the quantitative study 
PARP aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations to work with 
communities and police in order to provide more information about roles and responsibilities 
and strengthen interaction and relations between citizens and the police. Therefore, the 
original ToR of this study suggested assessing the impact of PARP at the citizen level.  
 
The discussions with HURINET during the inception mission as well as those with IOB after 
the mission made clear that the nature of implementation of the PARP would render an 
evaluation at the level of citizens difficult if not outright impossible. For this reason, the 
exchange with IOB centred most on what would be the primary target group(s) of the 
intervention where impact could be established. The conclusion from the discussion was that 
impact would be observable possibly at two levels: that of the Ugandan police officers and 
that of people who had contact with the Ugandan Police Force. The evaluation question in 
both cases could be whether there is a change in attitude and/or behaviour among police 
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officers (or their fellow officers working at their police stations) who had been involved in 
the PARP versus those who had not been involved. 
 
Since the identification and tracking of people with prior contact with the police would be 
very tiresome and expensive – if not outright impossible – the decision was made to focus the 
impact evaluation on the police, the results of which were summarised in the previous 
sections. 
 
 
4.3.5 Qualitative analysis: Interviews with police officers 
 
Next to the quantitative research on attitudes of Ugandan police officers in relation to 
acceptable and non-acceptable police behaviour, we conducted in-depth (qualitative) 
interviews with 23 police officers, drawn from districts that had been and districts that had 
not been included in PARP (see Appendix B, section B6).22 The police officers were drawn 
from the higher ranks and included Regional Police Commanders (RPCs), District Police 
Commanders (DPCs) and Officers in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (OC-
CIDs). The interviews were held in four PARP districts (Bushenyi, Kabale, Kabarole and 
Mbarara) and four non-PARP districts (Iganga, Jinja, Luwero and Tororo). The interviews 
consisted of a set of open questions related to the functioning of the police, the main 
challenges encountered in day-to-day work, the handling of complaints about the police, as 
well as questions regarding the observed impacts of the roll-out of PARP (see Appendix D, 
section D2). The latter set included questions on the positive and negative impacts generated 
by PARP, the overall relevance of projects such as PARP and the officers’ assessment of the 
sustainability of the results achieved by PARP. 
 
Overall, the assessments of the situation of the Ugandan Police Force and the problems 
encountered by the police in their daily work did not show important differences across 
districts targeted by PARP and districts that were not included in HURINET’s project. The 
problems mentioned by senior police officers related mainly to three issues: 
 Logistical problems, such as insufficient means of transport and insufficient petrol to 
use cars and motor cycles where these are available; 
 Office problems, related to insufficient quality of police stations, limited availability of 
stationery, and sub-standard prison complexes; 
 Personnel problems, as a consequence of qualitative or quantitative understaffing of 
the police stations, as well as of inadequate housing for police officers. 
In addition, some of the senior police officers reported political issues, such as interference 
by the central government or local and regional government officials with the work of the 
police. 
 
With regard to citizens’ complaints about the police, a variety of issues were mentioned, 
which do not seem to differentiate PARP from non-PARP districts. These were issues such 
                                                 
22 The interviews of police officers were included in the field work instead of interviews with representatives of 
civil society organisations, which had been envisaged at the time of the inception report. Shortly before the 
envisaged start of the round of interviews, it became clear to the research team that participation of 600 police 
officers in the survey could be secured only when those officers would obtain an allowance for travel and lunch. 
Budgetary constraints necessitated cancellation of the interviews with civil society organisations, as these would 
have involved more extended travel of the research assistants and additional facilitation costs (allowances for 
transport and lunch, and the renting of venues). The interviews with police officers could be held on the same 
day as the surveys took place, and thus did not result in additional costs. 
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as, importantly, corrupt practices maintained by the police (such as the asking for a 
contribution before cases are investigated, or the demand of payment before releasing 
arrested people on bond), a general impression of ineffectiveness of police activity leading to 
delays in investigations, the mismanagement of case files by police officers, and police 
officers getting compromised by collaborating with criminals. 
 
In terms of the police officers’ assessment of the activities undertaken within the context of 
PARP and the impacts deriving from these, there seemed to be a marked difference in 
assessment between officers working in districts that had been targeted by PARP and those 
that had not been targeted. All twelve police officers stationed in non-PARP districts were 
unable to comment on the activities undertaken in the context of PARP, and were equally 
unable to point at any positive or negative impact resulting from the project. Several of those 
police officers indicated explicitly they had not heard about the project before. 
 
Police officers who were stationed in PARP districts gave very different responses compared 
to their colleagues in the non-PARP districts. The comments provided by the officers from 
the PARP districts were generally at a rather abstract level, but it can be argued that those 
remarks showed a certain level of knowledge about, and possibly a shift in attitude towards, 
police behaviour, particularly when compared to officers working in districts that had not 
been included in PARP. Thus, at least some of the difference in knowledge and attitude 
between the two groups of police officers of equivalent rank could possibly be attributed to 
the impacts of PARP.  
 
The responses provided by nine (out the total of eleven interviewed)23 police officers in 
PARP districts typically related to a limited set of issues, connected to desirable police 
behaviour in terms of respect for human rights, the treatment of arrested people and 
interactions with the community in general. Although it is difficult to generalise on the basis 
of a limited number of police officers from PARP districts, the convergence in the answers 
provided to the interview questions (see Appendix D, section D2) is striking. This 
convergence could possibly be ascribed partially to the norm-setting effect produced by the 
involvement of police officers in PARP. Obviously, nothing can be said about the concrete 
impact of the acceptance of particular norms on behaviour, but it is probably safe to surmise 
that people who demonstrate adherence to particular norms will reflect some of that in their 
behaviour in daily practice. Box 2 contains examples of what interviewed police officers 
themselves raised as positive impacts of  PARP. 
 
Possibly, answers to the questions what police officers saw as ‘ideal practices’ in daily police 
operations, as well as suggestions made by police officers on how the quality of policing can 
be improved may be seen, to some extent, as a reflection of their normative conviction about 
proper police behaviour. In a way, these can be seen as validation of what PARP was claimed 
to have brought about. In this respect, the comment of one of the interviewees, who was 
stationed in the PARP district Mbarara, is also relevant: ‘I did not go for those trainings but 
on the side of respecting human tights, I have seen a change in people who went for those 
courses. They now know what human rights means; there is now less violation of human 
rights’ (interview with District Police Commander, Mbarara). Some typical examples of such 
best policing practices and suggestions for improving the quality of policing, given by police 
officers in PARP districts are presented in box 3.  
                                                 
23 Two police officers indicated they had been posted to PARP districts only recently, and were not able to 
comment on the possible impacts of the project. 
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Box 2: Quotes from interviews with police officers on perceived impacts of PARP 
‘Well, there are a number of positive changes I have rated as a result of the PARP project with 
HURINET. For instance as a result of the PARP project with HURINET impunity is no longer there 
and service delivery has improved especially in the areas of detention of suspects for long hours, 
torture of suspects, and corruption.’ (Regional Police Commander, Bushenyi district) 
 
‘Cases of torture of suspects have reduced. Police officers now respect the law, have customer care 
and handle suspects better.’ (Acting District Police Commander, Kabale district) 
 
‘More citizens know their rights and entitlements and can engage police officers on this. For example, 
it is common knowledge that police bond is free. More still, the intervention has bridged the gap 
between police and the citizens, and today, more private citizens can demand accountability from the 
police. More still civil society can better engage with police as stakeholders to enforce the 
implementation of the desired human rights standards.’ (Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigation Department, Kabarole district) 
 
‘Police are more inclined to their mandate of protecting people and their property than ever before. 
This has been enhanced with public sensitisation through the print and electronic media on citizen 
awareness campaigns.’ (Regional Police Commander, Kabarole district) 
 
‘The project taught me to be accountable, to improve on service delivery, to improve on democratic 
governance; that whatever you do, you should do it democratically. Even while talking, we need to 
talk to people like we do to our masters, we should not shout at them. If public officers know that 
people are our masters, then we would never abuse them.’ (Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigation Department, Mbarara district) 
 
In contrast to police officers stationed in PARP districts, officers from other stations tended 
to answer the questions about best practices and improving the quality of policing more in 
terms of technical solutions to the concrete problems experienced by the police, as well as the 
need to train police officers through refresher courses and similar activities. 
 
Box 3: Quotes from interviews with police officers on best practices and quality improvement 
‘The procedure of handling crimes begins with a report about a crime from members of the public, or 
media, or police officer. The complaint is then registered and investigations begin within a few hours 
and a response is made within a short time. The maximum time it should take is two days.’ (Comment 
about best practice, Officer in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department, Kabale district) 
 
‘There are a number of areas of improvement within the police force. And such areas basically 
include the following: human rights; training the different officers in the area of forensic 
investigation; crime management and investigation; public relations.’ (Comment about improvements 
to the quality of policing, Acting District Police Commander/Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department, Bushenyi) 
 
‘When I go for radio talk shows as well as meeting villagers where crimes are committed, I observe 
we need crime preventers within the villages. We also need to bridge the gap between community and 
police by having enough community liaison officers.’ (Comment about improvements to the quality 
of policing, District Police Commander, Mbarara) 
 
The interviews addressed, more in particular, also the role of civil-society organisations such 
as HURINET and the perception of such organisations by police officers. Some officers 
commented that PARP had taught the police about civil-society organisations, and 
particularly about the fact that the latter should not be seen as adversaries but also as partners, 
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the activities of which could actually benefit the work of the police. Comments related to 
civil-society organisations were mainly addressing the following aspects of the role of those 
organisations: 
 Enhancing transparency of police activities; 
 Contributing to the learning capacity and improvement in the functioning of police 
officers; 
 Sensitising citizens about their entitlements and the mandate of the police; 
 Enhancing oversight over the behaviour of police officers; 
 Establishing a better relationship between citizens and the police. 
 
 
4.3.6 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, we observe that HURINET’s police-oriented activities were scattered, one-
time interventions but nevertheless seem to have impacted on the attitudes of the 
participating police officers. This conclusion is substantiated by the findings in the surveys 
conducted among 600 police officers, as well as by the results of the in-depth interviews 
among 23 police officers. 
 
The survey results indicate that propensity-score matched impacts (PSM) of HURINET 
activities on proper policing are small, ranging from a significant difference of 0.26 to almost 
an entire point, namely 0.93. The PSM results are confirmed by the findings from the model 
applying inverse-probability weighting. The results are most pronounced for the judgements 
of the officers; they are reduced in half when it comes to reporting of misbehaviour. Thus, 
HURINET activities have affected the perception of police officers but only encouraged them 
slightly to speak out against bad practices. The findings seem to indicate that more systematic 
and regular activities could have had an even greater impact a behavioural change.  
 
At the same time, HURINET was successful in diffusing knowledge about proper policing, 
which is demonstrated by the finding that more severe cases tend to be judged more 
rigorously and these are the ones where the differences between participants and non-
participants are most pronounced. Cases where the most pronounced differences were found 
tend to deal with treatment of ‘clients’ (former arrestees and suspects, thieves, persons 
complaining) indicating that the human rights agenda of HURINET is reflected in the 
activities and has translated into better knowledge of the trained police officers. 
 
However, we cannot be sure that these different attitudes translate into improved practices 
since our survey tool does not allow us to observe behavioural outcomes. At most we can 
infer whether the attitudes are likely to translate into better policing practices. We do so by 
relating the responses to the question ‘Would this behaviour be regarded as a violation of 
official policy in your agency?’ to our outcome variables. When taking the difference 
between the average score for this question and the average score associated with officers’ 
own judgment of the severity of the situation, we observe that the attitudes displayed by the 
police officers still do not fully conform to the official code of conduct at the police agencies. 
Across all twelve cases and both for participating and non-participating police officers we 
find that their own assessment of the severity of the cases is less critical as compared to what 
the officers judge official treatment of the presented violations at their station. This suggests 
that while the rules about good policing are known and are officially in place, police officers 
do not fully comply with these rules. The self-assessment of the police officers’ behaviour 
indicates that the individual officers do not fully live up to the official standards of good 
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policing. We infer that individual behaviour is not necessarily fully aligned with reported 
attitudes. This in turn suggests that the official standards are not fully enforced, leaving room 
for individual officers to interpret the rules to their own advantage. On the basis of the 
survey, we conclude that activities on good and accountable policing are not very likely to 
assume their full potential when used as stand-alone instruments. It seems that they need to 
be combined with credible internal enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The results of the in-depth qualitative interviews largely confirmed the findings of the survey 
in the sense that the knowledge and attitudes of police officers in districts targeted by PARP 
were in conformity with the intended changes of the police project. Although the interviews 
also did not allow for a check on behaviour, police officers’ answers to certain open questions 
(in particular, concerning best policing practices and suggestions for improving the quality of 
policing) suggest that the normative beliefs about proper police behaviour may have been 
adjusted. Replies to questions about the involvement of civil-society organisations in police-
oriented activities suggest furthermore that attitudes among police officers about those 
organisations may have been impacted favourably by PARP activities. 
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5. ACODE: Local Government Councils’ Score Card Initiative 
(LGCSCI)  
 
5.1 Rationale and objectives of LGCSCI 
 
The Local Government Councils’ Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI) was set up in 2009 with 
support from the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP), a basket fund for supporting 
initiatives for improved democratic governance in Uganda, established by Denmark, Ireland, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK in 2008. The DDP is currently subsumed 
under the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF),24 which was established by Austria, 
Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Union 
and encompasses, apart from the DDP, a component on rights, justice and peace, and one on 
voice and accountability. DGF does not provide core funding for the LGCSCI; the initiative 
obtains funding from IDRC’s Think Tank Initiative. 
The LGCSCI is a 10-year initiative to strengthen citizens’ demand for effective public service 
delivery and accountability. More specifically, it aims to ‘strengthen the weak political 
accountability mechanisms between citizens and elected leaders that prevent citizens from 
receiving adequate public services, mainly by overcoming information-related barriers and 
boosting Councillor professionalisation and performance’ (VNG International 2014: 1). In 
their 2014 evaluation of the LGCSCI, VNG International reconstructed the following 
outcomes of the scorecard: 
1. A citizenry that increasingly demands for better accountability from political leaders 
and public officers;  
2. A citizenry that increasingly demands for better performance and efficient service 
delivery; and,  
3. Enhanced demand for improved accountability and services at the local level, which 
moves in a vertical trajectory and translates into improved governance, accountability 
and efficiency at national and sub-national levels (VNG International 2014: 7-8). 
The LGCSCI is to result in these outcomes by a) addressing weak accountability mechanisms 
between citizens and elected leaders, b) overcoming information related barriers, and c) 
boosting the professionalism and performance of councillors (VNG International 2014: 5).  
The LGCSCI’s three main activities are: 1) an annual assessment of district councils’ and 
councillors’ performance based on a scorecard; 2) feedback reports on assessments, covering 
the included districts and a synthesis report providing a comparative analysis; and 3) capacity 
building activities aimed at increasing the effectiveness of councils and councillors on the 
one hand and citizens’ demand for accountability on the other hand. Increased capacity of the 
local councillors is expected to result in better oversight of local service providers and thus in 
better service delivery.  
The 2012/2013 version of the scorecard was conducted in 26 districts across Uganda, as 
shown in the map in figure 4. 
 
                                                 
24 Among other activities, DDP funded also a similar project (the Parliamentary Scorecard project), which was 
implemented by the African Leadership Institute (AFLI) and which aimed to monitor the performance of 
Members of Parliament to make them accountable to their voters. 
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Figure 5: Districts participating in the LGCSCI 
 
Source: Tumushabe et al. 2013: 5 
The idea underlying the scorecard initiative is that ‘there is widespread recognition that the 
delivery of public services is less than desirable at best or has malfunctioned at worst. 
Improvements in key service delivery indicators in the areas of health, education, agriculture 
and roads are not considered proportionate with the levels of public investment in these areas’ 
(Tumushabe et al. 2013: 17). One of the major problems with existing monitoring 
instruments for the quality of service delivery is that they are oriented to the ‘supply side’, 
assuming that public service delivery can be improved by strengthening the monitoring 
functions of the local government institutions themselves (Tumushabe et al. 2010a: 5). 
 
Instead, improvements in governance should be found by locating monitoring at the ‘demand 
side’, implying with the citizens and their organisations, who should be ‘empowered to 
demand for better performance from governmental and other institutions and leaders’ 
(Tumushabe et al. 2010a: 8). This is important for ACODE, as ‘[c]itizens’ demand for 
performance and accountability through engagement is the epitome of a democratic society’ 
(Tumushabe et al. 2010a: 11). 
 
In the demand-side approach, existing mechanisms for horizontal accountability (i.e., 
between different government institutions) are supplemented by vertical accountability 
mechanisms, which give more power to citizens, both for exercising their rights formally as 
voters, and informally through citizens’ organisations. Local governments and their leaders 
occupy a dual role in this approach, as they perform both supply-side and demand-side 
functions. The latter function is performed vis-à-vis the central government, where they act as 
‘pressure points’ for greater accountability (Tumushabe et al. 2010a: 10). 
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The analysis of the causes of insufficient service delivery focuses on two interrelated factors. 
In the first place, the lack of capacity of the state is felt to impact on the quality of public 
policy and the implementation of public policy programmes, leading to poor service delivery 
(Tumushabe et al. 2013: 18). Next to this, the incentives of those responsible for public 
policy are seen to lead to the misuse of resources for political purposes (for instance, to serve 
patronage arrangements, one of the examples of which is the creation of new districts). A 
stark expression of these two factors can be found in the authority of local government 
relating to budgetary issues. Local governments have, on the one hand, very little room for 
collecting taxes and allocating resources, since taxation and budget allocation are dominated 
by the central government (see sections 2.6 and 5.3.3). On the other hand, many people 
working at the level of local government are linked to the national government through 
clientelistic relations (Tumushabe et al. 2010a: 10; 2013: 23-31, 67). 
 
According to LGCSCI, the key factors for bringing about change are: better adherence to the 
rule of law, which limits the discretionary powers of state functionaries; stronger democratic 
institutions, which provide more accountability mechanisms for government institutions; and 
stronger citizens’ voice, which leads to more pressure on service providers, policy makers and 
elected representatives (Tumushabe et al. 2013: 18). 
 
The role of the scorecard instrument in this logic is that it provides ‘a combination of regular 
assessments of performance of elected leaders and provision of performance information to 
citizens’ (Tumushabe et al. 2013: 2). An underlying assumption of the scorecard is that its 
use should lead to better awareness of political leaders of their roles, as well as more 
awareness among citizens about the responsibilities of those political leaders (Tumushabe et 
al. 2013: 68). This should, in its turn, lead to a strengthening of accountability of local 
councillors and thereby would have a positive impact on the quality of service delivery and 
the use of development budgets at the local level. 
 
The positive impact of the introduction of the scorecard may be impeded by various factors, 
some of which operate internally to local governments, and others that are external and 
operate at the national level. Internal factors are: conflicts deriving from the existence of 
multiple leadership positions at the local level; the low level of revenue collection and lack of 
financial autonomy; and failed multi-party politics at the local government level (Tumushabe 
et al. 2013: 68-70). Factors related to the embedding of local governments are: distortions 
inherent to Uganda’s decentralisation policy; and centralised control of the national budget 
resources (Tumushabe et al. 2013: 70-71).25 
 
The reconstructed theory of change that is captured in figure 5, indicates that the use of the 
scorecard is assumed to have a positive impact on public service delivery through various 
                                                 
25 ACODE have performed an initial assessment of the impact of the introduction of the scorecard on service 
delivery. Data reported in Tumushabe et al. (2013: 33-39) relate to trends in the coverage of public services 
(access to clean water, education and health), as well as cross-sectional analysis of performance in service 
delivery (exam scores in primary education, allocations to the development budget for roads, and allocations to 
the development budget for education). The analyses reported in Tumushabe et al. (2013) are limited to 
scorecard districts and do not compare results in those districts with districts that are not included in the 
LGCSCI. Results show mixed results in terms of performance over time: while some districts have experienced 
upward trends in coverage of public services, other districts demonstrate stagnating coverage or downward 
trends. Cross-sectional analysis for 2011/12 and 2012/13 indicate that, overall, higher scoring councils show 
better results in terms of exam scores in primary education, allocations to the development budget for roads, and 
allocations to the development budget for education. 
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result chains. First of all, the production, publication and dissemination of the scorecard is to 
increase the available information on the performance of councillors. This is, together with 
the capacity building activities focused on increasing citizens’ demand for accountability, to 
result into strengthened civic consciousness about the role and performance of councillors 
and, in turn, to increased demand for better services. Three key underlying assumptions need 
to hold for these mechanisms to function: 
1. citizens are aware of the findings of the local governance scorecard;  
2. citizens understand the findings of the local governance scorecard; and 
3. citizens are able to voice their demand. 
 
Figure 5: LGCSCI’s reconstructed theory of change26 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, through building the capacity of local councillors, which includes raising their 
awareness of their formal roles and responsibilities, in combination with producing and 
disseminating information on councillors’ performance and strengthening civic demand for 
better services, the performance of councillors is to be improved. Key underlying 
assumptions are that: 
1. Councillors are willing to improve their performance, in line with their formal roles 
and responsibilities; 
                                                 
26 ACODE did not develop a comprehensive Theory of Change. According to the VNG final project evaluation 
(2014:42) a Theory of Change was only partly elaborated and it failed to adequately describe or illustrate the 
proposed change. The evaluators, therefore, reconstructed a Theory of Change based on the information 
collected during the interviews with ACODE staff and other key stakeholders and relevant documentation about 
the LGCSCI (Tumushabe et al. 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013; VNG International 2014). The reconstructed Theory 
of Change presented in the final report differs from the reconstructed Theory of Change presented in the 
inception report. The Theory of Change that was reconstructed after the fieldwork phase does no longer include 
the assumed effect of LGCSCI on trust in local government. The latter impact was included at an earlier stage 
on the basis of interviews with staff at the ACODE headquarters. More in-depth discussions and interviews 
during fieldwork demonstrated that the enhancement of trust may have been expected by some of the LGCSCI 
staff, but it was not an integral part of the project objectives, nor of the activities undertaken by ACODE during 
the implementation of LGCSCI. Furthermore, the revised version now also includes the activity ‘building the 
capacity of citizens’. This because capacity building activities focused on increasing citizens’ demand for 
accountability were an integral part of the project logic – albeit that these activities have received (too) little 
attention in practice – and clearly linked to the envisaged outcome of increased civic demand for improved 
service delivery. 
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2. Councillors have the necessary minimum skills and knowledge to perform their 
formal roles; and       
3. Councillors have access to the required financial resources to perform their formal 
duties. 
Thirdly, the LGCSCI is to result in the strengthened ability of key stakeholders to lobby for 
better services at the sub-national and national level. These key stakeholders include local 
councillors, civil society organisations, ULGA, MoLG, and the MoFPED. It is based on the 
assumption that the findings of the National Synthesis Report and the individual district 
reports can support the key actors in effectively voicing their demands to the relevant actors 
at sub-national and national level. 
 
Finally, the improved performance of councillors according to their formal roles and 
responsibilities and the strengthened ability of key stakeholders to demand for improved 
service delivery at the local, sub-national and national level are in turn to result in improved 
service delivery. The key factors that influence this results chain are: 
1. Local councils’ ability to influence the size, allocation and release of the district 
budget; and  
2. Local government administrations’ capacity (both in terms of quantity and quality) at 
district and sub-county level.  
 
 
5.2 Implementation of LGCSCI 
 
ACODE, in coalition with a variety of local civil-society organisations, employs between 70 
and 80 researchers to fill in the scorecard in consultation with local councillors. The 
scorecard is to assess how elected political leaders (district councillors, chairpersons, 
speakers) and the district council as institution perform in view of their tasks and 
responsibilities specified in the Constitution, the Local Governments Act and other legal 
provisions.27 Councillors are seen as the main focal point of the scorecard, as these are 
elected to represent a geographically defined area and a special constituency of citizens. 
ACODE takes care of the training of the researchers, as well as involves the local leaders in 
discussions about the instrument of the scorecard (this involved 1,922 people in the 
2012/2013 assessment; Tumushabe et al. 2013: 12).  
The scorecard methodology involves five steps: 
1. Review of documents and literature on the district; 
2. Filling of the scorecard on the basis of interviews with councillors and collected 
written evidence on councillors’ performance; 
3. Verification of the data in field visits to service-delivery units and interviews with 
service consumers; 
4. Focus-group discussions with community groups on councillors’ performance (with 
participation of over 7,622 people in 684 focus-group discussions in all 342 sub-
counties in the 2012/2013 assessment; Tumushabe et al. 2013: 12); 
5. Analysis of the data and writing of the district scorecard report. 
 
                                                 
27 The scorecard supplements the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for 
Local Governments, which is conducted by the Ministry of Local Government and relates to the more technical 
part of local governments (Tumushabe et al. 2010a: 17; 2013: 1). 
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ACODE’s synthesis report on the 2012/2013 scorecard highlights the following five features 
since the start of the LGCSCI: 
 Improvement in the performance of elected political leaders; 
 A lack of improvement in the national political environment in which local politicians 
function; 
 Increased awareness about accountability of the elected functionaries among citizens; 
 A lack of citizen action regarding the demand for accountability. 
 Service delivery in all districts regarding education, health, water and sanitation, 
agriculture, environment and natural resources, and roads lags behind expectations. 
(Tumushabe et al. 2013: 3-4). 
 
 
5.3 LGCSCI’s effectiveness 
 
5.3.1 Research design and data 
 
A. Methods 
 
Research on the LGCSCI involved a quantitative and a qualitative part. The quantitative 
assessment of LGCSCI effectiveness, involving the analysis of administrative data at the 
district level and data on citizens’ perceptions of the quality of local democracy and 
governance from the Afrobarometer, is presented in section 5.3.2. Findings from interviews 
and discussions with local government councillors, LGCSCI researchers and citizens, are 
presented in section 5.3.3. Results from interviews on demand-side instruments more 
generally – with a focus on two main projects implemented by ACODE, LGCSCI and the 
Citizens’ Budget Tracking and Information Centre (CBTIC) – are presented in section 5.3.4. 
 
B. Quantitative analysis of LGCSCI effectiveness 
 
We collected district-level administrative data for the period 2005 to 2013 to assess the 
impact of the LGCSCI on accountability and budgeting behaviour. In order to assess the 
scorecard’s potential impact, we focused on data related to budgetary decisions and audit 
outcomes. Our dataset contains information on the amount of budget spent, per capita 
spending, and the amount of the budget returned to the central government.  
 
Next to this, our analyses focus on the Ugandan citizens perceived the quality of democracy 
and governance at the local or regional level by making use of six rounds of data collected by 
Afrobarometer.28 We have used Afrobarometer data since these promised to provide reliable 
statistical information on citizen attitudes on democracy and governance, the economy, and 
civil society. The quality and representativeness of the data are maximised by using national 
probability samples for a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in the 
survey countries.29 
 
                                                 
28 Afrobarometer is a survey research project that started in 1999 and carries out surveys in 36 different 
countries. See: http://www.afrobarometer.org. 
29 The surveys apply random sampling at every stage, so that more populated geographical units have a 
proportionally greater probability of being chosen into the sample, i.e., the probability of being sampled is 
proportionate to population size.  
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For the present study, we used six waves of survey data. Three surveys were carried out 
before the scorecard initiative was in place (2002, 2005 and 2008). Three rounds of surveys 
were held during the existence of the scorecard initiative, in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Data in the 
Afrobarometer surveys relate to the following indicators: 
 
 An assessment of the perceived share of local government councillors who are 
involved in corruption; 
 An assessment of the effort that local government councillors make to listen to what 
citizens have to say. 
 
While not all rounds of the survey contain identical questions, nor cover exactly the same 
topics, the data show sufficient overlap to enable a difference-in-difference analysis of 
citizens’ assessments of local council performance. The dataset thus extracted from the 
Afrobarometer contains comprehensive information from more than 9,000 individual 
citizens. An advantage of using Afrobarometer data is that survey information is available 
that was not collected in the context of the scorecard intervention but represents independent 
data on the perceptions of Ugandan citizens about politics. Thus, the risk of survey effects 
distorting the outcomes is negligible. 
 
C. Qualitative analysis of LGCSCI effectiveness 
 
Together with ACODE, three districts that had been targeted by LGCSCI were identified for 
field work. The selection was based on the desire to achieve geographical spread and 
differentiation according to the performance of local councils. The latter was determined on 
the basis of ACODE’s research on council performance (Tumushabe et al. 2013: 48). On the 
basis of the two criteria, field research focused on Mbale (Eastern Uganda, performance in 
upper tier), Kabarole (Western Uganda, performance in middle tier) and Amuru (Northern 
Uganda, performance in lower tier). ACODE liaised with their local resource persons about 
the district-level research and these resource persons selected, with our team, the target 
groups for interviews and focus-group discussions. 
 
D. Qualitative analysis of the demand-side approach to governance 
 
For the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the demand-side approach to governance, 
as well as the main challenges involved, a series of interviews were conducted with central 
players on governance reform. On the donor side, interviews were held at the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy in Kampala and the multi-donor Democratic Governance Facility 
(DGF), as well as with former staff at the Dutch Embassy. From the side of the Ugandan 
authorities, representatives from the Ministry of Local Government and the Uganda Local 
Governments Association (ULGA) were interviewed. Finally, a range of representatives from 
Ugandan civil-society organisations were interviewed. 
 
 
5.3.2 Impact analysis of the scorecard initiative on the perceived quality of local 
democracy and governance 
 
A. Summary statistics 
 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the budgetary outcome variables. We observe that 
the average district spends UGX 14.017 billion of public budget. This corresponds roughly to 
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€4 million and is an indicator of how financially limited local councils are in Uganda.30 The 
average percentage of the budget returned to the central level is roughly 3.9 per cent of the 
annual budget of the local councils. Local revenues contribute on average as little as UGX 
631.583 million (or less than €200,000) to the district budget. 
 
The performance of local councils is assessed annually by the Ministry of Local Government. 
The indicators in table 9 reflect this assessment. The annual assessment of minimum 
conditions indicates that in most cases, namely 85 per cent, these are met.  
 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for district level administrative information 
 
 
N Mean Std.Dev. 
Number of 
districts 
Available years 
Overall public spending in UGX (log) 763 23.22 0.54 111 2005-2013 
Overall public spending in UGX 763 14.02 billion 7.66 billion 111 2005-2013 
Per capita public spending in UGX (log) 763 10.64 0.34 111 2005-2013 
Per capita public spending in UGX 763 44,291.52 17,066.68 111 2005-2013 
Percentage of budget returned 763 3.90 8.42 111 2005-2013 
Contribution of local revenue to district budget 
in UGX (log) 
580 19.70 1.03 110 2005-2013 
Contribution of local revenue to district budget 
in UGX 
580 631.58 million 827.88 million 110 2005-2013 
Performance assessment 378 0.17 0.85 109 2005-2007, 2009, 2012 
Annual assessment of minimum conditions 
(met=1) 
564 0.85 0.36 109 2005-2007, 2009-2012 
Control variables      
Population size (log) 763 12.57 0.62 111 2005-2013 
Population size 763 341,478.20 201,271.90 111 2005-2013 
Population growth 763 3.24 1.26 111 2005-2013 
District of was split (dummy) 763 0.02 0.15 111 2005-2013 
  Note: The number of observations differs per outcome variable as not all information was collected on a yearly basis. 
 Source: Authors’ own calculations based on administrative data. 
 
As control variables we included the population size and population growth per district. The 
average number of people living in a district is 341,478. It is important to note that the district 
level dataset contains information for all Ugandan districts that have been in place since 
2009. This results in an unbalanced panel as some districts were only created in 2006 and 
2009. Therefore, we also constructed dummy variable that indicates that an existing district 
was split at a particular moment in time. To capture the full universe of activities in Uganda, 
we kept all districts in the sample and worked with that unbalanced panel as any sub-sample 
selection would be artificial. 
 
Table 10 shows the distribution of the budget-related observations over time. Given the 
expansion of districts since 2005, we have fewer observations for earlier periods. The 
maximum number of district-year observations is 111 indicating that we exclude one district. 
This is the district of Kampala. We have excluded Kampala for two reasons. First, it is the 
district of the capital and we expect that the dynamics related to public spending may be 
different from those in other districts. Secondly, Kampala was part of the scorecard districts 
in 2009 but the intervention in Kampala stopped in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 We employed the UGX-EUR exchange rate of 0.0003 that was observed in June 2015 
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Table 10: Distribution of district level observations for administrative data across the years 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
Percentage of the 
sample 
2005 55 7.21 
2006 67 8.78 
2007 77 10.09 
2008 77 10.09 
2009 77 10.09 
2010 77 10.09 
2011 111 14.55 
2012 111 14.55 
2013 111 14.55 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on administrative data 
 
Table 11 presents descriptive statistics for Afrobarometer data on citizens’ perceptions of 
local democracy and governance for the six rounds indicated in section 5.3.1.31 The data are 
representative for Uganda as a whole. While we do not have the same number of observations 
and not the same yearly coverage for all variables, there are at least two pre-treatment 
observations for each variable. The size of the sample allows us to identify relatively small 
changes in the perception of local democratic processes. 
 
The ordinal variables presented in table 11 express citizens’ perceptions of local councillors. 
Corruption is assessed on a scale ranging from 1 to 3, where 1 stands for the judgement that 
some councillors are corrupt, 2 indicates that most are corrupt, and 3 expresses that all are 
corrupt. Perceived performance is rated on a four-point scale, where 1 corresponds to being 
very unsatisfied, 2 indicates being somewhat unsatisfied, 3 stands for being somewhat 
satisfied and 4 represents a great deal of satisfaction with the work of the local councillors. 
The extent to which citizens feel that councillors listen to them is coded between 0 and 3, 
with answer categories are never (0), sometimes (1), often (2), always (3). The data express 
that citizens, on average, have the impression that more than just some local councillors are 
corrupt, but do not consider most councillors to be corrupt. Further, citizens indicate that they 
are, on average, close to ‘somewhat satisfied’ with councillors. Finally, the average 
respondent has the impression that local councillors listen only sometimes to their 
constituency.  
 
Table 11 also reports on a variety of control variables. Average age of the respondents 
appears to be 34.4 years. The sample is gender-balanced as 49.2 per cent of the respondents 
are women. Further, 77 per cent of the survey population belongs to one of the 10 major 
language groups with the Luganda language constituting the biggest one (16.9 per cent). 
Regarding respondents’ education level, it appears that the majority (42.4 per cent) have at 
least some primary education. Yet, 11.8 per cent of the respondents report not having any 
education at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Analysis of the observations indicates that they are fairly evenly spread over the six rounds of the 
Afrobarometer. The number of observations was lowest in the 2010 and 2011 rounds (1,715 and 1,747 
respondents) and highest in the 2002 and 2008 rounds (2,155 and 2,116 respondents. In case data for 2002 were 
not available for all outcome variables, for those variables there are still data on two pre-intervention periods. 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics for the Afrobarometer perception outcomes 
 N Mean Std.Dev. Available years 
Ordinal variables     
Councillors are perceived as being corrupt 9,220 1.35 0.76 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Perceived performance of local government councillors 11,694 2.78 0.83 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Councillors listen to what people have to say 6238 1.29 0.92 2005, 2008, 2012 
Control variables     
Age of the respondent  11,847 34.36 12.61 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Respondent is female 11,847 0.49 0.50 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Home language (Excluded category: Other small languages) 
   Acholi 11,847 0.08 0.27 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Ateso 11,847 0.07 0.26 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Langi 11,847 0.05 0.21 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Luganda 11,847 0.17 0.37 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Lugbara 11,847 0.04 0.20 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Lumasaba 11,847 0.05 0.21 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Lusoga 11,847 0.10 0.30 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Rukiga 11,847 0.06 0.24 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Runyankole 11,847 0.12 0.32 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Runyolo 11,847 0.04 0.19 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Education levels (Excluded category: No education) 
   Primary education 11,847 0.42 0.49 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Secondary education 11,847 0.35 0.48 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Higher education 11,847 0.11 0.31 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Religion (Excluded category: None, traditional or other religion) 
   Christian 11,847 0.88 0.33 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Muslim 11,847 0.11 0.31 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Living conditions (Excluded category: Living conditions are unchanged) 
   (Very) bad living conditions 11,847 0.51 0.50 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   (Very) good living conditions 11,847 0.27 0.44 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Consumption needs: Number of times gone without enough food in past 12 months (Excluded category: At most once or twice) 
   Several times gone without food  11,847 0.20 0.40 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Many times gone without food  11,847 0.09 0.29 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Always gone without food  11,847 0.03 0.18 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Watching TV (Excluded category: Never watches TV) 
   Watches TV at most once a month  
 
11,847 0.06 0.24 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Watches TV once a week 11,847 0.05 0.21 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Watches TV several times a week 11,847 0.07 0.25 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Watches TV every day 11,847 0.07 0.25 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Listening to the radio (Excluded category: Never listens to the radio) 
   Listens to the radio at most once a month  
 
11,847 0.02 0.14 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Listens to the radio once a week 11,847 0.04 0.20 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Listens to the radio several times a week 11,847 0.19 0.40 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Listens to the radio every day 11,847 0.66 0.47 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Reading of newspapers (Excluded category: Never reads the newspaper) 
   Reads newspaper at most once a month 11,847 0.10 0.30 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Reads newspaper once a week 11,847 0.11 0.32 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Reads newspaper several times a week 11,847 0.14 0.35 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Reads newspaper every day 11,847 0.06 0.23 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Respondent is very interested in politics 11,847 0.36 0.48 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Attendance of public meetings 
   Attended public meetings now and then 11,847 0.25 0.43 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Attended public meetings several times 11,847 0.38 0.49 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
   Attended public meetings often 11,847 0.17 0.38 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010-2012 
Note: The number of observations differs per outcome variable as not all information was collected in each survey. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Afrobarometer data. 
 
As to religion, the majority of Ugandans are Christians (87.7 per cent). Socioeconomic 
conditions are measured by self-reporting on living conditions and consumption needs. More 
than half of the respondents report that their living conditions are worse compared to those of 
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other Ugandans: this is something that indicates general discontent with living conditions. In 
terms of consumption needs, the majority of the respondents does not report any hardship 
concerning food security, but almost one fifth of the sample report that they had gone without 
food several times and almost 10 per cent say that they had gone without food many times. 
 
Afrobarometer information about household demographics is limited. The bottom part of 
table 11 reports on media usage and participation. The descriptive statistics reveal that TVs 
are not a common form of information. The majority of the sample, namely 76.1 per cent, 
does not watch TV at all. Radio is a more important source of information with 65.8 per cent 
of the respondents indicating that they listen to the radio every day. Lastly, newspapers are 
read at least once a week by almost one third of the population but daily readers are rarely 
found: only 5.6 per cent of the respondents read the newspaper on a daily basis. 
 
Dummy variables are used to measure respondents’ interest in politics. Of all respondents, 
36.1 per cent indicate to be very interested in politics. Moreover, participation in community 
meetings is common: one quarter of the respondents indicate that they attend such meetings 
now and then, while 38 per cent report attending several public meetings. 
 
B. Identification strategy 
 
The analyses implemented a difference-in-difference model: the model compares the change 
in outcomes in the scorecard districts (treatment group) before and after the scorecard 
initiative to the change in outcomes in the control group where the scorecard was not 
implemented. By comparing changes we have controlled for observed and unobserved time-
invariant characteristics that might be correlated with treatment status as well as the outcome. 
 
We estimate a first model where the unit of observation is district-level spending and a 
second model where the unit of observation is the individual citizen’s assessment of the 
performance of local councils. In the first model we control for population size (in logs) and 
population growth. In addition, we include a dummy variable indicating whether a district 
was split to account for the creation of new districts, which is equivalent to a structural 
change. The impact of treatment (the LGCSCI intervention), determined at the district level, 
is our outcome of interest. We further control for district-specific fixed effect and a time 
effect: we have included eight year dummies in the analysis to account for the yearly trends. 
We have accounted for cluster-robust standard errors at the level of the 119 districts. 
 
In the second model, related to citizens’ perceptions of local democracy and governance, we 
have included more control variables. Individual control variables include age, gender, 
religion, primary language spoken, education, living conditions, and consumption needs. Our 
outcome of interest again is the treatment effect (i.e., being included in the scorecard 
initiative), which is determined at the district level. Again we control for district-specific 
fixed effects and a time effect, as well as cluster-robust standard errors. 
Importantly, in the second model, the unit of observation is the individual citizen. We 
measure changes in the perceived political and economic atmosphere and in public attitudes 
in Uganda.  By comparing citizens residing in treated and control districts over time we can 
assess the impact of the scorecard initiative on political perceptions. 
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C. Results 
 
Results of the district-level difference-in-difference analysis of budgetary outcomes 
Results of the difference-in-difference estimation for the six budgetary and audit outcome 
variables are presented in table 12. We find that districts that are part of the scorecard 
initiative spend on average 7.5 per cent less in comparison to districts that are not part of the 
initiative (column 3). Next to being economically highly relevant, the coefficient’s p value of 
0.013 indicates that the result is also statistically significant. This result is in stark contrast to 
a naïve comparison of districts that does not account for the development over time, 
structural changes and population dynamics (column 2). Clearly, over time districts received 
larger budgets. The time dummies for the years 2009 to 2013 all show positive and 
statistically significant coefficient estimates that are at least twice as large as the impact of 
the scorecard initiative.  Unsurprisingly, district level spending is also positively associated 
with population size.  
 
The finding that districts participating in the scorecard initiative spend on average 7.5 per 
cent less suggests that the accountability aspect of the scorecard initiative results in less waste 
of public money and less ad hoc spending. It further suggests an accountability-investment 
trade-off indicating that increasing the number of rules and regulations embedded in 
accountability mechanisms might result in under-spending. It appears that the scorecards act 
as an additional layer of rules and regulations that are placed upon the councillors leading to 
reduced spending.  
 
The question is whether the reduction in public spending is actually an intended outcome of 
the scorecard initiative or rather an unintended by-product of the increased oversight of civil 
society over the work of the local councillors. This question cannot be answered on the basis 
of available data but it is possible to address a related question: is a reduction in public 
spending good or bad for the district population? Coefficients reported in columns 4 and 5 
indicate that reduction of public spending in scorecard districts does not have a bearing on 
per capita public spending. The introduction of the scorecard does not seem to have impacted 
on per capita public spending once the control variables are taken into consideration: the 
coefficient associated with the scorecard is negative but not statistically significant, indicating 
that per capita public spending is identical across all Ugandan districts no matter whether 
they participate in the scorecard initiative or not. 
 
When focusing on the percentage of the budget returned to the central government, we find 
the mirror image of reduced public spending (columns 6 and 7). The analysis indicates that 
3.27 per cent of total local budgets in scorecard districts remains unused and is returned to the 
central government. Again the finding is economically and statistically relevant (p=0.013). 
Coefficients in columns 8 and 9 indicate that districts participating in the scorecard initiative 
were not more successful in raising local revenue than non-scorecard districts. It is probably 
not surprising that the scorecard districts did not experience an increase in local revenues, as 
that would have involved an increase of personnel at the level of the local administration and 
this is costly. An assessment of the distribution of the local budget over roads, education and 
health showed that the scorecard initiative did not seem to have made a difference along these 
dimensions.32 Local councils depend to a large extent on the central government and have 
limited scope for moving funds across budget lines and deciding upon large-scale 
investments. 
                                                 
32 Detailed results are not presented for the sake of brevity but can be made available by the authors upon request. 
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Table 12: Main results of district-level difference-in-difference analysis 
 
Overall public 
spending (log) 
Per capita public 
spending (log) 
Percentage of 
budget returned 
Contribution of 
local revenue to 
district budget (log) 
Performance 
assessment 
Annual assessment of 
minimum conditions  
Scorecard intervention 0.26*** -0.08** 0.20*** -0.03 1.99 3.27**  -0.07 -0.01 0.58*** 0.18 0.33*** 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (1.23) (1.30)    (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) (0.05) (0.06) 
District was split (dummy)  0.14***  0.12***  -2.67*    -0.20**  0.21  0.06 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (1.54)     (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.09) 
Population size (log)  0.50***  -0.45***  0.99     0.33**  -0.06  -0.04 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (2.29)     (0.15)  (0.34)  (0.05) 
Population growth  0.12  0.10  -4.59     1.07*  -0.45  -0.35 
  (0.13)  (0.14)  (4.15)     (0.58)  (0.88)  (0.42) 
Year 2006  -0.07*  -0.06*  0.52     0.30***  -0.13  0.13 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (1.44)     (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.08) 
Year 2007  -0.01  -0.03  -1.86*    0.28***  -0.73***  -0.34*** 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (1.04)     (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.09) 
Year 2008  -0.05  -0.08**  -1.80     0.69***     
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (1.11)     (0.10)     
Year 2009  0.17***  0.11***  0.69     0.67***  -0.07  0.25*** 
  (0.06)  (0.04)  (1.74)     (0.12)  (0.17)  (0.09) 
Year 2010  0.29***  0.23***  -4.74***  0.46***    0.26** 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (1.31)     (0.17)    (0.11) 
Year 2011  0.29***  0.23***  -1.45     0.55***    0.25** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (1.56)     (0.18)    (0.12) 
Year 2012  0.39***  0.34***  -3.78**   0.46**  0.05  0.23* 
  (0.05)  (0.06)  (1.45)     (0.19)  (0.29)  (0.14) 
Year 2013  0.45***  0.27***  -3.81**   0.77***     
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (1.64)     (0.21)     
Observations 763 763 763 763 763 763 580 580 378 378 564 564 
Districts 111 111 111 111 111 111 110 110 109 109 109 109 
R2 (within) 0.06 0.49 0.07 0.53 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.22 0.06 0.45 
Notes: Linear fixed effects regression for overall public spending, per capita public spending, percentage of the budget returned, contribution of local revenues to district budget, overall 
performance, and the annual assessment of minimum conditions. District fixed effects are included; standard errors are clustered at the district level. The within R2 is reported since we report the 
results of fixed effects regressions. 
* denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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To assess the identifying assumption of our empirical model – i.e., the parallel trends 
assumption – we have compared the above outcomes in scorecard and control districts prior 
to treatment. Between 2005 and 2008 there do not seem to be differences in the outcome 
variables, which is reassuring us that the districts were following similar patterns in budget 
allocation and performance  (see table 13). We find, however, that districts that were included 
in the LGCSCI in 2009 and later had experienced considerably higher contributions to the 
public budget in the years prior to the initiative. Thus, for the outcome variable ‘local 
contribution to public revenues’ the identifying assumption underlying the difference-in-
difference approach is not valid. For the other variables it holds.  
 
 
Table 13: Parallel trend regressions for district-level administrative data 
 
Overall 
public 
spending 
Per capita 
public 
spending 
Percentage 
of budget 
returned 
Contribution 
of local 
revenue to 
district 
budget  
Performance 
assessment 
Annual 
assessment 
of minimum 
conditions  
Pre-intervention assignment 0.08 0.06 -0.94 0.61*** -0.03 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.85) (0.17) (0.15) (0.07) 
District was split (dummy) 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.15 -0.23 -0.17 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.09) (3.10) (0.20) (0.34) (0.15) 
Population size (log) 0.76*** -0.25*** -0.23 0.74*** 0.20 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.86) (0.20) (0.12) (0.06) 
Population growth -0.05** -0.05* -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.35) (0.09) (0.07) (0.03) 
Year 2006 -0.13*** -0.11*** 0.39 0.30*** -0.01 0.15* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (1.49) (0.10) (0.15) (0.09) 
Year 2007 -0.05 -0.05 -1.52 0.23*** -0.66*** -0.31*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (1.04) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) 
Year 2008 -0.10** -0.11*** -1.29 0.48***   
 (0.04) (0.03) (1.02) (0.10)   
Observations 276 276 276 208 194 196 
Districts 78 78 78 73 75 75 
R2 0.74 0.26 0.02 0.46 0.15 0.18 
Notes: Parallel trend regressions comparing the pre-intervention trend between 2005 and 2008 for those districts that will 
eventually participate in the scorecard initiative and the districts that do not participating in the scorecard initiative. Results 
are presented for the budget and performance outcome variables. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
* denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
In addition, we estimated a model where we wrongly assume that scorecard initiative had 
started only in 2008 (table 14).33 The wrongly assigned starting date of the initiative does not 
appear to have any impact either, except for the outcome variable local contribution to public 
revenue. Again, we did not find any impact of the placebo treatment. The parallel trends test 
and the placebo treatment indicate that the underlying assumptions for the employed 
identification strategy hold: this implies that our difference-in-difference analysis can be 
considered a valid approach. 
 
On the basis of district-level administrative data we could show that the scorecard initiative 
has produced budgetary accountability. In this instance, it is important to realise that the local 
council can only take limited budgetary decisions, and is dependent on the local 
administration. While the councillors are assessed by the LGCSCI, the bureaucrats and civil 
servants are not. Yet, the councillors’ work is very much tied to the proper functioning of the 
local administration. Moreover, as most of the local funds come from the central government 
                                                 
33 We had to wrongly assign the start of the intervention to 2007 for the outcome variables performance 
assessment and audit as for these we do not have 2008 data. 
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and these funds are limited, neither the local legislative nor the local executive bodies have 
much room to implement their own ideas and invest in large projects. 
 
 
Table 14: Placebo regressions for district-level administrative data 
 
Overall public 
spending 
Per capita 
public spending 
Percentage of 
budget returned 
Contribution of 
local revenue to 
total district 
budget  
Performance 
assessment 
Annual 
assessment of 
minimum 
conditions  
Placebo intervention in 
2008 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(1.56) 
0.22* 
(0.13 
  
Placebo intervention in 
2007 
    
-0.13 
(0.23) 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
District was split (dummy) 0.15*** 0.18*** 1.55 -0.09 0.24 0.22 
 (0.05) (0.04) (3.20) (0.09) (0.39) (0.16) 
Population size (log) -0.14 -1.33* -17.90 -1.11 2.29 -0.22 
 (0.82) (0.80) (20.38) (2.07) (3.77) (2.66) 
Population growth 0.03 -0.01 -5.66 0.29 -2.67** -1.77** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (4.10) (3.13) (1.07) (0.69) 
Year 2006 -0.04 -0.02 0.56 0.31*** -0.24 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.04) (1.69) (0.10) (0.20) (0.13) 
Year 2007 0.06 0.06 -0.75 0.35** -0.96*** -0.38 
 (0.06) (0.06) (1.81) (0.16) (0.33) (0.23) 
Year 2008 0.05 0.04 -0.16 0.69***   
 (0.08) (0.07) (2.81) (0.24)   
Observations 276 276 276 208 194 196 
Districts 78 78 78 73 75 75 
R2 (within) 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.39 0.27 0.28 
Notes: Placebo regressions allowing the scorecard intervention to already start in 2008, if no 2008 data is available the 
placebo intervention starts in 2007. Results are presented for the budget and performance outcome variables. District fixed 
effects included; standard errors are clustered at the district level. The within R2 is reported since we report the results of 
fixed effects regressions. 
* denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Results of the Afrobarometer difference-in-difference analysis of perceived quality of local 
democracy and governance 
The above does not imply that the scorecard initiative is in vain and should not have been 
implemented. The initiative also aims at raising awareness among elected councillors and the 
public of local democratic processes and at increasing oversight by civil society 
organisations. We address whether the scorecards have achieved this objective by assessing 
data obtained from Afrobarometer. Results are presented in tables 15 and 16, which are 
comparable to table 12. Table 12 was based district-level administrative data, while tables 15 
and 16 are using Afrobarometer data. 
 
At the level of civil society the scorecard initiative seems to have fulfilled its mission with 
respect to transparency, as the councillors in scorecard districts are perceived to have been 
less corrupt since the intervention was put in place. The coefficient associated with the 
scorecard intervention is -0.12. This coefficient explains 16.1 (=-0.12*/0.76) per cent of the 
standard deviation of perceived corruption (see table 11), which implies that the average 
respondent in intervention districts is likely to judge that only some of the councillors are 
corrupt whereas respondents in non-intervention districts perceive a larger share of 
councillors as corrupt. The results from the ordered probit model suggest an even larger 
reduction of perceived corruption among councillors, since the coefficient is -0.18. However, 
this coefficient cannot be interpreted at face value as it involves rescaling relative to the 
Likert cut-off points. We refrain from a tedious discussion of the rescaling procedure. In what 
follows we interpret the coefficient estimates from the ordered probit results correctly relative 
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to the cut-off points. The likelihood that most of the councillors are perceived as corrupt is 
reduced by 4 percentage points in scorecard districts if all the control variables are at their 
mean value. The share of individuals considering all councillors to be corrupt is reduced by 
2.5 percentage points in scorecard districts. This implies, in turn, that citizens in scorecard 
districts are more likely to consider only some of their councillors to be corrupt. Turning to 
the other control variables included in the model, we make the following observations: the 
individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to perceive the local councillors as 
corrupt whereas those people who read the newspaper several times a week and are thus 
relatively well informed are less likely to consider the local councillors to be corrupt. The 
observation is similar for those respondents who indicate that they often attend community 
meetings. These individuals are less likely to perceive their local councillors as corrupt. This 
last finding emphasizes the importance to control for individuals’ participation when 
assessing their judgment of elected leaders.  
 
We now turn to the perceived performance of local government councillors (table 15, 
columns 6-9). The scorecard initiative appears not to have had an effect on the perceived 
performance of the elected local leaders. The simple correlation suggests even a negative 
impact (table 15, column 6). But when we include the control variables, the effect disappears. 
This holds consistently for both the linear and the ordered probit model. Although there are 
no complaints about the work performance of the local councillors, the citizens in scorecard 
districts are more likely to say that councillors do not listen to what people have to say (table 
15, Columns 10-13). The coefficient associated with the intervention dummy is coherently 
negative and statistically significant in three out of four cases. Most importantly the 
statistically negative effect is displayed no matter whether we employ the linear or the 
ordered probit model. The coefficient associated with the scorecard is -0.16 (table 15, column 
12) indicating that 16.9 per cent in the variation of the perceived attentiveness of the local 
councillors is explained by the scorecard initiative. Putting this in terms of the probit model, 
we find that local councillors are 4.3 percentage points less likely to be perceived as listening 
often to their constituency (all the remaining control variables are at their mean value) and 
3.2 percentage points less likely to be perceived as always listening to their constituency. 
 
The coefficients associated with the control variables inform us further about the types of 
citizens that are concerned about the attentiveness of their councillors. The moderately 
informed individuals, who say that they read the newspaper either once a month or once a 
week, have the impression that local councillors listen to what ordinary people have to say. 
Moreover, respondents who indicate that they are very interested in politics and those who 
attended at least several community meetings in the twelve months preceding the survey are 
more likely to perceive their councillors as attentive to their concerns.  
 
Thus, results at the level of the citizens indicate that the scorecard initiative increased 
transparency resulting in lower levels of perceived corruption. Concomitantly, the higher 
level of transparency seems to have raised expectations. The local constituency does not 
indicate that they are unsatisfied with the performance of their councillors. They wish, 
however, that councillors would listen more to their needs.  
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Table 15: Main results of Afrobarometer perception difference-in-difference analysis 
 
Councillors are perceived as being corrupt 
Perceived performance of local government 
councillors 
Councillors listen to what people have to say 
 
Basic FE 
FE with 
controls 
FE with 
additional 
controls  
Ordered 
probit 
Basic FE 
FE with 
controls 
FE with 
additional 
controls  
Ordered 
probit 
Basic FE 
FE with 
controls 
FE with 
additional 
controls  
Ordered 
probit 
Scorecard intervention -0.14** -0.13* -0.12* -0.18*   -0.16*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.05    -0.40*** -0.15 -0.16* -0.21*   
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)    (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)    (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)    
Age of the respondent  -0.00* -0.00 -0.00     0.00*** 0.00** 0.00***  0.00** 0.00 0.00    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)    
Respondent is female  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01     0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09***  -0.03* -0.00 -0.00    
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)     (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)     (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)    
Primary education  0.00 0.01 0.01     -0.03 -0.03 -0.05     -0.03 -0.04 -0.05    
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)     (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)     (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)    
Secondary education  0.07 0.07* 0.11*    -0.06** -0.07*** -0.10***  -0.02 -0.04 -0.05    
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)     (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)     (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)    
Higher education  0.14*** 0.14*** 0.21***  -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.21***  -0.00 -0.03 -0.03    
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)     (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)     (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)    
Reads newspaper at most once a month -0.07** -0.07** -0.09**   0.04 0.04 0.05     0.08** 0.08** 0.10**  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)     (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)     (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)    
Reads newspaper once a week  -0.05** -0.05** -0.07**   0.01 0.01 -0.00     0.15*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)     (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)     (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)    
Reads newspaper several times a week -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.16***  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03     0.07 0.05 0.07    
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)     (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)     (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)    
Reads newspaper every day  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05     -0.02 -0.03 -0.04     0.11 0.06 0.08    
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)     (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)     (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)    
Respondent is very interested in politics  0.00 -0.01      0.07*** 0.11***   0.15*** 0.19*** 
   (0.02) (0.04)      (0.02) (0.02)      (0.03) (0.04)    
Attended public meetings now and then -0.04 -0.05      0.02 0.02      0.02 0.03 
   (0.03) (0.04)      (0.02) (0.03)      (0.04) (0.05)    
Attended public meetings several times  -0.03 -0.05      0.04* 0.05*     0.13*** 0.16*** 
   (0.02) (0.04)      (0.02) (0.03)      (0.03) (0.04)    
Attended public meetings often  -0.05* -0.08**    0.11*** 0.15***   0.23*** 0.29*** 
   (0.03) (0.04)     (0.03) (0.04)      (0.05) (0.06)    
Observations 9,220 9,220 9,220 9,220 11,694 11,694 11,694 11,694 6,238 6,238 6,238 6,238 
Districts 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
R2 (within for FE, pseudo for 
Ordered probit) 
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Notes: Linear fixed effects regression for the variables (i) Councillors are perceived as being corrupt, (ii) Perceived performance of local government councillors, (iii) Councillors listen to what 
people have to say. The number of observations differs per outcome variable as not all information was collected in each survey. Coefficients associated with the language dummies, religion, 
the use of radio and TV, living conditions, consumption needs and the year dummies are not presented for the sake of brevity. The excluded category for education is no education. District fixed 
effects included; standard errors are clustered at the district level.  
* denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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As for the district-level data on budgetary decisions and audit results we also tested the 
identifying assumptions underlying our empirical model for the citizens’ perceptions. The 
parallel trends regressions are presented in Table 16. The parallel trend holds for all except 
one variable as can be seen from the lack of statistical significance of the coefficient 
associated with the pre-intervention assignment. For the variable ‘Councillors listen to what 
people have to say’ we find a significant pre-treatment effect in scorecard districts. However, 
the direction of the effect is contrary to the expectations of the scorecard initiative: in 
comparison with citizens of non-scorecard districts, citizens of districts where the LGCSCI 
was implemented experienced a greater drop in the attentiveness of their local councillors. 
  
In addition, we also performed the placebo test, implying that we assumed wrongly that the 
scorecard intervention had started in 2008. None of the outcome variables respond to the 
wrongly assigned starting date. This further strengthens our findings with respect to the 
citizens’ perception of local democratic processes, as it indicates that the findings associated 
with the scorecard can credibly be related to the intervention. 
 
 
Table 16: Parallel trend regressions for Afrobarometer perception outcomes  
 Perception about: 
 Corruption Performance Listening 
Pre-intervention assignment -0.01 0.06 0.10* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Age of the respondent -0.00 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Respondent is female 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Primary education 0.05 -0.08** -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Secondary education 0.11 -0.12*** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Higher education 0.20*** -0.14*** 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) 
Reads newspaper at most once a month -0.04 0.05 0.15** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Reads newspaper once a week -0.06 0.08*** 0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Reads newspaper several times a week -0.14*** 0.04 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Reads newspaper every day -0.07 0.10* 0.12 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) 
Respondent is very interested in politics 0.02 0.06*** 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
Attended public meetings now and then -0.03 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Attended public meetings several times -0.02 0.06** 0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Attended public meetings often 0.02 0.13*** 0.27*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Observations 3,865 6,179 4,154 
R2 0.06 0.05 0.10 
Note: Parallel trend regressions comparing the pre-intervention trend between 2005 and 2008 for those districts that will 
eventually participate in the scorecard initiative and the districts that do not participating in the scorecard initiative. Results 
are presented for the five perception outcomes. Coefficients associated with the language dummies, religion, the use of radio 
and TV, living conditions, consumption needs and the year dummies are not presented for the sake of brevity. The excluded 
category for education is no education. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.   
* denotes p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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5.3.3 Local council performance 
 
A. Practical context  
 
On a practical level there are a number of factors which limit the abilities of local 
governments in Uganda to perform better and engage effectively in participatory policy-
making. The frequent late delivery of central government funds, for example, was highlighted 
by political and technical teams in all three districts visited – all noted that planned (and 
budgeted) projects were often delayed, and sometimes abandoned, owing to late transfers of 
funds from central government. This was argued to be a particularly acute and fundamental 
roadblock improved performance given the dependence of LCs’ finances on central 
governments (interviews with councillors and district and sub-county technical staff and CSO 
personnel, Amuru, Kabarole and Mbale, 15-21 April 2015; see further above). Many 
councillors in all three districts also suggested that the issue significantly undermined popular 
trust in them and in local government itself with many citizens interpreting delayed or 
cancelled projects as the consequence of allocated funds being ‘eaten’ (stolen) or diverted to 
other causes by district or sub-county councillors or officials (Manyak and Katono 2010). 
The fact that unspent central funds at local level are often required to be remitted back to 
Kampala at the end of a financial year has exacerbated these delivery and trust gaps (focus 
group discussions and interviews with LCV councillors, Amuru, Mbale and Kabarole, 15-21 
April 2015). 
 
Limited resources also constrain the capacities of district and sub-county administrations to 
monitor and implement programmes – as well as the capacities of councillors to engage 
regularly and meaningfully with constituents (and vice versa), especially those who live in 
remote parts of districts. Contractions in funds for local government overall, coupled with the 
proliferation of districts, has meant a perennial shortfall in competent administrative staff in 
many districts – as well as absenteeism by office-holders who must supplement their state 
salary with employment elsewhere (Green 2013). Councillors themselves are paid only 
100,000 Ugandan Shillings (c.US$30) – 70,000 (c.US$23) after tax – per month and receive 
allowances for attending a small number of council sessions per year (interviews with LCV 
councillors, Amuru, Mbale and Kabarole, 15-21 April 2015).  
 
Most councillors interviewed in the three districts emphasised the significant costs accrued in 
regularly travelling to meet with constituents (particularly for district women and disabled 
people councillors, whose geographical remit is the whole district rather than a sub-county) 
as well as the cost of providing refreshments when facilitating such meetings (a common-
place expectation). They argued that their salaries and allowances did not stretch far enough 
to cover even these expenses and felt that this prevented them from more regularly reaching 
out to constituents outside of formal settings (e.g. events at sub-county or district 
headquarters).34 
 
The fact that the construction of new district headquarters and hiring of district staff (usually 
over 200) takes significant time also means that districts are often without functioning offices 
and bureaucracies – sometimes for years (Lewis 2014). This is a particular problem for 
regions of the country where district proliferation has been most acute, primarily northern and 
eastern Uganda (where electoral support for the regime has been less consistent or 
                                                 
34 There was some ambiguity in discussions with councillors whether the issue concerned late payment of 
facilitation fees or the fact that no such payments existed. 
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widespread). During fieldwork in Amuru District, for example, it became apparent that key 
political and administrative staff still based themselves out of Gulu, the district which 
formerly included Amuru, over one hour’s drive away. As a consequence, the district offices 
in Amuru are often deserted and it is a real challenge in practice to simply find key staff 
(interviews with local researchers and councillors, and observation, Amuru, 20-21 April 
2015). This is in spite of the fact that Amuru District was created nearly a decade previously 
– in 2006.  
 
For Ugandan citizens themselves – most of whom are usually even less able to cover the 
costs of travel to sub-county or district headquarters, particularly those located de facto in a 
neighbouring district (focus group discussions with local residents, Mbale Town, 17 April 
2015, Busoro, Kabarole and Mugusu, Kabarole, 21 April 2015) – these issues naturally 
constrain their ability to participate in local governance. Limited local opportunities to 
engage councillors and administrators (the latter on monitoring visits, for example) mean that 
citizens must take more initiative themselves in reaching out to these actors directly, often 
requiring the making of trips to headquarters. Even then, as those at a community focus group 
in Mugusu sub-county, Kabarole district complained, administrators are often absent (owing, 
in part, to the issues discussed above). Green captures this phenomenon and the frustration of 
such missed encounters aptly in referring to the title of Ian Clarke’s 1998 book The Man with 
the Key has Gone (Green 2013: 12). 
 
Annual budget conferences represent the primary statutory opportunity for citizens to 
participate in decision-making regarding budgetary allocations and project planning at the 
local level. Though theoretically open to all, respondents in all three districts presented the 
openness and format of these conferences (primarily occurring at district and sub-county 
level) very differently. For while most LC councillors and administrators tended to portray 
these events as widely accessible and entailing genuine open debate between state and non-
state actors, NGO, CSO and citizen focus groups more often presented them as a ‘show’ 
where decisions already made were recounted ‘lecture-style’ and attendees largely restricted 
to government officials and ‘development partners’ (interviews and discussions with 
councillors and technical staff, NGO and CSO representatives and focus group discussions 
with local residents in Amuru, Kabarole and Mbale Districts, 15-21 April 2015). Though the 
transparency and vibrancy of debate clearly differs across budget conferences our analysis 
largely fits with that of Blore et al who observed that ‘in most local governments 
participation is quite limited, and the process tends to be dominated by councillors and 
officials’ (Blore et al 2004: 105).  
 
Indeed, a number of civil society activists in Mbale claimed that they had been refused entry 
to a district budget conference in the past as they were not considered a key ‘stakeholder’ 
(focus group discussion with ACODE budget champions, Mbale Town, 17 April 2015). And 
in Amuru, various interviewees (including administrators) stated that in reality the budget is 
prepared by the technical staff and hardly any community involvement takes place 
(interviews with local CSO activists and technical staff, Amuru, April 2015). The failure to 
cover travel or refreshment costs for attendees was argued to be a further impediment to 
genuine citizen participation in these conferences.  
 
B. Local-centre links 
 
Given the very significant constraints under which local governments operate, and their 
almost total dependence upon central government transfers to function, considering the 
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relationship between LCs and Kampala is clearly crucial for any analysis of demand-driven 
governance. Councillors and district chairs in the three fieldwork sites, however, argued that 
there is little capacity at district level to influence national players and limited knowledge 
about how such engagement might best take place.  
 
Lobbying of MPs, for example, appears to take place occasionally in an ad hoc fashion but is 
largely considered to be ineffective. Indeed, enthusiasm among councillors for lobbying and 
challenging the centre on behalf of constituents is tempered by a widespread pessimism that – 
in the words of one LC official in Busoro sub-county, Kabarole district – ‘complaints to the 
government are never effective’ (interview, Busoro sub-county headquarters, Kabarole, 21 
April 2015). The re-centralisation of senior local administrator posts since 2005 and 
prominent local role of RDCs (see above and 2.1.4) has naturally further confused the 
division between centre and local to some extent and ensures against a united ‘local’ 
approach to lobbying Kampala.  
 
Councillors and technical staff at the local level nevertheless view one organisation – the 
Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA) – as their main ‘voice’ and representative 
vis-à-vis Kampala. ULGA describes its mandate as ‘to unite Local Governments, and provide 
them with Association member services, and a forum through which to come together and 
give each other support and guidance to make common positions on key issues that affect 
Local Governance. ULGA carries out this mandate through lobbying, advocacy and 
representation of Local Governments at local, National and International fora’ (ULGA 2015). 
 
ULGA serves as an instrument of local governments vis-à-vis the Ugandan Ministry of Local 
Government. ULGA representatives claim that the association, which is owned by Ugandan 
local governments, wishes to drive agendas in support of the local institutions even if the 
MOLG does not support these. In particular, ULGA’s ability of ‘scaling up’ discussions, 
away from the purely local level, is seen as a major strength of the association. Despite this 
self-image at ULGA, the association has not been able to prevent the continuous creation of 
new districts. Particularly the lack of resource-generating capacity at the local level is 
perceived as a threat to the functioning of local government (interviews at ULGA, 17 April 
2015). 
 
C. The political economy of local government 
 
Ugandan local governments – and councillors in particular – are significantly restricted in 
their ability to respond effectively to demand for improved service delivery and other 
demands from constituents, a situation which has worsened over the last decade. Massive 
dependence upon mainly conditional central government grants – many of which are often 
transferred from Kampala late – substantially limit LCs’ discretion over what can be 
budgeted for and implemented while recentralisation of administrative positions since 2005 
has removed a further layer of local accountability from the local government bureaucracy.  
 
Limited funds also impact upon councillors’ and administrators’ ability – and willingness – to 
travel widely and regularly within their constituencies, forcing constituents to take on travel 
costs themselves (sometimes to empty or locked offices) to raise issues or lobby for improved 
services. Moreover, local government units’ voices in Kampala – either directly or through 
ULGA – are weak and there is limited evidence that the centre will take account of local 
perspectives in policy-making; not least with regard to the small size of local government 
allocations in the national budget. 
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This is not, of course, to say that councillors lack any room to represent and respond to 
citizen demands. It is crucial to acknowledge in this review, however, that this room is very 
significantly circumscribed – an issue which many of their constituents do not necessarily 
appreciate or understand. 
 
 
5.3.4 Civic consciousness and citizens’ demand for better public service delivery 
 
A. Civic consciousness 
 
The main objective of LGCSCI was to strengthen civic consciousness and increased demand 
for better services. From the case-study research it became clear that the LGCSCI had only 
very limited impact in terms of strengthening civic consciousness. Dissemination of the 
scorecard results turned out to be fairly limited. In the three districts visited, only 
approximately 40 per cent of the citizens interviewed were aware of the scorecard. Indeed, in 
one Mbale focus group with parish and village level citizens and LCs this figure was closer to 
90 per cent (Focus group discussion, 16 April 2015). This percentage is relatively low if one 
takes into account the fact that the citizens the evaluators have spoken to were mobilised by 
ACODE, thus one can assume a selection bias. Moreover, focus groups in Mbale and 
Kabarole took place in sub-counties, villages and parishes geographically close to District 
Headquarters – thus participants could be expected to be have more frequent, everyday 
contact with councillors than their counterparts in sub-counties further afield. 
 
Furthermore, citizens’ understanding of the information contained in the scorecard was even 
more limited. Of the citizens that claimed to be aware of the scorecard, most knew only about 
the final scores and ranking, but not about what the scores mean in terms of the performance 
of individual councillors and how these link with local government performance. Not only is 
citizens’ insight into the actual performance of councillors limited, but based on the field 
research it became also clear that citizens, moreover, have still limited awareness of what the 
formal roles and responsibilities are of the councillors. These findings are in line with the 
evaluation done by VNG International (2014), which found that only a small – but, according 
to the evaluation, significant – number of citizens understood the scorecard results and that 
while an increased understanding of the formal roles and responsibilities of councillors was 
noted, it was still very limited and citizens continued to still mainly demand for informal 
services (e.g. contribution to weddings and burials, education fees etc.) (VNG International 
2014: 31,41). 
 
Limited results have also been achieved in terms of strengthening citizens’ demand for better 
services. During the interviews and focus group discussions only a few examples could be 
provided of how citizens had demanded better service delivery. Councillors in all three 
districts also often emphasised the substantial ‘expectations’ of communities vis-à-vis a 
variety of issues which included, but were not limited to, service delivery (particularly the 
repair of water holes and latrines and the building of roads). The 2014 evaluation lists more 
examples of citizens’ demand for service delivery but fails to link these to the LGCSCI and 
concludes that ‘citizenry demand remains a weakness’ (VNG International 2014: 17). The 
examples quoted by the interviewees and during the focus group discussions appeared, 
furthermore, not to be directly related to the LGCSCI. This is not surprising as citizens’ 
awareness of the meaning of the scores was low.  
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Another key constraint that in practice has impeded citizens to effectively express their 
demands to local councillors is the lack of constructive engagement opportunities between 
citizens and councillors. Engagement between councillors and communities is, in general, 
very limited. While a few of the district councillors interviewed showed limited interest to 
engage with their constituencies, most district councillors expressed their discontent with this 
situation. The councillors explained that they face difficulties when organising meetings with 
the communities as these seem often not to have been incentivised to attend meetings with 
councillors by the demand for better services, but more by sitting allowances or other 
personalised material enticements (e.g. sodas). The citizens interviewed during the field 
research confirmed this situation. The LGCSCI hardly contributed to any increase in 
opportunities for constructive engagement between community and councillors.  
 
A number of councillors and civil society activists interviewed nevertheless emphasised the 
important role of appearing on ‘phone-in’ and ‘talk-show’ programmes on local radio stations 
for councillors as a means to engage with a wider audience of constituents. A councillor in 
Mbale, for example, noted that he appears regularly on a phone-in show on local radio as a 
means to reach-out to constituents and noted how he was able on a recent programme to 
clarify to callers that ‘burial attendance is not part of [the councillor’s] role’. While radio 
listenership overall is very high in Uganda (BBC World Service 2006) the popularity of these 
particular programmes seemed to be somewhat limited. In a FGD among citizens in Busoga 
sub-county, Kabarole only six out of sixteen participants claimed to have ever listened to a 
radio programme featuring a councillor. 
 
 
Box 4: Quotes from interviews and focus group discussions 
‘ACODE needs to sensitise the community more to understand the role of the district councillor, so 
that the community understands that if a leader calls for a meeting it is not about paying sitting 
allowances, her role is not to pay school fees etc.’ (District councillor II, Amuru) 
 
‘The community has limited insight into the role of district councillors, they focus on informal roles’ 
(One of the district councillors in Mbale during a FGD) 
 
‘We have heard about it [LGCSCI] but are not sure about the meaning of it.’ (Ugandan citizen, Mbale 
District during a FGD) 
 
‘On the ground, [attending and officiating in] weddings and burials remain the most important part of 
our role for communities.’ (District councillor I, Kabarole) 
 
‘There is a need for greater sensitisation of the electorate [about councillor roles] – they think that 
politicians are all about money and gifts.’ (District councillor II, Kabarole) 
 
‘Communities do not understand the roles of councillors, chairpersons and MPs – they mix all leaders 
together.’ (Sub-county councillor I, Mugusu, Kabarole) 
 
‘Because of the level of education, communities look mainly at scores – this is the bottom line.’ (Sub-
county councillor I, Bungokho, Mbale) 
 
A number of councillors and civil society activists interviewed nevertheless emphasised the 
important role of appearing on ‘phone-in’ and ‘talk-show’ programmes on local radio stations 
for councillors as a means to engage with a wider audience of constituents. A councillor in 
Mbale, for example, noted that he appears regularly on a phone-in show on local radio as a 
means to reach-out to constituents and noted how he was able on a recent programme to 
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clarify to callers that ‘burial attendance is not part of [the councillor’s] role’. While radio 
listenership overall is very high in Uganda (BBC World Service 2006) the popularity of these 
particular programmes seemed to be somewhat limited. In a FGD among citizens in Busoga 
sub-county, Kabarole only six out of sixteen participants claimed to have ever listened to a 
radio programme featuring a councillor. 
 
During a debriefing session with ACODE, ACODE confirmed the main findings presented 
above. It acknowledged that the LGCSCI has failed to pay sufficient attention to the 
‘demand-side’. Instead, the project has mostly focused on building the capacity of local 
councillors and producing the local governance scorecard. Thus, while the LGCSCI is based 
on the idea that citizens should be ‘empowered to demand for better performance from 
governmental and other institutions and leaders’ (Tumushabe et al. 2010a: 8), as 
improvements in governance should be found by locating monitoring at the ‘demand side’ 
(see section 5.1), the LGCSCI has not yet sufficiently focused on strengthening citizens’ 
capacity to demand for accountability and improved service delivery in practice. ACODE is, 
however, currently piloting the use of Civic Engagement Action Plans to address this 
weakness and strengthen the ‘demand side’.35   
 
 
Box 5: Quotes from interviews 
‘It is a challenge to organise a meeting with the community. They are used to getting everything for 
free, as was the case in the IDP camps. They want soda or sitting allowances and if you don't give 
something the turnout will be low.’ (District councillor I, Amuru) 
 
‘When you visit communities they always ask “how have you left us?” – it is a monetisation of 
politics, we must pay for the attendance of the community…it makes members scared to go back to 
the communities.’ (District councillor I, Mbale) 
 
‘When members organise community meetings they have to say that “we are not here to give you 
money but to give services”.’ (District Clerk, Mbale) 
 
‘At official meetings [i.e., not burials or weddings], only 7-10 people will come and they will expect 
sodas. If you do not provide sodas they will tell people who ask that “we have never seen that 
councillor”.’ (District councillor I, Kabarole) 
 
B. Councillors’ performance  
 
Next to strengthening civic consciousness and increasing citizens’ demand for better services, 
the LGCSCI is to raise councillors’ awareness of their formal roles and responsibilities and to 
strengthen their performance. Based on both the case-study research and VNG International’s 
evaluation it is clear that the LGCSCI capacity building activities and the councillors’ 
participation in the scorecard has contributed to an increased understanding amongst 
councillors of their formal roles and responsibilities. In addition, there is convincing evidence 
                                                 
35 Aware of the fact that more attention needs to be paid to the demand side, ACODE introduced Civic 
Engagement Action Plans (CEAPs) in March 2015. CEAPs are action plans generated by the community, based 
on which they can engage with their local government councillors around specific service delivery concerns. 
CEAPs are a) to foster citizens’ understanding of the results of the scorecard b) to support citizens with using 
the scorecard to demand accountability from the local councillors, and c) to increase citizens’ capacity to 
demand for improved public service delivery. So far, CEAPs have been piloted in five districts (ACODE 2015: 
1-2).  
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of councillors’ improved performance. During the case-study research interviewees stated 
that due to the peer-pressure invoked by the scorecard, and the capacity building activities 
under the LGCSCI, councillors have improved their performance in terms of e.g. monitoring 
public service delivery units and participating in council meetings. It was also noted by 
district councillors (both male and female) in Mbale and Kabarole that the scorecard had 
strengthened the confidence of female councillors to participate in debates – an indirect but 
nonetheless positive outcome of the LGCSCI initiative.  
 
VNG International’s evaluation concludes that there is ‘a clear improvement in the scorecard 
performance of LCs, Chairperson and Speakers’ (VNG International 2014: 21) and the 
synthesis report on the 2012/2013 scorecard also claims that the performance of elected 
political leaders has improved since the introduction of the scorecard (Tumushabe et al. 2013: 
3-4).  
 
Box 6: Quotes from interviews 
‘At first, the councillors didn't want the scorecard, they didn't want to be assessed. But later on around 
70 per cent became interested, mainly because of the trainings … Before the scorecard project many 
councillors just went to the council to collect money, but now they understand what kind of role they 
should play … There is a big change in debating, councillors present more relevant issues now and 
follow the rules of procedure so they no longer sit for two days. Councillors also come with more 
evidence, like examples from the community.’  (District clerk I) 
 
‘In the beginning of the project, I was the second-to-last person, now I’ve become the second best. 
The scorecard and trainings helped me to understand my role and so my performance has improved.’ 
(District councillor III, Amuru) 
 
“Previously [to the LGCSCI], councillors took things for granted – they signed-in for council 
meetings and would then leave. Now they are attentive and participate, now they keep records of 
meetings [with communities and technical staff].” (District councillor I, Kabarole) 
 
‘As a result of the scorecard the level of debate [in District Council sessions] has greatly improved. 
Now there are heated debates, better motions and clearer justifications for motions... Attendance has 
increased and the number of times going to the field has increased... Record-keeping and reporting 
has also increased…the scorecard focuses on evidence-based things [respondent then showed the 
interviewer photos captured on his iPad from monitoring visits undertaken in the previous few 
months].’ (District councillor III, Kabarole) 
 
‘The scorecard has led to a very big change in councillors’ behaviour – they want to be evaluated well 
and this forces them to be active in Council…Each councillor struggles in budgeting debates to get 
funds and services for their community….There is an increase in people talking in Council where they 
didn’t before….people take issues seriously now.’ (District councillor II, Mbale) 
 
Nevertheless, from the case-study research it also became clear that various factors still 
negatively affect councillors’ performance. Limited access to financial resources was, for 
example, very often quoted by interviewed councillors’ as a main reason why they cannot 
fully perform their main duties. Many of the councillors interviewed stated that they, for 
example, face difficulties with monitoring public service delivery units as they have 
insufficient means to finance the transportation costs. Another key constraint is the fact that 
not all councillors possess the necessary minimum skills and knowledge to perform their 
formal roles. For example, various interviewees indicated that not all councillors can speak 
English, which limits their ability to participate in council meetings. Also, interviewees 
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pointed to the fact that some of the councillors are simply not interested to perform their 
formal roles and responsibilities. 
 
C. Quality of service delivery 
 
According to the LGCSCI’s Theory of Change, improvements in the performance of district 
councillors and the greater ability of key stakeholders to demand for improved service 
delivery at the local, sub-national and national level, should ultimately result in improved 
service delivery. VNG International’s evaluation presents various examples of improved 
service delivery but fails to convincingly attribute these examples to the LGCSCI. The 
evaluation does also not arrive at an conclusion concerning the overall impact of the LGCSCI 
(VNG International 2014: 32-33, 51-55).  
 
The interviews found some evidence of improvements in public service delivery, which could 
be attributed to the improved performance of councillors. For example, interviewees gave 
examples of how the performance of health units had improved due to councillors’ 
strengthened monitoring activities, which contributed to better staff attendance and drug 
supplies. 
 
 
Box 7: Examples of improved public service delivery 
In Amuru, the functioning of a health centre was improved after several monitoring visits of the 
district councillor had revealed that the health staff were not properly managed and absenteeism was 
high. The district councillor raised this issue at the district level, which led to the replacement of the 
old manager and a significant improvement of the functioning of the centre. (Interviews with a 
District Councillor and two local researchers involved in the LGCSCI) 
 
In Mbale, the quality of material in new roads was improved after several monitoring visits by a sub-
county councillor revealed inadequate procurement and supervision procedures. (Interview with a 
Sub-County Councillor, Bungokho, Mbale) 
 
 
Box 8: Quotes from interviews 
‘The local government faces the problem of late releases of resources by the centre, and then they 
cannot spend it in time so that the money needs to return back to the centre. Communities don't know 
this and blame councillors.’ (District councillor I, Mbale) 
 
‘Priorities at the district level should be in line with national priorities. We have limited scope for 
manoeuvre, budget allocations are tied to specific sectors. … Subsistence agriculture is the least 
funded while most people depend on it. The national government does not pay enough attention to 
this sector, but is focused on infrastructure … Another challenge is the unrealistic budget, we get 
indicative budget figures from the planning ministry, but the centre releases less than that. The public 
doesn't understand that, as we had promised to do more, but we simply don't get the money from the 
centre’ (District councillor II, Mbale) 
 
‘The main constraint to improved public service delivery we face is the mass poverty in Amuru that 
does not allow the local government to raise local revenue, which is needed to implement public 
services. Other obstacles, are land conflicts and the low capacity of technical staff and councillors.’ 
(Administrative officer I, Amuru) 
 
‘Things are placed in the budget and works are done but then funds run down from the centre and 
projects remain unfinished.’ (Parish councillor I, Busoro, Kabarole) 
102 
 
 
In the three districts where the research team conducted the interviews, all examples of 
improved service delivery related, however, solely to an improved implementation of public 
service policy and management of public service units, but not to any changes in budgetary 
allocations. Overall, no strong evidence was found suggesting that the LGCSCI resulted in a 
noticeable change in public service delivery.  
 
In practice, the local councillors’ ability to significantly strengthen public service delivery is 
significantly constrained by the facts that a) local councils’ have limited ability to effectively 
influence the size, allocation and release of the district budget and b) local government faces 
serious capacity constraints at both district and sub-county level. This reflects the broader 
structural constraints under which district councillors operate in Uganda – as outlined above 
in sections 2.6 and 5.3.3. The fact that similar challenges were reported by respondents in all 
three districts, and that these challenges correspond to those identified and discussed in the 
wider literature on the political economy of local government in Uganda, suggests that these 
are embedded, nationwide issues which are not limited to just one region or locality. 
 
 
5.4 ACODE and the demand-side of good governance promotion 
 
Most interviewed persons indicated that they understand the move away from supply-side 
and towards demand-side good governance promotion, in particular given the observed 
tendency of the Ugandan President to consolidate the regime and use the state’s resources 
increasingly for purposes of ‘regime maintenance’. Interviewees emphasised that, as a 
consequence of such trends, support of governance programmes through the state had lost its 
logic in the case of Uganda.  
 
Despite the general understanding of the logic behind demand-side governance projects, 
interviewees commented on some of the perceived problems with the implementation of the 
LGCSCI and CBTIC36 projects, as well as more general weaknesses of and threats to 
demand-side approaches. Comments focused, in particular, on four themes: the nature of the 
two demand-side projects, the position of ACODE in relation to the Ugandan government, 
the nature of the state in Uganda and the role of civil society organisations in the country. 
 
Many observers argued that, in general, demand-side governance projects such as LGCSCI 
and CBTIC are welcome in the Ugandan context. Interestingly, the potential contribution of 
demand-side activities to governance in Uganda was underscored by representatives of civil-
society organisations, state institutions such as the Ministry of Local Government and the 
Uganda Local Governments Association, as well as the donor community. The reasoning 
behind such support differs from organisation to organisation. Civil society organisations 
emphasise the potential contribution of demand-side governance instruments as tools for 
supporting advocacy work and legitimising NGO activities by providing citizen inputs 
(interviews, CSBAG and NGO Forum, 16 and 17 April 2015). Government representatives 
stress that the scorecard for local councillors serves to ‘keep district leadership on their toes’ 
with regard to the quality of their work and may be a useful instrument for organising 
                                                 
36 CBTIC (Citizens’ Budget Tracking and Information Centre) is a project implemented by ACODE, focusing 
on enhancement of government accountability and transparency in the allocation and utilisation of government 
revenues and donor funds. The objective of the project was that the collection of data on government income 
and expenditure and subsequent distribution of this information throughout the country would create 
possibilities for the population to hold the government accountable for its financial policies. 
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‘downward accountability’ of representatives to the electorate (interviews, Ministry of Local 
Government and Uganda Local Governments Association, 15 and 17 April 2015). Observers 
in the donor community showed altogether to be more sceptical about the potential of 
demand-side governance instruments because of limited receptivity on the part of 
government. Yet, those observers still indicated the potential of civil-society organisations to 
use the tools to influence legislative processes through their contacts with Members of 
Parliament, as well as to impress the need for greater accountability (interviews, DGF, 14 
April 2015). 
 
Despite their general appreciation for demand-side governance projects such as LGCSCI and 
CBTIC, observers also emphasised certain weaknesses. One of the main critical issues related 
to demand-side projects appeared to be the relatively technical nature of the approaches and 
the difficulty of NGOs to transfer the results to broader audiences. The scorecard initiative as 
implemented by ACODE requires the collection and analysis of a large quantity of data. As a 
consequence, the organisation needs to focus much of its attention to the research process of 
the scorecard and the validity and reliability of the data. It is for this reason that observers 
comment that ACODE has paid little attention, until quite recently, to the dissemination of 
the results of the scorecard outside the local councils targeted by the instrument (interviews, 
DGF, 14 April 2015). In relation to the budget-tracking instruments, the causes of limited 
outreach to larger audiences seem to be mainly technical in nature. ACODE attempted to set 
up an SMS network for the quick dissemination of information to citizens, but found out that 
few citizens signed up because of the costs involved in receiving and sending text messages 
(interview, ACODE, 21 May 2014). To the extent that the media could be used – for instance 
for transferring information in radio talk shows – it appears that technical problems were 
surmountable (interviews, DGF, 14 April 2015 and CSBAG, 17 April 2015). 
 
A second weakness of demand-side approaches appeared to be the gap between the project 
outputs and the desired impacts that the projects were supposed to have. The targets of both 
LGCSCI and CBTIC were to enhance accountability of decision makers: in the case of 
LGCSCI such greater accountability should lead to improved service delivery, while the 
result of CBTIC would be the allocation of state resources to priority areas determined by 
citizens. Observers noted that the attempts by the President and the ruling NPM to enhance 
their grip on state resources – in the case of local government by increasing the number of 
districts and in the case of budget allocation by increasing the percentage that is spent 
through so-called supplementary budgets that are not subject to parliamentary oversight – 
place serious limits on the effectiveness of demand-side governance programmes (interviews, 
CSBAG, 17 April 2015 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 July 2015). 
 
Apart from the implementation of the demand-side projects, interviewees also addressed the 
role and position of organisations such as ACODE. It was observed that ACODE, by its very 
nature, is very dependent on the funds that are supplied by donor organisations, either 
bilaterally (such as by The Netherlands) or multilaterally (such as through DGF). ACODE is 
an organisation populated by professionals, who are committed to doing credible research. 
More than other NGOs, ACODE was characterised as a ‘mission-driven’ organisation, 
committed to political change in Uganda. It is its institutional interest to retain its 
respectability and credibility, for instance by partnering with international research institutes 
for implementing policy-oriented research. One example of such partnerships is with the US-
based organisation Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), for the evaluation of the scorecard 
initiative and a budget information intervention similar to CBTIC, using randomised 
controlled trials in 28 districts across the country (IPA n.d). The political economy of 
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ACODE is such that its existence is very much linked to the implementation of projects such 
as the scorecard initiative. The project is therefore described by some observers as one of the 
main life lines of the organisation (interviews, DGF, 14 April 2015). 
 
The implementation of demand-driven governance initiatives cannot be seen separately from 
the political environment of Uganda and the interests that are being served by the Ugandan 
state. As mentioned above, observed tendencies such as the increase in the number of districts 
or the increased claim by the executive on the financial resources of the state are perceived to 
have a negative impact on political accountability. The creation of new districts enhances 
opportunities for patronage, as more supporters of the President can be supported by 
allocating them with attractive positions. Moreover, the use of financial resources for security 
forces (army and police) restricts, on the one hand, the possibility to deliver specific services, 
while, on the other hand, it places limits on the mobilisation of people in public spaces 
(interviews, NGO Forum, 16 April 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 July 2015). 
 
Finally, the response of the Ugandan regime to the activities of civil-society organisations 
was addressed by the interviewees. Various developments, such as the adoption of the Public 
Order Management Act and the proposal of an NGO bill, are seen as serious impediments to 
the functioning of civil-society organisations. Next to this, various interviewees reported on 
the restrictions placed on NGO activities by Resident District Commissioners at the district 
level (interviews, NGO Forum, 16 April 2015, CSBAG, 17 April 2015). Overall, the 
impression conveyed in the interviews was that the space for civil society in Uganda has been 
shrinking and that their advocacy role, which is felt to be politically sensitive by those in 
power, has been made more difficult. In general, the tendencies described here are 
circumscribing the autonomous role that civil-society organisations have been claiming. 
 
One of the observations of interviewees on the role of civil-society organisations was that the 
time horizon of support for organisations involved in demand-side governance activities is 
typically too short. Given the nature of the project objectives of such demand-side activities, 
which are usually not achievable in a normal planning cycle of three to five years, NGOs are 
therefore seen to be overly focused on the delivery of project outputs, and sometimes lose 
sight of the bigger picture. In response to the argument that civil-society organisations should 
adopt a longer time horizon, a good number of the interviewees argued that donors need to 
demonstrate longer-term commitment to NGOs – suggestions of ten-year periods with 
intermediate assessment were made in this regard. Other interviewees commented that donors 
should adopt a ‘hybrid’ strategy with regard to NGOs operating on the demand side: next to 
the main objective, focused on the project’s results, support should take capacity building of 
these NGOs as an important objective on the side. For some interviewees, project results 
should not even be the central consideration for supporting civil society in Uganda. For them, 
it seemed more important to guarantee maintenance of an autonomous sphere, outside the 
grip of the Ugandan government, in order to bring about longer-term, gradual change to the 
political system in the country (interviews, Royal Netherlands Embassy, 14 April 2015, NGO 
Forum, 16 April 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 July 2015). 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
The Local Government Councils’ Score Card Initiative (LGCSCI) was set up by ACODE in 
2009 and expanded to 26 districts across Uganda as per the 2012/2013 round. The analysis of 
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LGCSCI with the help of quantitative and qualitative data has produced a mixed set of 
findings concerning the instrument’s effectiveness. 
 
Analysis of district-level administrative data for the period from 2005 to 2013, obtained from 
the annual assessment of local governments by the Ugandan Ministry of Local Government, 
indicated that districts participating in the scorecard initiative tend to spend, on average, less 
of their budgets than districts that are not part of LGCSCI. Also, the LGCSCI districts appear 
to return a larger share of their budget to the central government. A possible explanation of 
this finding may be that the LGCSCI has resulted in a stronger sense of accountability among 
local government councils.  
 
Data collected in six waves of the Afrobarometer survey, involving over 9,000 individual 
Ugandan citizens, indicated that the scorecard initiative does not seem to have had an effect 
on the perceived performance of local councillors, although citizens of scorecard districts see 
their councillors as less corrupt than councillors working in non-scorecard parts of the 
country are perceived by their constituencies. 
 
Data obtained from interviews and focus group discussions with a range of participants and 
observers of the implementation of LGCSCI have provided additional insights into a range of 
aspects related to LGCSCI, such as the broader political economy of local government in 
Uganda; the impact of the scorecard on civic consciousness and councillor performance; and 
the weaknesses of demand-side good governance promotion. The political economy of local 
government appears to exert a major influence on the functioning of local councils, 
particularly since the great dependence of local governments on central government funds 
reduces the effectiveness of activities undertaken at the local level. Coupled with the limited 
remuneration of local councillors, the creation of new districts for political reasons, and the 
tendencies to re-centralise decision making and strengthen the role of Resident District 
Commissioners, who are appointed by the President, the overall position of local government 
in Uganda is rather weak. 
 
The scorecard initiative appears to have had very limited influence on citizens’ consciousness 
of public affairs in their district. Overall, few citizens are aware of the scorecard’s philosophy 
and seem to know only about the ranking of local councillors. This may be due, in part, to the 
lack of opportunities for citizens to engage with their councillors. Finally, the scorecard does 
not seem to have resulted in greater demand by citizens for better services. Examples of 
improved service delivery seem to have resulted not so much from budgetary changes, but 
rather from improved policy implementation and better management of public service units. 
 
Interviews and focus group discussions provided indications that an important implication of 
the introduction of the scorecard was that local councillors get a better understanding of their 
roles and responsibilities. Also, citizens and councillors report overall better performance of 
councillors, in part as a result of the peer pressure built up by the scorecard. Factors impeding 
the performance of councillors include limited financial resources to do their work, as well as 
the low level of skills and knowledge of certain groups of councillors. 
 
Data obtained from interviews and focus group discussions indicate that the demand-side 
approach to good governance is fraught with some inherent weaknesses. First, the technical 
nature of the ACODE projects that are analysed in this study makes it difficult to convey the 
results to broader audiences. Further, the fact that project outputs such as the scoring of local 
councillors’ performance are quite distinct from the aspired impact of the projects – notably, 
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enhanced accountability of political leaders – make realisation of project objectives quite 
difficult. Finally, the response by the incumbent political class to mobilisation of citizens and 
advocacy by civil society is often a factor that seriously limits the effectiveness of demand-
side governance interventions. 
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Appendix A: Evaluation questions and country-specific Terms of 
Reference 
 
A1. Evaluation questions 
 
From: IOB Policy Review Good Governance: Democratization, promotion of rule of law and 
control of corruption, Terms of Reference, December 2013, pp. 16-17. 
 
For each selected country, the evaluation questions are: 
3.1.What were the main governance challenges in the country in the areas of justice 
sector/rule of law, and decentralization? To what extent was the leadership in the country 
willing to address these challenges? 
3.2.To what extent and in which ways were these governance challenges addressed by other 
Dutch agencies active in the country (MFS, NIMD, other centrally financed activities) and by 
other donors? 
3.3. What were motivations and objectives for Dutch governance policies and funding 
decisions, including choice of channel/implementing agency in the justice sector and in 
decentralization? What was the role of SGACA and of similar studies of other donors? 
3.4. To what extent did policies and funding decisions in justice sector and decentralization of 
the Netherlands address the main governance challenges in these areas and did they take into 
account the political feasibilities for change? Did they take into account what other donors 
were doing and what other Dutch agencies were doing? 
 
And for the selected projects: 
Rationale and objectives: 
3.5. Does the project document include a description of the expected outputs? If not, can 
these expected outputs be reconstructed on the basis of the project activities? 
3.6. Does the project document describe the expected intermediate outcomes, and final 
outcomes? If not, can these outcomes be reconstructed on the basis of the project activities? 
3.7. Was the final objective of the project a governance related objective, or was it at impact 
level, that is, was it related to poverty reduction or economic growth? 
3.8. Does the project document describe how outputs, intermediate outcomes and final 
objectives were expected to be achieved? If not, how can this be reconstructed? 
3.9. What were the motivations and objectives for the project and how do they relate to 
governance challenges and opportunities in the country, activities of other Dutch agencies 
and of other donors in the country and/or in the area concerned? 
3.10. Did the project sufficiently take into account possible differential impact on men and 
women? 
 
Implementation: 
3.11. How did the Netherlands implement, monitor and evaluate the project? 
3.12. Did project implementation, monitoring and evaluation sufficiently take into account 
governance challenges and opportunities in the country, the activities of other Dutch agencies 
and other donors? 
3.13. How did project implementation relate to other Dutch bilateral or EU policies and 
instruments to promote this governance objective? 
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Effectiveness: 
3.14. To what extent have outputs been achieved? What was the mechanism, and which other 
factors contributed to the results, positively or negatively? 
3.15. To what extent have intermediate outcomes and outcomes been achieved? What was the 
mechanism, and which other factors contributed to the results, positively or negatively? 
3.16.Were there any unexpected or unintended results of the project? 
3.17. Are the project (intermediate) outcomes or other results different for men and women? 
3.18. To what extent can the project be expected to have contributed to the ultimate 
governance objectives, given the influence of other factors? 
 
For all Dutch projects in justice sector and decentralization in the three countries: 
3.19 What do available evaluations say about effectiveness (in particular questions 3.14-3.18 
above) of these projects? 
 
The evaluation will not attempt to assess the efficiency of the selected projects. It will 
probably be impossible to assess whether such outputs and outcomes could have been 
achieved with fewer inputs or could more have been achieved with the same inputs (level 1 
efficiency analysis), let alone whether other projects or activities could have achieved the 
same outputs and outcomes at lower costs (level 2 efficiency analysis). Nonetheless, if there 
is clear evidence of excessive inputs as compared to the achieved outputs and outcomes (level 
1 analysis), this will be reported. 
 
 
A2: Country-specific Terms of Reference 
 
Contents of the study 
The field study Uganda is one of the three country studies within component 3 of the overall 
policy review. It contains a study of the motivations and objectives of Dutch policies and 
activities in the areas of decentralization and justice sector, the context and relevance for 
these policies and activities, a desk study of all available evaluations of Dutch projects in 
these two areas, and an impact study of the two selected projects. This implies measuring the 
impact of the projects at the level of individual citizens by means of a survey. The evaluation 
team is expected to answer all evaluation questions of this component, listed on pages 16-17 
of the Terms of Reference of the overall Policy Review. The methodological requirements 
are outlined on pages 17-18.More information on the two projects can be found on pages 18-
20 and in Appendix 4. 
 
The work will be carried out in two phases, the inception phase and the actual evaluation. 
During the inception phase the research design for the impact study of the two projects will 
be elaborated, and a beginning will be made with answering the questions on objectives, 
motivations and context (questions 3.1-3.4). During this phase a field visit is foreseen of 1-2 
weeks. 
This phase will result in an inception report, which will at least contain: 
 Preliminary answers to the questions 3.1-3.4 and a description of the methodology for 
verifying and finalizing the answers to these questions. 
 For the selected projects: an intervention logic, an evaluation matrix (questions, 
indicators, data collection methods), developed questionnaires, and a detailed 
sampling strategy. 
 An outline of the final report. 
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The inception report will be discussed with IOB and with the Reference group. It will need to 
be approved (go/no go decision) before the evaluation team can proceed. 
 
IOB has carried out a first search of available evaluations of the Dutch projects in 
decentralization and justice sector in Uganda, and these evaluations will be supplied to the 
evaluation team upon contract signing. The evaluation team is recommended to do a further 
search. 
 
The draft final report will also be discussed with IOB and the Reference group. 
 
Products 
The following reports will be produced: 
 Inception report 
 Final country report 
 
Planning 
Early February 2014 Signing contract 
February - March 2014 Inception field work 
Writing of draft inception report 
April 2014 Approval Inception report 
May - September 2014 Field work and writing draft country report 
October 2014 Discussion and approval country report 
 
Maximum budget  € 130.000 (excluding VAT) 
 
Evaluation team requirements 
The candidate is asked to propose a team consisting of least one international team leader, 
overall responsible for the evaluation and contact person for the Ministry, and at least one 
local counterpart in Uganda. 
 
The team as a whole needs to meet the following requirements: 
 Knowledge of political processes in developing countries, in particular in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
o Knowledge of the Uganda political system, processes, and NGO climate is an 
advantage. 
 Experience in evaluation of good governance projects in developing countries. 
o Experience with evaluation of decentralization and justice sector projects is an 
advantage. 
 Experience with evaluation using mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods. 
 Experience in quantitative analysis of survey data and the application of 
counterfactual analysis. 
 Previous collaboration between the international evaluator and the local counterpart is 
an advantage. 
 
The international team leader needs to meet the following requirements: 
 Experience in managing a team of evaluators. 
 Broad experience in conducting evaluations. 
 Extensive reporting skills. 
 Good communication in English. 
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The local counterpart needs to meet the following requirements: 
 Experience in conducting evaluations. 
 Experience in managing a team of enumerators for a survey. 
 Good communication in English. 
 
The above competencies will be supported and verified by: 
 CVs 
 Two reports of relevant evaluations undertaken by the international team leader. 
 An interview with the international team; an interview with the local counterpart is 
optional. 
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Appendix B: Interviewees37 
 
B1. Representatives of the government of The Netherlands 
12 May 2014 Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
- Judith Maas, Coordinator West Africa, 
Department of Sub-Saharan Africa (formerly at 
RNE Uganda) 
- Jos Weijland, Coordinating Policy Officer, 
Department of Sub-Saharan Africa 
- Eva van Woersem, Country Expert Uganda, 
Department of Sub-Saharan Africa 
19 May 2014 Royal Netherlands 
Embassy in Uganda 
- Joyce Kokuteta Ngaiza, Senior Governance 
and Human Rights Advisor 
- Hans-Peter van der Woude, Deputy Head of 
Mission, Head of Cooperation 
15 April 2015  Royal Netherlands 
Embassy in Uganda 
- Joyce Kokuteta Ngaiza, Senior Governance 
and Human Rights Advisor 
- Theo Oltheten, First Secretary, Political 
Affairs, Human Rights and Rule of Law 
1 July 2015 Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Jeroen Verheul, Ambassador for Foreign Trade 
and Development Cooperation (Dutch 
Ambassador to Uganda, 2007-2012) 
   
   
B2. Uganda fieldwork: Justice and law and order 
19 May 2014 Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs 
S.K.J. Byakusaaga-Bisobye, Head Policy 
Analysis and Planning 
19 May 2014 JLOS secretariat - Rachel Odoi Musoka, Deputy Senior 
Technical Advisor, Advisor on Access to 
Justice, Civil 
- Sam Wairagala, Technical Advisor 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
- Lucy Ladira, Advisor on Access to Justice, 
Criminal 
20 May 2014 HURINET-U - Mohammed Ndifuna, Chief Executive 
Officer 
- Caroline Kanyago, Project Officer, Police 
Accountability and Security Sector Reform 
- Patrick Tumwine, Advocacy Research and 
Information Officer 
- Cina Banhard,  Technical Advisor 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
23 May 2014 HURINET-U see above 
   
   
 
 
  
   
                                                 
37 Details of interviewees are given as completely as possible. Some interviewees, who wished to remain 
anonymous, are not named (N.N.), while others were introduced by position only. 
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B3. Uganda fieldwork: Decentralisation and local governance 
21 May 2014 ACODE - Arthur Bainomugisha, Executive Director 
- George Bogere, Research Fellow CBTIC 
- Godber Tumushabe, Programme Advisor 
- Lilian Muyomba Tamale, Research Fellow 
LGCSCI  
- Irene Achola, Research Assistant 
- Sophie Nampewo Kakembo, Research 
Officer CBTIC 
22 May 2014 Uganda Governance 
Monitoring Platform 
Arthur Larok, Country Director Action Aid 
22 May 2014 Uganda Debt Network Jude Odaro, Programme Officer, Capacity 
Building and Empowerment 
23 May 2014 ACODE see above 
15 April 2015  Ministry of Local 
Government 
Patrick K. Mutabwire, Director, Local 
Government – Administration 
15 April 2015 Ministry of Local 
Government 
Paul Bogere, Commissioner for Local Council 
Development 
16 April 2015 Uganda National NGO 
Forum 
Job Kiija, Coordinator, Citizen Mobilisation 
17 April 2015 Uganda Local 
Governments 
Association (ULGA) 
- Damalie Namuyija Mbega, Director Human 
Resources and Administration 
- Godwin Ainomujuni, Procurement Officer 
- Irene Zawedde, Acting Legal Officer 
- Jamidah Namujanja, Acting Director 
Communication and Public Relations 
17 April 2015 Civil Society Budget 
Advocacy Group 
(CSBAG) 
Julius Mukunda, Programme Coordinator 
24 April 2015 ACODE - George Bogere, Research Fellow 
- Kiran Cunningham, Research Fellow and 
Professor of Anthropology, Kalamazoo College 
- Lillian Muyomba Tamale, Research Fellow 
- Onesmus Mugyenyi, Deputy Executive 
Director 
   
   
B4. Uganda fieldwork: Donor organisations 
22 May 2014 DANIDA Charles Magara, Senior Programme Advisor 
Governance 
22 May 2014 Democratic 
Governance Facility 
- Fergal Ryan, Component Manager, Voice 
and Accountability 
- Sophie Racine, Component Manager, Rights, 
Justice and Peace 
14 April 2015 Democratic 
Governance Facility 
- Nicolas de Torrente, Component Manager, 
Deepening Democracy 
- Martin Muwereza, Deputy Component 
Manager, Voice and Accountability 
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16 April 2015 Kimbuta Rural 
Development 
Programme 
Samuel Watulatsu, KRDP UK Representative 
   
   
B5. Uganda fieldwork: District-level interviews on LGCSCI and CBTIC 
15 April 2015 Mbale district HQ - Muhammad Mafabi, District Speaker 
- Absolom Nabende, LCV Councillor 
- Deputy CAO 
- Bernard Mujasi, District Chairman and LCV 
Councillor 
16 April 2015 
 
Bungokho sub-county 
HQ, Mbale 
- Ahmed Washaki, Sub-County Chairman and 
LCIII Councillor 
- Sub-county CAO 
- Group of citizens (focus group discussion) 
16 April 2015 Bungokho Rural 
Development Centre 
N.N. 
16 April 2015 Mbale District HQ Group of LCV councillors (focus group 
discussion) 
17 April 2015 Mbale district HQ - Sub-County Chairman and LCIII Councillor 
(and ACODE Budget Champion) 
- District Assembly Clerk 
17 April 2015 Mbale Town Group of ACODE Budget Champions (focus 
group discussion) 
20 April 2015 Kabarole district HQ - Richard Rwabuhinga, District Chairman and 
LCV Councillor 
- Mosese Ikagobya, Deputy District Chairman 
and LCV Councillor 
- Four LCV councillors (focus group 
discussion) 
- Deputy CAO 
20 April 2015 Kabarole Research and 
Resource Centre 
(KRRC) 
- David  Mugara 
- Samuel Kazooba (also ACODE Budget 
Champion) 
20 April 2015 Gulu Town - Akena Walter, LGCSCI researcher  
20 April 2015 Lamogi sub-county 
HQ, Amuru district 
- Atkinson Ojarea, LC III (also ACODE 
Budget Champion) 
- Senior assistant secretary office 
- Eleven community members/Budget 
Champions (focus group discussion) 
20 April 2015 Pabo sub-county HQ, 
Amuru district 
- Akena Moses, Parish chief 
- Mr. Labala, Parish chief (also ACODE 
Budget Champion) 
- Five community members/Budget 
Champions (focus group discussion) 
21 April 2015 Mugusu sub-county 
HQ, Kabarole district 
- Group of LCIII, II and I councillors (focus 
group discussion) 
- Group of residents (focus group discussion) 
- Sub-County Chairman and LCIII Councillor 
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- Four members of Sub-County senior 
administrative team  
21 April 2015 Busoro sub-county 
HQ, Kabarole district 
- Sub-County Chairman and LCIII Councillor 
- Group of residents (focus group discussion) 
- Group of Sub-County senior administrative 
team 
21 April 2015 Amuru district HQ - District Assembly Clerk (also ACODE 
Budget Champion) 
- Deputy CAO 
- District Speaker 
- District Councillor Pabo sub-county 
- Deputy District Chairman and District 
Councillor 
21 April 2015 Amuru district Staff of the NGO Ahaco 
   
   
B6. Uganda fieldwork: Interviews among police officers 
16 April 2015 Bushenyi district - Regional Police Commander 
- Acting District Police Commander/Officer in 
Charge of the Criminal Investigations 
Department 
16 April 2015 Iganga district - Acting Regional Police Commander 
- District Police Commander 
- Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department 
N/d Jinja district - Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department  
- Deputy Regional Police Commander  
- District Police Commander 
N/d Kabale district - Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department  
- Acting District Police Commander 
- Regional Police Commander 
14-16 April 
2015 
Kabarole district - Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department  
- Regional Police Commander 
- Office Commander 
14 April 2015 Luwero district - Deputy Regional Police Commander 
- Deputy Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department 
- District Police Commander 
N/d Mbarara district - Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department  
- District Police Commander 
- Regional Police Commander 
15 April 2015 Tororo district - Regional Police Commander 
- District Police Commander 
- Officer in Charge of the Criminal 
Investigations Department  
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Appendix C: Assessment of governance interventions 
 
C1. JLOS 
 
Name activity Justice Law and Order Sector SIP I (2001-2006), SIP II (2006-2011), SIP 
III (2012-2016/17)  
Activity number:  
Country: Uganda 
Implementing 
organization: 
JLOS GoU 
Thematic area: justice law and order 
Focus:  
Demand/supply: supply and demand  
Period: 2001-2016/17 
Budget: NL support (2007-12): € 22 million supply side, € 2 million demand side 
Modality:  
 
 
1. Project description and relevance 
 
Overview: 
 Project background/context (short): 
The Justice, Law and Order Sector in Uganda was formed in 2000. It linked to the development and 
implementation of Uganda’s first Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP, Uganda’s version of a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). The PEAP process formed an incentive for the establishment of 
‘sectors’, which enabled co-ordinated planning in support of national poverty eradication goals and 
which were favoured by international donors to channel and align development aid. By organising 
themselves into a sector, JLOS institutions set joint objectives in line with those of the PEAP. 
Ten institutions joined JLOS, including the Uganda Police Force, the Uganda Prison Service, the 
Ministry of Gender and the Ministry of Local Government, with a link to Local Councils Courts. Over 
the years, JLOS grew to its current 17 member institutions. A special Secretariat was established in 
August 2000 and it developed its first Sector Investment Plan for the years 2001 to 2006. The mission 
of JLOS was formulated as ‘to enable all people to live in a safe and just society’ (World Bank 2009).  
Since 2000, the Netherlands Embassy has been a key partner in the development of the Justice, Law 
and Order Sector (JLOS) in Uganda. It was instrumental in bringing the sector together around the 
year 2000, and it has been a major player in the International Development Partner Group. The 
Embassy supported both the formal supply side of the sector (government and constitutional bodies) 
and the demand side (citizens and civil society organisations), gradually moving from one to the other 
over the years. In terms of funding, supply side support amounted to some € 22 million, while demand 
side support was approximately € 2 million in the period between 2007-2012 (ToR, December 2013). 
Sector budget support (2007-2010) and contributions to a SWAp fund (2011) for the justice and law 
and order sector (JLOS) are the major elements of the Dutch involvement in Uganda. Total Dutch 
contributions amounted to approximately € 22 million in this period, or almost two-thirds of all 
development assistance funds for Uganda. Support to JLOS was suspended in 2014 in response to the 
passing of the Anti-Homosexuality Act by the Ugandan Parliament and the ratification of the act by 
President Museveni. Despite the annulment of the act by the Constitutional Court, The Netherlands 
has been withholding all support funds for JLOS, because of the involvement of various government 
agencies in JLOS (communication, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Kampala). 
 Project objectives: 
During the period of the first Strategic Investment Plan (SIP I), the main objectives of JLOS were to 
maintain law and order and increase access to justice for all persons.  
SIP II, for the years 2006-2011, carried forward the purposes of SIP I, and aimed in addition to 
enhance the public’s capacity to demand improved service. One expression of this objective was the 
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inclusion of civic and local leaders in the District Chain Linked Initiative (World Bank 2009: 18) and 
in the JLOS Coordination Committees (Saferworld 2009).  
The goal of the third Strategic Investment Plan (SIPIII) for the 2012-2016/17 period is to promote the 
rule of law. It aims to increase public satisfaction with JLOS services from 60% in 2011 to 70% by 
2016. It also strives to increase public confidence in the justice system from 26% in 2012 to 44% in 
2016, and to enhance the index of judicial independence from 3.8 to 4 in 2016. 
 Project activities/input: 
Being a sector programme JLOS has a multitude of activities. These include the promotion of 
enacting laws, institution and capacity building for fighting corruption, improving prisons both its 
physical environment and the treatment of prisoners, improving police services, conducting legal 
education and the promotion of human rights. 
 Primary beneficiaries: 
Beneficiaries are many, ranging from staff of prisons and police to prisoners and citizens, to judiciary 
and state attorneys. 
 Secondary beneficiaries: 
N/a 
 Identified stakeholders: 
N/a 
 
Dutch good governance strategy: 
 Correspondence with Dutch efforts in the area of good governance? 
Yes. 
 If yes, in what way? 
The high interest in the sector on the Dutch side is shown in the key role performed by the Embassy in 
the JLOS Development Partners Group, often as the Chair of the group. High ambitions on the part of 
the Embassy characterized the Dutch support.  
Thematically, The Netherlands’ focus within JLOS has been on the police, supporting a change from 
regime policing to democratic policing and civilian oversight, and on the judiciary system, promoting 
its independence, including improvement of legal aid and the prison system (Royal Netherlands 
Embassy Uganda 2005).  
Due attention has also been given to gender equality issues, with the Embassy playing an active role 
in the gender working group of JLOS (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2005) and supporting 
gender activities such as the fight against Female Genital Mutilation (Royal Netherlands Embassy 
Uganda 2008), and increased access to justice for victims of gender based violence (Royal 
Netherlands Embassy Uganda 2014).  
Decentralisation, another major theme of Dutch support to Uganda, also figured in the JLOS, e.g. as 
support to the Local Government Development Programme II (Royal Netherlands Embassy Uganda 
2005). The Ministry of Local Government has been one of the participating institutions from the start 
of the Sector. The JLOS specific mandate is to supervise the Local Council Courts throughout the 
country 
 
Coherence: 
 Correspondence with governance challenges and opportunities in the country? 
Not always. According to the MASP 2008-2011 the Embassy saw scope to promote part of The 
Netherlands’ agenda that fell outside the circle of interest of the Government of Uganda, notably the 
fostering of more democratic policing. It believed that it could convince the GoU of the long-term 
benefits thereof, through dialogues, ‘show’ projects and support to advocacy initiatives and civilian 
oversight. Another of the Embassy’s priorities was the promotion of the independence of the judicial 
system, which was neither in line with the government’s direct interest. The Embassy believed that its 
lead role in the JLOS and its good reputation would lead to success in this field (Royal Netherlands 
Embassy Uganda 2008). 
In the MASP 2012-15 the Embassy adapted its strategy. The dialogues in the JLOS sector were to 
continue, but, based on past experience, they were to have a more informal character instead of being 
formalised political dialogues. Another lesson was that the opportunities to make progress at the 
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political level were far more limited than those at the technical level. So, the focus chosen was on 
strengthening professionalism of JLOS personnel and civil society actors. Both strategies were re-
enforced further in the MASP 2014-2017. 
 Correspondence with MFS (co-financing program) supported governance interventions? 
Yes 
 Correspondence with governance interventions financed by other donors? 
Yes. External support for JLOS comes from Austria, Denmark, the European Union, Germany, 
Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNDP/UNCD, the United Kingdom and the World Bank, 
which are brought together in the JLOS Development Partners Group. 
 
 
2. Results 
 
Construction matrix of results: 
 
Table 1. Intervention logic 
Input … EUR 
Through-put    
Outputs    
Outcomes    
Impact  
Source: constructed on the basis of project appraisal document [BEMO]/ project documentation 
 
Legend: 
 Result as defined in the project appraisal document [BEMO] 
 Result reconstructed based on project appraisal document 
[BEMO]/ project documentation 
 
Description realization of results: 
 Description realization of output: 
In 2009, the World Bank published a report (World Bank 2009, Uganda Legal and Judicial Sector 
Study Report) of a study undertaken in 2005 and updated in 2007 and in 2008. The scope of this study 
was limited to i) the commercial courts and the establishment of the Centre for Arbitration and 
Dispute Resolution (CADER), ii) the adequacy of legal education, and iii) the provision of legal aid 
services to the poor. 
The report concluded that the commercial justice reform programme was a success, as was the 
CADER. A higher capacity and changed attitudes of lawyers trained by the centre were major results. 
Concern was raised about the priority in JLOS for commercial justice in a country where the majority 
of the population is engaged in agriculture, and where programs on family and land justice are 
urgently needed. This was particularly pertinent in view of the other findings of the study, notably that 
the system of legal education was inadequate, with legal education institutions overlapping, wasting 
resources and turning out large number of lawyers that were unable to carry out tasks required within 
the sector. Similarly, access for the poor to justice was found to be weak and the delivery of justice in 
serious need of improvement.  
In 2012, The Netherlands Court of Audit performed a study about sector budget support with Uganda 
as a case (Algemene Rekenkamer 2012, Accounting for Bilateral development Aid: Sector Budget 
Support, Uganda Case Study). The study investigates how donor and partner countries account for 
budget support, but it has not looked at the effectiveness of the support itself. 
 
SIP II (JLOS APR 2011/12): 
 77% of priority laws under SIP II enacted 
 capacity building to fight corruption and to use prosecution led investigation 
 1500 staff trained in human rights skills 
 community awareness through barazas, media campaigns, etc. 
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 mortality rates in prisons reduced from 10 in 1000 inmates at start SIP II to 2 in 1000 at end of 
SIP II 
 88% of prison units have human rights committees 
 54% increase of prison carrying capacity – vs. 72% increase in prison population growth,  
o as a result: 35% of prison units have serious congestion levels, police population ratio 
increased from 1:709 to 1:755, warden prisoner ratio deteriorated from 1:4.5 to 1:5, in 
some places 1:10 
 bucket system eliminated in 70 prison units 
 staff housing in police stations and prisons enhanced 
 functional presence of courts, police, prisons increased 
 22% reduction in case backlog, reduction of average stay on remand 
 increase in recruitment and training of staff 
 56% increase in access to legal aid 
 11 fire centres established 
 improvement of regulatory environment for doing business, 76% of priority commercial laws 
enacted 
o yet, low disposal rate of tax disputes – country dropped 3 places in the Ease of Doing 
Business Index 
 
SIP III: 
 Law and rule making continued 
 Local court system development continued 
 Infrastructure development for courts and police force continued 
 Training for police force continued 
 Information campaigns and outreach programmes continued 
 10% reduction juveniles involved in crimes 
o overall increase in crimes involving children of 12% (child neglect) 
o decrease in child abuse and torture 
 46 new firefighting trucks 
 courts having functional district community service committees up from 90 to 103 
 sensitization programmes in conflict prevention and capacity building of criminal justice sector 
 legal aid provisions enhanced  
 disposal rate of registered human rights complaints went up from 22% in 2011 to 30%. 
 Reduction of 31% in new complaints UHRC as a result of training and enactment of Prohibition 
and Prevention of Torture Act 
 Functional human rights committees in 95% of prison units 
 Remand-convict ratio: 54% - 45% 
o Challenge is limited number of judges to handle huge number of inmates 
 Continuation of gradual improvement in housing and sanitation in prisons 
 Life skills training to inmates 
 2013/14: coverage of districts with complete chain of frontline JLOS services up to 47% as 
compared to 34% in 2012/13, that is increase in number of districts from 79 to 84 
 2013/14: 10.5% increase in number of cases disposed as compared to 2012/13 
 2013/14: average length of stay on remand for capital offenders reduced from 11.4 to 10.5 
months, for non-capital offenders from 3 to 2 months 
 2013/14: complaints against prisons reduced by 24%, those against police by .05% 
 2013/14: suspension of support by The Netherlands causes a shortfall of over € 6.5 million for 
2014/15, which is 50% of JLOS SWAP budget. Consequently, various projects will be deferred or 
delayed: infrastructure and improvement, legal aid to poor, community policing, staff training, 
case backlog reduction, capacity building. 
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 Description realization of (intermediate) outcome: 
 
SIP II (JLOS APR 2011/12): 
 Reduction in human rights violations by JLOS institutions 
 43% reduction in incidence of crime over SIP II period 
 increase in conviction rates from 49% to 53% 
 reduction of re-offending rate from 45% to 27% 
 0.3% reduction road traffic accidents 
 
SIP III 
 Police to population ratio 1:754 
 7 places up in Doing Business Index 2014, from 129 to 122 
 2013/14: 0.5 reduction in volume of crime incidence; from 305:100.000 persons in 2012 to 
273:100.000 persons in 2013 
 
 Description realization of final outcome: 
N/a 
 
Differential impact on men and women: 
 Possible differential impact taken into account? 
 If yes, in what way?  
Number of women committing crimes increased by 48% (2011/12)! 
 
SIP II:  
joint programme with UN Women to enhance justice for women, through gender policy, strategy, 
improvement women’s representation in JLOS, etc. (Chapter 6 APR 2011/12) 
 
SIP III: 
- Domestic Violence Act translated into 8 local languages 
- Pilot to establish 5 safety centre 
- Female Genital Mutilation Act No 5 of 2012 simplified 
- Development of gender mainstreaming checklist to integrate gender principles and standards into 
draft legislation 
- Gender policy introduced in Judiciary 
 
Description unexpected/unintended results: 
N/a 
 
3. Main findings and conclusion 
 
Relevance (ex ante): 
 
Effectiveness: 
The only available reporting on results comes from the GoU. It is mainly at the output level, 
occasionally some outcomes are mentioned. Without any proper evaluation study, conclusions about 
effectiveness and impact cannot be given. 
 
Reasons for (in)effectiveness: 
 Influence of other factors: 
 Contribution to ultimate governance objectives: 
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4. Sources 
 
Documents: 
For background information about JLOS: 
 Saferworld (2009) Monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the Justice Law and Order Sector 
in Uganda: a case study 
 (Algemene Rekenkamer 2012, Accounting for Bilateral development Aid: Sector Budget Support, 
Uganda Case Study 
 RNE, MASP 2005-2008, 2008-2011, 2012-2015   
For reporting on results:  
 The World Bank (2009) Uganda Legal and Judicial Sector Study Report, 49701 
 JLOS Annual Performance Report 2011/12 (SIP II) 
 JLOS Annual Performance Report 2012/13 (SIP III) 
 JLOS Annual Performance Report 2013/14 (SIP III) 
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C2. Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) 
 
Name activity Deepening Democracy Programme DDP 
Activity number: 16653 
Country: Uganda 
Implementing 
organization: 
The DDP Basket Fund will be managed by a Programme Management Unit 
(PMU) within the Danida-HUGGO-office while Danida-HUGGO will be 
acting as the Programme Financial Management Agent (FMA). The overall 
(strategic) responsibility for the implementation of the DDP will lie with the 
Programme Steering Committee (PSC). 
Thematic area: Democratisation 
Focus: Strengthening democratic processes in Uganda 
Demand/supply: Combination 
support to country-led processes for deepening democracy and increasing 
public participation in decision making and building the capacity of those 
institutions that have the mandate to promote and safeguard such public 
participation. 
Period: 2007-2011 
Budget: There is a basket fund, administered by Danida-HUGGO. The division 
between donors is as follows: 
UK  $10 million (over five years) 
Ireland  $1 million (over three years) 
Denmark $4 million (over three years) 
Norway $2 million (over three years) 
Sweden  $2 million (over three years) 
Netherlands $2 million (over three years) 
Total  $21 million 
 
 
Modality:  
 
 
1. Project description and relevance 
 
Overview: 
 Project background/context (short): 
In 2006, Uganda moved towards a democratic system by introducing multi-party elections for the first 
time in over two and a half decades. The process faces a number of challenges such as weak and 
under-funded state institutions (especially those responsible for democratisation, e.g. the Electoral 
Commission and Parliament), corruption and governance problem at central and local level (lack of 
strong political will to fight corruption), weak political parties, civil society and media (to effectively 
hold government accountable), the existence and results of conflict in a number of areas (especially in 
the North and Karamoja).  
Development partners recognize the importance of supporting democratisation processes. These are 
complex and require multiple interventions to deepen the democracy trend in Uganda. Through the 
adoption of the DDP, development partners jointly developed a strategy for such interventions; these 
are aimed at exactly addressing the challenges faced by the key agents of democracy and focus on 
identified (possible) drivers of change within the Ugandan society. 
 Project objectives: 
The programme aims to support the democratisation process in a coherent, well-coordinated and 
effectively targeted way. 
The DDP has the dual strategy of supporting country-led processes aimed at increasing public 
participation in decision making and building the capacity of those institutions that have the mandate 
to promote and safeguard such public participation. 
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The Deepening Democracy Programme has five strategic objectives or components: 
(1) Enhancing the integrity of elections 
(2) Institutionalizing an effective multi-party political system 
(3) Strengthening parliamentary autonomy and oversight 
(4) Encouraging more active and participatory civic engagement  
(5) Strengthening a free media to promote accountability 
 
 Project activities/input: 
Around 30 partners have implemented projects under these components. 
- Support to the Electoral Commission, 
o Electoral Commission,  
o DEMGroup (Uganda Joint Christian Council  
o Transparency International- Uganda  
o ACFODE  
o Centre for Democratic Governance  
o JLOS  
o Uganda Law Society 
- The organisational development of political parties, 
o Political parties (FDC, DP, UPC, PPP, JEEMA, CP, PDP, SDP)  
o NIMD and participating IPOD parties (NRM, FDC, DP, UPC, CP, JEEMA)  
o Women in Democracy Group (UWONET, FOWODE, NAWOU, CEWIGO, ACFODE) 
- Support to parliamentary processes 
o Parliament 
o Association of West European Parliamentarians for Africa  
- Civil society  
o Uganda Human Rights Commission 
o Kabarole Research Centre 
o ActionAid (MS Uganda) 
o Inter-Religious Council of Uganda 
o Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform 
o National NGO Forum 
o Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda 
o African Leadership Institute 
o ACODE 
o Uganda Youth Network 
o Legal Action for People with Disabilities  
o International Alert-UNCCI 
- Media in democracy 
o Uganda Radio Network 
o PANOS East Africa 
o MEMONET 
o Makerere University, Department of Mass Communication 
o Art 29 Coalition 
o National Association of Broadcasters 
o African Centre for Media Excellence 
o Africa Freedom of Information Centre 
o Uganda Journalists Association 
 
 Primary beneficiaries: 
Different programme components aim at different target groups (political parties, media, electoral 
commission, parliamentarians, rural community development groups, etc.). Through working with 
them the entire population of Uganda is targeted. 
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 Secondary beneficiaries:  
see above 
 
 Identified stakeholders:  
see above 
 
Dutch good governance strategy: 
 Correspondence with Dutch efforts in the area of good governance? 
 If yes, in what way? 
Yes. The Netherlands has been an active donor in support of the democratisation process, resulting in 
the introduction of a multi-party system in Uganda. Now that democracy needs to be deepened in 
Uganda, The Netherlands keeps on playing an active role, again by joining hands with a number of 
other donors (Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, DFID), by way of contributing to the 
implementation of the DDP. 
 
Coherence: 
 Correspondence with governance challenges and opportunities in the country? 
 Correspondence with MFS (co-financing program) supported governance interventions? 
 Correspondence with governance interventions financed by other donors? 
Yes, see above 
 
 
2. Results 
 
Construction matrix of results: 
 
Table 1. Intervention logic 
Input 2 million EUR 
Through-put    
Outputs    
Outcomes    
Impact  
Source: constructed on the basis of project appraisal document [BEMO]/ project documentation 
 
Legend: 
 Result as defined in the project appraisal document [BEMO] 
 Result reconstructed based on project appraisal document 
[BEMO]/ project documentation 
 
Description realization of results: 
 Description realization of output: 
 Description realization of (intermediate) outcome: 
 Description realization of final outcome: 
 Realisation of results 
From the End-term evaluation report 2011, Deepening Democracy programme Uganda, by IDP 
“The programme only took off by mid-2009 and was implemented over a period of 2-2½ years, which 
is a very short time to show clear outcomes and impacts of a program of this character. Available 
review reports on some of the interventions provide some relevant information but little about 
outcomes. In other cases highly relevant information on the context is provided but it is not possible 
to establish effectiveness links between the data provided and the interventions supported by DDP. In 
addition, some studies and evaluations had not been completed at the time of this end-term evaluation. 
The evaluation of results, therefore, centres to a large extent on outputs and seeks on this basis to 
draw conclusions on outcomes where it seems safe and justified to do so.” (p 5) 
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Enhancing integrity of elections: 
- Contribution to increased voter registration through support to the development of new guidelines 
and materials for the Registration Appeals Tribunals and training of trainers, the publication of 
new Registration Appeals Tribunals manuals and ‘Top up’ allowances for display and tribunal 
officials.  
- Contribution towards credibility of election results by supporting the purchase of the Electronic 
Results Transmission and Dissemination System (ERTDS), which ensured that results were 
tallied and relayed in a transparent manner.  
- The Electoral Committee made efforts to engage all the political parties in planning and other 
processes.  
- CSO engagement in monitoring the electoral process through the DEMGROUP  
 
Institutionalizing an effective multi-party political system 
- Contribution towards the parties being more competitive.  
- Contribution towards the parties being more structured  
- Contribution to increased dialogue between the political parties and in particular making the NRM 
party part of this dialogue. 
 
Strengthening parliamentary autonomy and oversight   
- Providing the Shadow cabinet, parliamentary committees and associations with the resources 
needed to make informed analysis and oversight of government policies and legislation 
- Training of staff of Parliament 
 
Encouraging more active and participatory civic engagement 
- The Citizens’ Manifesto involving a large number of rights holders and reaching a  very wide 
audience.  
- A comprehensive but not so well coordinated voter education-cum-civic education program was 
delivered by a multitude of CSOs  
- Monitoring of local level duty bearers contributed to improve service delivery  
- CSO capacity to engage in policy advocacy has been enhanced One of the CSO outputs is the local 
government scorecard to assess performance and help hold local government accountable 
(ACODE) 
 
Strengthening a free media to promote accountability 
- URN has been enabled to provide more citizens with reliable and impartial news  
- Improved approaches to participatory broadcasting in development communication  
Under all components challenges remained, such as lack of cooperation among stakeholders, internal 
wrangles, lack of capacity for planning and budgeting. 
 
Differential impact on men and women: 
As part of the strengthening of parliamentary autonomy and oversight, the Uganda Women’s 
Parliamentary Association (UWOPA) succeeded in having the Domestic Violence and Female Genital 
Mutilation (FGM) bills eventually being passed into law.  
 Possible differential impact taken into account? 
 If yes, in what way? 
 Description of possible differential impact: 
 
Description unexpected/unintended results: 
N/a 
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3. Main findings and conclusion 
 
Relevance (ex ante): 
N/a 
 
Effectiveness: 
 IDP End-term evaluation report 2011: 
Overall Conclusions (p 52/53) 
“The Evaluation Team does not hesitate to conclude that overall programme performance has been 
good and results have been achieved at a satisfactory level. 
The programme (-) was timely and highly relevant. Alignment with official national policy priorities, 
the inclusion of all major actors, the ability to respond to changes in the context, and the flexibility to 
meet unforeseen needs and demands all contribute to ensuring a high degree of relevance.”  
Programme support to the Election Commission was justified irrespective of prevailing scepticism 
about the EC’s integrity and impartiality. DDP support cannot – and has not – eliminated this 
scepticism but it has contributed to improving the overall performance of the EC. 
DDP support to political parties (-) has struck the necessary balance and has gradually contributed to 
producing the planned outputs and thereby provided a strong foundation for future organisational 
development of the political parties. Overall, progress was good and the results satisfactory. 
DDP support to Parliament provided the Shadow cabinet, parliamentary committees and associations 
with the resources needed for them to make informed analysis and oversight of government policies 
and legislation. The training of staff of Parliament enhanced their capacity to provide more effective 
support to MPs. Overall, progress and results were satisfactory. 
Support under the Civic Engagement component included a large number of actors and a multitude of 
interventions. (-) but most of the planned outputs have been produced to a satisfactory extent and, in 
some cases, to a very satisfactory extent. However, progress towards improved internal CSO 
governance has been limited and there is still a great need to improve the coordination of civic 
education programmes and projects. Voter turnout was lower than targeted but the target of ‘Increased 
and broad participation of CSOs in engaging leaders, representing citizen concerns and demanding 
accountability’ was met. The Evaluation Team ventures the opinion that achievements have been 
good overall and that platforms have been established to enhance the democratic development along 
the lines presented in the component objectives. 
Results in the media component have been mixed. There are few results to show in relation to 
freedom of expression and only a little in respect of capacity building for selected media and training 
in investigative journalism. In contrast, there has been good progress on the quality of news and 
programming on independent radio stations, and research on media coverage of the election process 
progressed reasonably well after a reconfiguration of approach and focus. ‘Guidelines for Media 
Coverage of Elections in Uganda’ were produced as planned but little is known about their actual use. 
Thus, overall component results have been fair.” 
 Draft programme completion report 2012: (author and status unknown) 
The rating for the overall goal of improved democratic governance in Uganda is “less than 
satisfactory”. 
“DDP contributed to some of the noted positive aspects in Uganda’s governance and electoral 
processes in recent years. Without DDP involvement and support, it is highly unlikely that the EC’s 
electronic results transmission system would have been implemented, that the ‘Honour Your Vote’ 
multi-media campaign on electoral participation would have taken place, that Presidential candidates 
would have faced questions from a citizens’ audience on national TV or even that the nascent 
dialogue between political parties in IPOD would have gotten off the ground. However, DDP cannot 
claim to be the sole cause of these achievements. DDP rather helped transform some incipient ideas 
into reality, added to some existing plans and/or enhanced the quality of some existing ambitions, 
acting as a ‘catalyst’ or ‘accelerator’ for such projects. (p 52) 
A significant portion of DDP-supported interventions were directed at citizens’ themselves: 
improving their level of information, their knowledge of political processes, their ability to take action 
as a result. Results show that DDP-supported interventions achieved high levels of awareness, but that 
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their impact in influencing changed attitudes or behaviour cannot be established, possibly due to their 
short-term nature. (p 52) 
 
Reasons for (in)effectiveness: 
(Draft programme completion report 2012:56) 
The political culture in Uganda: The centralization and personalization of executive power, the 
linkage of the ruling party with state organs, the affiliation of security agencies with the ruling party 
and patronage politics have persisted during the period of DDP implementation. Lack of timeliness in 
decision making, lack of cooperation among stakeholders, lack of capacity for proper planning. 
“The main assumption driving the DDP is that Uganda remains fundamentally committed to the 
democratic path and that foreign aid can make a difference in moving the country forward. It would 
have probably been more accurate and realistic to assume that Ugandan citizens remain committed to 
democracy (as evidenced in Afrobarometer surveys) and that certain individuals / institutions / 
organizations are actively promoting improvements in democratic governance, even if they are 
countered by regime survival interests that can lead to anti-democratic measures. In such an 
environment, foreign support like the DDP’s can make a difference, if it is well targeted and 
supportive of existing intentions by ‘agents of change’, whether in the state or non-state sector. It 
cannot however fundamentally affect the direction and nature of the political process.”  
 Influence of other factors: 
Multitude of political culture related factors + novelty of need to work together 
 Contribution to ultimate governance objectives: 
Hopefully forthcoming but fragile and limited  
 
Lesson: 
IDP evaluation (2011:51) 
Influencing democratic practice, values and culture is a long-term process that is influenced by a 
number of factors, many of which are beyond the control of the programme and its partners. It is 
therefore important to set realistic targets, and to review them regularly.  
Consciously limiting the PMU’s role to “technical support”, as opposed to engaging directly in policy 
discussions contributes to credibility of the programme and a sense of impartiality. This does not rule 
out timely sparring and coaching.  
(Draft programme completion report 2012:57) 
The ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ framework has proven useful, future programming should be more 
oriented towards ‘demand-side’ interventions for two main reasons. “The first is that the current 
ambivalent status of democratic governance processes and institutions makes supply-side 
interventions, particularly targeting state actors, more difficult. The second reason, which follows 
from the first, is that ‘demand’ side interventions such as access to quality information, civic 
education or governance accountability initiatives not only respond to people’s expressed wishes (cf. 
Afrobarometer and other surveys), but also will likely be undertaken by partners more receptive to 
external assistance and are more likely to lead to democratic progress in Uganda’s ‘mixed picture’ 
context.  
 
4. Sources 
 
Documents: DDP file in IOB file 0.3. Democratization – 01. Project information:  
16653 DDP Basket, Logical Framework Civic engagement component, Multiparty system logframe, 
Parliament Logframe, DDP Logframe,  
Draft Programme Completion report, version July 6 2012 (author and status unknown) 
Final DDP Evaluation report 2011 (IDP 2011, End Term Evaluation Report, Deepening Democracy 
Programme Uganda) 
 
  
132 
 
C3. Local Government Development Programme II (LGDP II) 
 
Activity description 
Name activity  Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) II 
Activity number: 1585 
Country: Uganda 
Implementing 
organization: 
GoU 
Thematic area: decentralisation 
Focus: support to local government institutions 
Demand/supply: supply 
Period:  05-29-2003 until 06-30-2007 
Budget: total costs at appraisal: US$165 million 
World Bank credit – US$ 50 million 
World Bank grant –  US$ 75 million 
Netherlands – US$ 15 million 
 
World Bank disbursed XDR 91.7mn,  
Co-financing and Other External Partners: Government of Netherlands - 
US$15mn; Republic of Ireland - US$7.5mn; DANIDA - US$1.8mn; Austria 
Development Corporation - US$0.3mn; GoU/LGs - US$14.8mn. 
 
Modality:  
 
 
1. Project description and relevance 
 
Overview: 
 Project background/context (short): 
The Second Local Government Development Project (LGDP II) was designed and implemented 
within the broader context of the PEAP and UJAS. LG reforms in Uganda started in 1992 with the 
decentralization policy pronouncement. Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), a medium-term 
development plan that guides government policy and provides a framework for detailed sector and 
Local Governments (LGs) planning. The PEAP was first drafted in 1997, revised in March/April 2000 
and the summary presented to the Boards of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund in May 
2000 as Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The third PEAP (2004-2007) focused on 
four key pillars: (i) creating an enabling environment for economic growth and structural 
transformation; (ii) ensuring good governance and security; including improvement in public service 
delivery and decentralization; (iii) directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes; 
and (iv) improving the quality of life of the poor. 
 Project objectives: 
The project development objective was to improve local government's institutional performance for 
sustainable and decentralized service delivery. 
The Key Indicators were: (i) 75 percent of Local Governments (LGs) with a three year rolling 
development plan; (ii) 75 percent of Higher Local Governments (HLGs) submitted final accounts on 
time to the Office of the Auditor General; and (iii) 35 percent of LGs registering 20 percent increase 
in their own revenue (taxes, user charges and fees) from the baseline year 2002/03. 
 Project activities/input: 
The project had five components: 
1 - Support for the Decentralization Process  
2 - Local Development Grant (LDG)  
3 - Local Government Capacity Building  
4 - Local Government Revenue Enhancement 
5 - Support to Project Implementation 
133 
 
 
 Primary beneficiaries: 
The primary target groups of the project were the local governments and their institutions and 
constituencies, as well as private contractors for implementation of the substantial parts of the local 
government program. 
 
 Secondary beneficiaries: 
N/a 
 
 Identified stakeholders: 
N/a 
 
Dutch good governance strategy: 
 Correspondence with Dutch efforts in the area of good governance? 
 If yes, in what way? 
 
Coherence: 
 Correspondence with governance challenges and opportunities in the country? 
 Correspondence with MFS (co-financing program) supported governance interventions? 
 Correspondence with governance interventions financed by other donors? 
 
 
2. Results 
 
Construction matrix of results: 
 
Table 1. Intervention logic 
Input … EUR 
Through-put    
Outputs    
Outcomes    
Impact  
Source: constructed on the basis of project appraisal document [BEMO]/ project documentation 
 
Legend: 
 Result as defined in the project appraisal document [BEMO] 
 Result reconstructed based on project appraisal document 
[BEMO]/ project documentation 
 
Description realization of results: 
 Description realization of output: 
 Description realization of (intermediate) outcome: 
 Description realization of final outcome: 
 
We have three documents describing the results of the LGDP II: 
 Slotdocument LGDP LGSIP.pdf (March 2010) 
In the Slotdocument LGDP LGSIP.pdf the RNE looks back at both LGSIP and its predecessor LGDP, 
recognizing that LGSIP quickly ran into serious problems but that there were achievements for 
LGDP. (It is similar to slotdocument 1585.pfd in Dossier van map LGPD ii_1585) 
- LGDP was able to partly achieve its objective of improving local government institutional 
performance for decentralised service delivery.  
- The functional capacity of local governments has improved: they are now able to prepare and 
submit annual final accounts.  
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- A system of annual assessments on good and poor performance was developed, with multiple 
ripple effects, e.g. the quantity and quality of infrastructure in the countryside has significantly 
increased.  
- Local governments can now plan and manage the delivery of services to the population, with 
increased participation by the people.  
- The LGDP was instrumental in developing the Local Government Sector Investment Plan. 
The LGDP was unable to resolve the lack of sustainability of the decentralisation system as a whole, 
arising from inadequate financing of local governments and a weak finance and revenue base. 
Dependence on central and donor resources continued to exist. The creation of 24 additional districts 
during LGDP II further complicated the situation. 
One of the key lessons from LGDP for the RNE is: 
“Without sound political support there is no meaningful local revenue generation and without 
meaningful local revenue there can be no meaningful decentralisation”. 
 World Bank Implementation and Completion Report LGDP II 2008 
The ICR Outcome rating for LGDP II was satisfactory. Project implementation was facilitated by a 
project implementation unit, which was fairly well integrated with the MoLG. However, government 
policy shifts during the project period offered three substantial challenges:  
- Government established new local governments 
- Graduated Tax (G Tax) was abolished 
- Owner-occupied houses were exempted from paying Rates 
 World Bank IEG 2014 Project performance assessment report: (ex-post evaluation exercise) 
pp ix-x 
“The project was initially successful in building administrative capacity of Local Governments and 
supported over 30,000 sub-projects in several sectors. However, such improved administrative 
capacity has been underutilized due to substantial policy reversals since 2005. Institutional 
performance of Local Government started to deteriorate from 2007, as shown by the results of annual 
national assessments carried out by the Ministry of Local Government. The 2008 National 
Assessment, carried out immediately after project closing, showed that only 84 local governments out 
of the national total 1105 at the time earned rewards, while 931 were penalized, due to declining 
quality of record keeping, meagre revenue collection, weak budgeting and planning, widespread use 
of force accounts against procurement regulations, and a more general lack of interest in the national 
assessment itself. 
The policy reversals started in 2005 have included near elimination of local revenue base, reduction of 
transfers to Local Governments, increased percentage of conditional grants, and creation of new 
districts, mostly for political patronage as shown by several studies on this topic. These reversals have 
been hindering service delivery and value for money, as noted in the latest Bank’s Country Assistance 
Strategy, leading to a weakening of Local Governments’ discretionary powers, a centralization of 
functions and resources, and a reduction of available financial and human resources at district level. 
Each new district increases the administrative costs, takes away staff of existing ones and reduces 
resources available for service delivery, creating a high administrative burden at the district level, 
with wages consuming a large and increasing share of total expenditures, leaving insufficient funding 
for non-wage needs. 
The combination of these factors has made the progress achieved under the project not sustainable, 
and affected the quality of service delivery. As the project’s development objective was to improve 
the Local Government institutional performance for sustainable, decentralized service delivery, this 
Review concludes that the achievement of objectives was Modest. The initial improvements in the 
institutional performance of Local Governments were not sustainable and are currently at a high risk 
of being reversed due to the new Government of Uganda’s attitude towards decentralization, although 
there have been some positive developments recently like the moratorium on the creation of new 
districts decided by Cabinet in March 2013. Lack of funds for operations and maintenance has 
subsequently led to the progressive erosion of the initial improvements in quality of management, and 
infrastructure.” 
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Differential impact on men and women: 
 Possible differential impact taken into account? 
No, it is said that “gender is included in objectives and assessment criteria” (Appraisal doc LGDP II) 
 If yes, in what way? 
 Description of possible differential impact: 
 
Description unexpected/unintended results: 
 
3. Main findings and conclusion 
See above 
 
Relevance (ex ante): 
 
Effectiveness: 
 
Reasons for (in)effectiveness: 
 Influence of other factors: 
 Contribution to ultimate governance objectives: 
 
 
4. Sources 
Documents: the three reports mentioned above, plus appraisal documents in IOB files LGDP and 
LGSIP 
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Appendix D: PARP survey vignettes and interview questions 
 
D1. PARP survey vignettes  
 
Case 1 
A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from 
merchants on his duty. She does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the 
generosity of those who give gifts to her. 
 
Case 2 
The police officer Godfrey stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a 
personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not taking the offending 
motorist to court to answer to charges for the traffic offence. 
 
Case 3 
The police officer Glory discovers a burglary of a general merchandise shop. The display 
cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the 
shop, she takes 10 jerricans of cooking oil and 1 sack of posho of 100 kilograms worth about 
a month’s pay for that officer. She reports that the items had been stolen during the burglary. 
 
Case 4 
Mary goes to the police station to report a case where her husband has been beating her for 
the last one year. She lost one of her teeth and has a damaged eye due to the beating. The 
police officer on duty thinks this is a mere family dispute and not a crime for the police to 
handle. He refuses to register the case. 
 
Case 5 
A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during 
coming holidays. The supervisor Catherine offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to 
repair her personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behaviour. 
 
Case 6 
At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He 
sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the 
vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously drunk. He also finds that the 
driver is a police officer. He transports the driver to her home. Evaluate the behaviour of the 
police officer on duty. 
 
Case 7 
A formerly arrested man comes to the police station and wants to fill in a complaint form. He 
claims that he was not treated properly during his arrest. The police officer Sarah who is in 
charge laughs at him and sends him away. 
 
Case 8 
Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into a shop. The 
man flees. They chase him for about ½ a kilometre before apprehending him by tackling him 
and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple 
of times in the stomach and step on his back several times as punishment for fleeing and 
resisting. 
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Case 9 
A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money equivalent to 
a full day’s pay for that officer. She reports the wallet as lost property but keeps the money 
for herself. 
 
Case 10 
A police officer on duty receives a woman who wants to register a case of murder of her child 
by a neighbour. The officer registers the case and promises to follow up and arrest the suspect 
in a few hours’ time. Two days down the road, the suspect has not been arrested and was 
sending messages threatening to harm the complainant. The woman went back to the same 
police station to report the scenario and the suspect was arrested and detained at the police 
station. However, the suspect was released immediately on account that there was not enough 
evidence to convict him. Evaluate the behaviour of the police officer who first received the 
woman. 
 
Case 11 
A subdistrict has a challenge of water shortage for a period of four months. The area leader 
together with residents decide to petition national water for the poor services and failure to 
deliver. However, the situation continues for two more months. The area leader and the 
residents opt to stage a peaceful demonstration as a way of showing their dissatisfaction. No 
sooner had the demonstration started than the District Police Commander deployed a team of 
officers with teargas and firing of live ammunitions killing 20 of the demonstrators including 
the area leader. Evaluate the District Police Commander’s behaviour. 
 
Case 12 
Samwel goes to a police station to register a complaint over one of their officers who had 
beaten and tortured him. At the station he finds a friend of the officer who tortured him. The 
friend refuses to register his complaint and instead decides to detain him for a week over 
giving false information to the police. Evaluate the behaviour of the friend. 
 
 
D2. PARP interview questions 
 
1.  What are the current challenges of policing? 
2.  Could you describe a normal work day? 
3. In your daily work do you encounter complaints about the police? Which types of 
complaints do you find? 
4. How then do you deal with the complaints? 
5. In this region, how do you go about charging individuals for crime? 
6. What do you consider an ideal procedure? 
7. Where do you see room for improving the quality of policing? How could this be 
achieved? 
8. Is there any particular professional situation that you remember where you were 
particularly proud of your reaction or behaviour? Explain 
9. Is there any particular professional situation that you remember where you were 
particularly disappointed/embarrassed of your reaction or behaviour? Explain 
10. In your opinion, what worked well during implementation of the PARP project with 
HURINET in terms of strategies, interaction, coordination, etc.? 
138 
 
11. If you were to implement this or a similar project with HURINET, what would you wish 
to be improved in implementation? 
12. What kind of positive changes to the Ugandan Police Force do you see as a result of 
implementing the PARP project with HURINET? 
13. What kind of negative changes to the Ugandan Police Force do you see as a result of 
implementing the PARP project with HURINET? 
14. Are there unintended consequence you see that came as a result of this project? 
15. Do you think the police achieved its objectives of enhancing accountability? What 
concrete achievements in the project would you somehow tag to the improvement in 
accountability? 
16. What did you appreciate most as Ugandan Police Force about the PARP? How can its 
relevance be increased? 
17. Going forward, what do you think CSOs should focus on in working with the police on 
accountability issues? 
18. Of the results achieved in the last five years, which ones are likely to be sustained? What 
do you see as sustainability challenges? 
